Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

43. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to France (Houghton), Department of State, Washington, April 1, 1957¹

Washington, April 1, 1957

SUBJECT

• Current Problems Facing France

Ambassador Houghton stated that this would be his last visit to Washington before leaving for Paris² and he wished to say goodbye to the Secretary and get any last-minute guidance the Secretary wished to give him.

The Secretary stated he thought it would be important for the Ambassador, prior to his departure, to see the Vice President with regard to one of France’s principal problems, namely, Algeria. The Vice President had returned from his recent trip to Africa with very positive ideas in this connection.³ He felt that there was no solution to the problem other than independence and that the longer the French resisted the inevitable, the worse the situation and final result would be. The adjacent countries of Morocco and Tunisia were in general favorably disposed towards France, but the continuation of the Algerian conflict was having an adverse effect on relations between France and her former protectorates.

With regard to the second major problem, that of the balance of payments, the Secretary thought that there was not much that the United States could do. The essence of the present difficulty was French unwillingness to face up to the situation and to adopt the internal reforms necessary to counter the deteriorating trend.

Ambassador Houghton stated that from what he had learned, it certainly seemed to him that the French would first have to start tightening their belts. He wondered, however, whether plans might be made for the possibility of the United States stepping in to help out at a point that we judged might be both necessary and appropriate.

The Secretary thought it would be a good idea in this connection for the Ambassador to discuss the situation with the Secretary of the Treasury. He said that Baumgartner, Governor of the Bank of France, had told Mr. Bowie at the last OEEC meeting in February⁴ that he hoped the United States “was not going to bail France out of its present difficulties.” The Secretary thought this statement reflected the attitude of the more responsible people in France; it was natural, on the other hand, for the politicians to put off difficult decisions of this nature.

The Secretary expressed some concern regarding the stability of the Mollet Government and stated he hoped the Government would not fall before ratification of the Common Market and EURATOM treaties was completed. He felt that after the French Parliament’s rejection of the EDC, the United States would take a very dim view of French failure to ratify the Common Market and EURATOM.

The Secretary said, in connection with French financial difficulties and the upcoming ratification debates, that French Ambassador Alphand had put forth the “personal” suggestion that the United States might be disposed to assist France financially within the framework of the Common Market, once the treaty had been ratified.⁵ It was true, the Secretary stated, that the United States through the Export-Import Bank had provided a loan to the Coal and Steel Community at its outset in order to show our support. He did not know, however, whether either the Common Market or EURATOM would merit United States financial assistance—or assistance in such a form as to be helpful to France. It was possible, nevertheless, that if the French were to initiate vigorous measures and thereby gain our confidence as to their determination to solve their problems, as in the case of the United Kingdom, we might then revise our thinking as to financial assistance.

The Secretary stated that while his plans were not yet definite, he was now contemplating going to the next NATO Ministerial Meeting.⁶ He had not originally intended to go, but he thought failure on his part to attend the first NATO Ministerial Meeting to be held at Bonn might be subject to misunderstandings. If he did decide to go to Bonn, it was likely that he might subsequently visit Paris to attend one day of the regional conference of the Western European Ambassadors.⁷

Ambassador Houghton inquired as to the advisability of his seeing Jean Monnet from time to time in Paris. The Secretary said that while Monnet was an old friend of his and he had considerable admiration for him, he thought that it would be a mistake if the impression were gained that United States policy with regard to France was influenced in any way by Jean Monnet. Because of his ardent espousal of European causes, Monnet had gained many enemies in France. Moreover, in view of Monnet’s enthusiasm for any project with which he was associated and his very persuasive talents, his views should be taken with a certain amount of reserve. There was, therefore, no reason not to see Monnet, the Secretary concluded, but it might be better if he were not to become an habitué of the Embassy.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/4–157. Confidential. Drafted by Matthew Looram.
2. Houghton was appointed on March 14 and presented his credentials on April 17.
3. For Vice President Nixon’s report of his 3-week African tour, February 28–March 21, 1957, see vol. XVIII, p. 57.
4. A Ministerial meeting of the OEEC Council was held in Paris, February 12–13, 1957.
5. Ambassador Alphand made this suggestion during a conversation with Secretary Dulles on February 8. A memorandum of that conversation, February 11, is in Department of State, Central Files, 851.10/2–1157.
6. The Secretary attended the NATO Council meetings in Bonn, May 2–3, 1957.
7. For documentation on the Conference of Ambassadors, Paris, May 6–8, 1957, see vol. IV, pp. 571 ff.