32. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
3363. I called on General De Gaulle in his office at the rue Solferino and talked with him for about a half hour. Talk ranged over gamut of world affairs and I found de Gaulle courteous as usual, but distinctly in better spirits than I had seen him before.
He was pessimistic about the Arab world, and in particular, about North Africa. He felt that events had gone too far in North Africa to be reversed and that it was now impossible to predict what the eventual result would be. However, he felt that whatever it was it would not be friendly to the West. He feels that basically Arabs make little or no distinction between various Western nations, including the U.S., and [Page 94] consider all of them as Christians, and therefore people with whom it is impossible to be really friendly. He does not feel that Middle East has any desire at present to turn to Soviet Union or to Communists. He thinks medium term future in Middle East will be a period in which Arab nations trade off U.S. against Soviet Union, accepting assistance and aid from either side without compunction. He pointed out that Arabs are very competent at this game and had played it with success for many years between England and France. All that is changed now is that England and France have been replaced by Soviet Union and U.S.
De Gaulle felt that loss of Middle East and prospective loss of North Africa to Occident had greatly weakened the Western position, but said that fortunately, and he emphasized his view that it was pure luck, the Soviet empire had begun to crack up at the same time. He said the difficulties within the Soviet bloc were enormous and he felt that to all intents and purposes Soviet Communism had lost its crusading ideological drive and no longer had any real attraction to the masses in the world. He felt it would be impossible for Soviets to ever regain their previous ideological strength. He felt that the Communist regime in Russia would probably continue but it would become more and more merely a regime of bourgeois functionaries.
When I queried him about the future of France he said it was obvious that the present regime would fairly shortly run into serious difficulties. He felt, however, that this would lead to no change as he was certain that whenever a change in regime appeared likely which would give France a strong government the U.S. would step in with substantial financial aid in order to preserve the present weak regime. He said it was natural for strong countries to prefer that other countries should be relatively weak and easy to handle. That was certainly the case with the present French regime as far as the U.S. was concerned. Therefore, he found it perfectly natural that the U.S. would act to preserve the present regime in France. He said the regime was only in power now because the U.S. had saved it at the time of the Marshall Plan and said we would undoubtedly do the same thing again.
When I protested that U.S. had no desire to see a weak France, he brushed my protests aside and said maybe the desire was not a conscious one but it was a natural instinct and he was sure that it would govern American policy in the future as in the past. He said, however, that he was not certain that the U.S. would be successful in its efforts to preserve the present weak regime in France. He seemed to think difficulties for the regime would come primarily from financial problems rather than from Algeria. He said that while Algeria was a highly emotional problem it did not directly affect the lives of the Frenchmen in the Metropole and, therefore, the fate of Algeria was not apt to bring about mass action in France. He said regimes do not vote themselves [Page 95] out of existence and therefore nothing could be expected from the present French Assembly, and that mass action was not likely until or unless the people of France in a great majority felt that life was hard and difficult, which was certainly not the case now.
I then asked De Gaulle what his opinion was about negotiations now going on in Brussels for Euratom and the Common Market. He did not reply regarding Euratom but said he thought the Common Market would never actually come to pass. He said a great step such as that required strong governments and the present European governments were weak and incapable of taking the necessary actions. He said it was perfectly possible that treaties would be signed and even that they would be ratified and put into effect, but he felt certain they would never actually work and when the time came for hard decisions under the treaty, action would be indefinitely postponed for one reason or another.
As I was getting ready to leave, thinking the conversation had come to an end, De Gaulle said “I have heard rumors that you are going back to Washington2 and if that is true do not forget China”. He went on to say that in his view China poses undoubtedly by far the greatest problem in the world today. He feels certain that the Chinese will obtain great power and strength in the coming years, maybe in 25, more likely not for 50 years, but he said 50 years is a very short time in the history of the world. He said he does not believe that the Chinese are really Communists at heart—that they are first of all Chinese. He feels it is very important that the West, and particularly the leading power in the West, the U.S., should reestablish contact with China. He said we should remember that it was contact with the West that had led to the recent difficulties in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets had been unable to bar all contacts and eventually the feeling of liberty had seeped through and caused the present situation, which he was sure was difficult even in Russia itself.
De Gaulle then said he wished to say a few words about his views on the U.S. He said he felt the U.S. was clearly the most powerful country in the free world now, and therefore was faced with making decisions all over the world, a situation which had never been faced before by the American people. He said that in the face of this new situation it was natural that the U.S. should make mistakes, which he felt they had made. However, he felt that by no means all the actions of the U.S. had been mistakes, and in sum he felt that it was a great blessing to the world that the U.S. existed today as it does. He said he [Page 96] hoped that the American people would understand his overall friendship for the U.S. even when he might be severely criticising some individual American policy which he felt to be an error.
Interview was noteworthy because De Gaulle made only very passing reference to the fact that he was no longer a political figure, and talked very freely about the possibility of a change of regime in France which he clearly indicated meant an authoritarian non-Communist one. He is obviously seeing many people and has appointments at half hour intervals. As I arrived present French Minister to Hungary was just leaving and as I left a retired Army General, whose name I did not catch, was waiting to see De Gaulle.