39. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1
SUBJECT
- Visit of French Prime Minister Guy Mollet
I believe that our primary objective in French Prime Minister Mollet’s visit here is psychological—to create an atmosphere both in private and in public which indicates the restoration of normal and friendly relations between France and the United States, without reviving the “Big Three” concept. It will not be possible or necessary to come to an agreement with Mollet on all the matters that will be discussed or to make an attempt to align or coordinate our policies in all areas of the world. It is hoped, however, that there might be an overall understanding on major world issues and an appreciation and comprehension on the part of the French as to our policies and aims on certain specific issues outside Europe which are of interest to the French.
Most of the subjects which Mollet has proposed for the agenda, which is enclosed,2 are broad and general in scope. What he apparently wants principally is a frank exchange of views on world issues and thereby, a greater understanding between France and the United States. In his first conversation with you alone on Tuesday morning, February 26, Mollet may review the background and circumstances of the French military intervention in Suez. We have been informed in this connection that Mollet was very disappointed that it did not prove [Page 105] feasible for Eden and himself to visit you here immediately following the cessation of this operation. Apart from this matter, I do not believe that it is his intention to get into contentious issues.
As a confirmed Socialist, Mollet probably has doubts personally as to the long-term value of American capitalism, at least as applied to other areas of the world, but he is basically sound on East-West issues, strongly pro-NATO, a vigorous advocate of European unity and has always been pro-American. The Mollet Government has been in office for more than a year, a long period in French politics, and he will probably soon be faced with increasing opposition in Parliament. However, even if he is overthrown, Mollet as the leader of the strongest non-Communist party in France can be expected to continue to exercise a strong influence on the French political scene.
On the majority of topics on the agenda—European problems, “Eurafrica”, Communism, policies with regard to less-developed areas—Mollet will probably do most of the talking, particularly with regard to recent progress made on EURATOM and the Common Market. His views are expected to be generally in consonance with our own. With regard to the British proposal to reduce UK NATO forces in Germany, you may wish to stress the importance you attach to the maintenance of effective and sufficient “shield” forces. It might also be appropriate to refer to the fact that we are programming dual-purpose weapons for our NATO allies and hope to announce shortly in NATO that we will initiate training in the use of these weapons. It is planned that the French forces would be singled out on a high priority basis for a training project (nuclear weapons delivery training for selected French fighter-bomber units).
The French concept of “Eurafrica”, a close inter-relationship and inter-dependence of Western Europe and Africa, is an ambitious but meritorious idea, which may be a device for transferring the present colonial relationship into a partnership on more equal terms. The possibilities of its concrete realization are impossible to predict at this time and would in any event seem considerably far off. The French are now contributing to the political, social and economic progress of their “Black African” territories. However, the Algerian conflict, unless soon resolved, will pose a serious obstacle to this scheme, insofar as North Africa is concerned. While encouraging a forward-looking policy by the Europeans towards Africa, we should not, I think, make any commitments as to U.S. participation or association in such a program.
U.S. assistance in the UN debate on Algeria contributed to the approval of a moderate resolution which had French concurrence.3 It [Page 106] would be interesting to know how Mollet now envisages the carrying out of his program for resolving the Algerian conflict.
The specific points Mollet wishes to raise, i.e.: the status of the Suez Canal and Israeli-Arab relations, will probably be discussed in the first instance by Pineau with me. The course of these discussions will naturally depend on last minute developments. The French will continue to stress the desirability of some intermediary favorably disposed toward the users which can exercise a determining influence on the operation of the Canal. They will also emphasize the need for a long-term settlement guaranteeing Israeli security.
While there are no specific issues outside the context of the general discussions which, I feel, should be raised on your own initiative with Mollet, it may be feasible during the talks to finalize plans for President Coty’s visit to the United States next June. We are tentatively planning on his coming to Washington June 3, 4 and 5.4
Finally, it is always possible that Mollet may allude privately to the French balance of payments difficulties which may become acute in the course of this year. The French may shortly submit an application for Export-Import Bank financing of civil aircraft. It is probable, however, that such would provide only marginal relief. The principal problem for the French is to cut back imports without harming their economy or undermining their present policies in support of NATO and the Common Market. Moreover, even if austerity measures are taken, they may not suffice to meet the situation; and yet, there is not likely to be much disposition in any event on the part of the Congress now or later to provide financial assistance to France.
Submitted herewith is the proposed schedule of events for the Mollet visit.5
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.↩
- Not printed. Mollet suggested discussions on: I. European Problems: Common Market, EURATOM, European Defense—NATO; II. Eurafrica: Inter-relationship of Europe and Africa; III. Communism (East-West Relations): The common approach which the Western Powers should follow with regard to Communism in Europe, the Middle East, etc.; IV. Policy with Regard to Less Developed Territories: Attitude of the Free World Powers toward Less Developed Territories, French Policy and its overseas territories; V. The Status of the Suez Canal; and VI. Israeli-Arab Relations.↩
- Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1012 (XI) on Algeria, February 15, 1957.↩
- Documentation on President Coty’s proposed visit is in Department of State, Central File 751.11. As a result of the defeat of Prime Minister Mollet’s government on a vote of confidence in the French National Assembly on May 21, Coty cancelled the visit.↩
- Not printed.↩