310. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1


  • Your Talks with Prime Minister Macmillan, October 24 and 25

As you know, Prime Minister Macmillan is coming this week to consider with you the present state of our alliance and problems related to it. Enclosed is a summary briefing paper which contains my ideas of the purposes of the conference and in general terms how we may achieve them. I am also enclosing a tentative schedule of the agenda items for the two main meetings between you and the Prime Minister.

John Foster Dulles2
[Page 797]

Enclosure 1


General Background

Purpose of the MACMILLAN Conference

The purpose of this conference is, in view of the growing crisis in allied relationships, to create a more effective community of effort in the free world. If we are successful in establishing a closer community of effort with the British, we and the British together, as the two countries which form the core of the free countries’ defense alliances, should develop this stronger sense of community with our other allies. An important consequence of this action would be to replace our present alliances, which are based on a principle of mutual protection that is becoming obsolete and wasteful, with a new system of relationships founded on a strong sense of security in which defensive tasks for the area as a whole are distributed according to each country’s capabilities. Another consequence may be the establishment of common machinery in the economic and psychological fields to deal effectively with Soviet economic and propaganda warfare. If at the close of this dramatic conference we can point to specific steps we have agreed to take toward achieving a true sense of community, our joint efforts should revive confidence in the determination of the United States and the United Kingdom to provide coordinated leadership for the free countries.

Particular United Kingdom Policy Objectives.

Judging from his correspondence relating to the conference, Prime Minister Macmillan clearly recognizes the critical period we are in and the need to pool more effectively the scientific brains and other resources of the free world. Another principal British object in this meeting is the restoration of British prestige by participating with the United States in joint direction of the allied effort as they did during the war. The British probably also wish to take advantage of our reactions to the Soviet successes in rocketry to obtain some modification in our legislative restrictions on the provision of nuclear information and materials.

[Page 798]

Particular United States Policy Objectives.

In order to realize the general purposes mentioned above, the U.S. and U.K. will have to reconcile the substantial divergencies now existing between their respective foreign policies. The principal changes we wish in British policy are as follows:

We would like to have the British bring their policy towards Communist China into line with our own. This means, first, wholehearted agreement to deny it membership in the United Nations and, second, British agreement to break relations with Communist China as soon as it is politically feasible for them.
We are interested in the maintenance of the British position in the Persian Gulf and would like to persuade them to make adjustments necessary to assure maintenance of that position. In this connection, we also favor the resumption of Anglo-Saudi relations on a sound basis as soon as possible.
We wish to extract from the British a firm commitment that they will not obstruct, through such devices as GATT consultations, progress towards achievement of a common market on the continent.

What We Can Give the British.

Besides pledging our cooperation in imparting a sense of community into our relations, we can make the following specific offers to the British:

We can promise the Prime Minister that the Administration will do everything within its power to obtain Congressional action to modify the legislative restrictions on the provision of nuclear information, materials and weapons to our allies. The U.K. would be saved large capital investment if it could purchase enriched uranium for weapons and submarines from the U.S. It would also improve the efficiency and usefulness to the free world of the U.K. stockpile.
Under the provisions of the present Atomic Energy Act, the Atomic Energy Commission is discussing with the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority sale of some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] enriched uranium to be used as fuel in U.K. power reactors. This would make unnecessary an expensive addition to U.K. production facilities.
In return for their commitment not to interfere with the progress in the Common Market, we can reaffirm our clear support for their project for a Free Trade Area to associate other OEEC countries with the Common Market as reiterated at the October 16–18 OEEC Ministerial Meeting. This is important to them because they feel that their competitive position in export trade would seriously weaken should the Common Market be established without a Free Trade Area.
It would probably be feasible to conclude the agreement on provision of IRBM’s to the UK at the time of this meeting if the draft agreement which was recently prepared in the Defense Department is acceptable to the British and if they find our replies to their 11 questions satisfactory.

[Page 799]

Suggested Machinery for Following Up Decisions and Insuring Closer Future Collaboration With the U.K.

I recommend that you and Mr. Macmillan appoint me and Foreign Secretary Lloyd as your respective agents for monitoring the execution of decisions taken, supervising the progress of collaboration between the heads of the other Departments and Agencies in each country concerned, and deciding for reference to you and the Prime Minister in future any subjects or problems which you and the Prime Minister should discuss and decide.

Next I recommend that after the Conference is concluded, you direct a communication to the responsible officials in the fields of defense, intelligence, information, economic, scientific and United Nations affairs, informing them of the responsibility you have given me and instructing each such official to establish a closer cooperative working relationship with his opposite number in the British Government, keeping me currently informed of progress and problems.

Enclosure 2


Thursday, October 24, 10:30 a.m.

Assessment of the Soviet threat, both general and especially as regards the Middle East.
Matter of closer consultation and coordinated action in military, political, economic and psychological areas.
Matter of sharing information and availability of nuclear and other modern weapons.
Improvements in our common efforts in such fields as complementary forces, research, development and production.
Means to insure that decisions reached are executed.
High-level consultation with other allied countries.

Friday, October 25, 2:30 p.m.

Appraisal of military alliances, politically and militarily.
Problem of sharing scientific information and effort including problem of nuclear and other modern weapons.
Problem of bringing into our mutual security arrangements a greater sense of community and a more effective distribution of tasks.
More effective utilization of the free world’s economic resources including economic warfare measures against the Soviet Union.
Developing a more effective psychological offensive.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/10–2157. Secret.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
  3. Secret. Drafted by Secretary Dulles.
  4. Secret.