Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

49. Draft Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Paris, July 11, 1957¹

Paris, July 11, 1957

SUBJECT

• Summary of Conversation With General Ely in Paris, France, 11 July 1957

1. My 11 July 1957 conversation with General Ely was based on the following agenda:

a. Item 1—New weapons for the French Army.

(1) Towards what date can France expect to receive the new equipment, Honest John in particular? France hopes that this may be as early as possible.

(2) Will U.S. assistance in this field to France be continued and perhaps increased, as to quantity and quality?

(3) A U.S. production mission was to go to France shortly. Is this still to take place and around what date?

(4) What are the weapons whose production in France might be envisaged?

b. Item 2—Establishment of integrated depots for atomic weapons in Europe.

(1) Under what condition would the atomic weapons to be used by the French Forces be placed at their disposal?

(2) Where would the depots be installed?

(3) What should the characteristics of these depots be?

c. Item 3—Equilibrium between modern and conventional weapons for Western defense.

(1) How, within the framework of NATO strategy, can the problem of limited conflicts be envisaged?

(2) What would be the consequences on the utilization of atomic weapons?

2. Present in addition to General Ely and myself were:

• Lt. General Lavaud, Advisor to the Defense Minister of France and Technical Advisor on Atomic Energy
• Colonel De Rougemont, Staff Assistant to General Ely
• Captain R. M. Pitts, USN, JMAAG, Joint Staff, JCS
• Colonel W. B. Rosson, USA, Chairman’s Staff Group
• Lt. Colonel Philip Cocke, USA, Interpreter, Hq, Allied Forces, Central Europe

3. General Ely confined his discussion under the first item largely to an expression of concern over indefinite dates for delivery of Honest John units and initiation of training for a French Nike cadre in the United States. In connection with Honest John, the French plan to establish a technician’s school of their own, even though they understand our plan to use the “buddy system” for training with U.S. units in Europe. I advised him not to establish the school pending receipt from me of further information on delivery dates (action assigned to the Joint Staff on 16 July 1957). With respect to Nike, I indicated that I would confirm October 1957 as the date for commencement of French training in the United States (action assigned to the Joint Staff on 16 July 1957).

4. In the Matador field General Ely requested an increase of from one to three Matador squadrons, citing the need for “the best functioning entity” as his reason. I stated that I had no authority to change the number (request referred to the Joint Staff on 16 July 1957). He also questioned me as to whether a February 1957 request by the French for 4 Nike battalions, 3 Corporal/Sergeant battalions, plus one battalion and 14 batteries of Honest John, could be met. I told him that while future military aid programs will probably not be large enough to permit fulfillment of this request on a grant aid basis, and that while Congress will be less disposed toward grant aid, reimbursable aid might be increasingly available.

5. In what I believe to be the first time such a question has been raised with an official of the United States, General Ely next alluded to our IRBM agreement with the U.K., and asked whether the French could obtain as a deterrent weapon and by purchase if necessary, a ground-to-ground missile of 3000-km range such as furnished the U.K.? France desires our IRBM in order to avoid the cost of her own research in this field. Furthermore, according to General Ely, the risk of limited war in Europe is greater as long as modem weapons are in the hands of the U.S. alone. This stems from the belief of many that the Soviets may be successful in separating the U.S. from her European Allies with resultant failure of the U.S. to intervene in such a war. With modem weapons in the hands of the European Allies, however, the Soviets will think twice before embarking on a limited war in Europe. I commented that while I agree that modem weapons should be in the hands of France as part of the NATO deterrent, I do not agree with the possibility of limited war with the USSR. He then stated that what I had said was of highest interest since it confirmed the direction of French defense policy.

6. As for the method by which the French might present a request for IRBM to the United States, I suggested that it would be preferable to use the Minister of Defense–Secretary of Defense channel. I have the definite impression that the French intend to push forward on this subject. Advance thought and preparation will be required on the U.S. side.

7. Turning to the subject of production of new weapons in France, General Lavaud reviewed the sequence of events concerning the recent SDMICC survey of French security and expressed concern over what the French interpreted as undue delay in receipt of the report and in the follow-on visit of the production survey team. I explained the requirements involved in processing the SDMICC report and indicated that the French should receive word thereon shortly. General Ely wished to know whether agreements would have to be signed between the two countries. I indicated that certain conditions might have to be met by France, after which the production security team would appear. General Ely expressed satisfaction with this explanation.

8. On the second agenda item General Ely asked when the results of the U.S. study on the NATO atomic stockpile concept would be available. I explained that State and Defense are progressing with the study, the principal feature of which relates to what we can do under the U.S. law. General Ely then alluded to three draft agreements on atomic storage sites and exchange of atomic information passed by the French Embassy to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris in June of this year (I had scanned these papers at the Ambassador’s residence earlier that same day).² The three exchanges constitute an entity which the French do not desire to split. I pointed out that the U.S. study could be much more specific now that State possessed the French proposals, but expressed doubt that we could earmark specific numbers of atomic weapons for France in advance.

9. General Lavaud injected his concern over the importance, from the viewpoint of internal French politics, of obtaining important concessions for France in return for U.S. storage sites on French territory. I reminded him and General Ely that we are faced not only with some political problems of our own, but also with the problem of having every other ally at our doorstep the moment we enter into a special relationship with France.

10. To his inquiry as to whether he could be furnished information on the infra-structure involved in atomic storage sites, I recommended to General Ely that he request this material from Deputy USCINCEUR.

11. In connection with the final agenda topic, equilibrium between modern and conventional weapons for Western defense, General Ely led off by stating that he did not consider limited conflict possible in NATO Europe. I agreed. He then added that disassociation of atomic weapons from conventional weapons is becoming more and more theoretical. I agreed, adding that the December 1956 NATO Council meeting had convinced me that the Political Directive paragraph on limited actions caused great confusion.³ I explained that limited actions were really a function of time. As in the case of some of the Israeli raids against Jordan, for example, the operations were terminated by daylight at which time the attacking forces had returned to their own side of the border. If, under like circumstances, fighting continues after daylight, the opposing air forces will get into action and the war will spread rapidly. I ventured the opinion that Berlin is the only place in NATO Europe in which a limited action might develop. General Ely agreed.

12. Moving to a definition of the NATO shield in Europe, General Ely went through a rather tedious and confusing argument that the shield must be sufficiently strong to give the Soviets the firm impression that by infiltration tactics they can’t displace it back to the Atlantic. I stressed that the shield must be understood as comprising the total NATO offensive and defensive strength in both Europe and America, with U.S. atomic retaliatory strength constituting the main element—the one feared most by the Soviets. General Ely agreed, but only after calling attention to his concern over the effect of U.K. force reductions in weakening the shield. I injected the contention that as long as the USSR is convinced that the U.S. will use its power against them if they attack in Europe, they will be forced to attack the U.S. first. Referring to some of Adenauer’s statements which have served to cast doubt on whether the U.S. will employ atomic weapons in behalf of our European Allies, I emphasized that, in my estimation, such a development is not possible.

13. In connection with budget problems, I discussed the responsibilities of military leaders to assist their governments in maintaining a sound economy as opposed to asking for the sky in an effort to insure against all contingencies. General Ely agreed and went on to speak in serious vein of the psychological importance to Europeans of continued presence of U.S. troops on the Continent to convince the Soviets that we will intervene in event of attack. I reminded him that when we augmented our European deployments beginning in 1950, we had stated they wouldn’t stay forever. We have six divisions in Europe and may keep them there a long time. The composition of these units will change, however. And, too, certain other countries, such as Germany, can provide troops at a faster rate than now contemplated. If the German proportion of men under arms corresponded to ours they would have 1.5 million men in service. Furthermore, our men serve two years. Finally, we must concern ourselves not only with Europe, but with the rest of our roughly one million men deployed around the world. They generate difficult political and status of forces problems. General Ely asserted that France has similar problems. Her term of military service is 27–30 months with no exemptions other than illness. She has 700,000 troops abroad.

14. I ended this particular exchange by citing increasing Congressional concern over the strength of U.S. forces overseas vis-à-vis indigenous strength, the trend in our aid programs to place reliance upon our Allies for ground forces and their support, the impossibility from a cost standpoint of adding the capabilities of each new weapon to the present level of forces instead of seeking compensatory reductions. Over the next 5–10 years, as we divide the budget between the Army, Navy and Air Force, there will be less for the Army and Navy and for support of our forces overseas.

15. As a final point before talking privately with him at his request,⁴ I told General Ely that one of the most dangerous developments I know of relates to talk of the possibility of war with the Communists in which atomic weapons would not be used. I asserted that much of this talk is generated by the Communists themselves as a deliberate maneuver. We cannot, however, stretch our limited means to cover plans for both limited and atomic war. Our greatest hope for no war is unquestioned atomic power and the determination to use it. General Ely agreed.

1. Source: Naval Historical Center, Radford Papers, Memos for the Record. Top Secret. Drafted by Radford. A verbatim account of this conversation, dated July 15, is ibid.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. A copy of the draft Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 822. Documentation on the December 1956 NAC meeting is in volume IV.
4. A memorandum of this conversation between General Ely and Admiral Radford on disarmament and Algeria, July 18, is in the Naval Historical Center, Radford Papers, Memos for the Record.