Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

301. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 11, 1957— 6 p.m.

297. Previous messages (Embassy telegrams 7277, June 25; 106, July 3; 156, July 5; 172, July 6; 173, July 6; 179, July 8; 205, July 8; 148, July 10)² have reported Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference on current basis. This telegram concludes roundup current information but does not recapitulate reference telegrams.

According Canadians, prior to discussion UN Selwyn Lloyd reported to have suggested Menzies give anti-UN speech during conference. Actual fact, however, that while Menzies criticized UN and showed concern over degree influence small irresponsible members, he agreed with India and Pakistan there should be no withdrawal from UN. United Kingdom also took milder and more constructive position than immediately after Suez in affirming adherence UN and desiring increase its effectiveness. South Africa anti-UN as expected and India expressed usual desire increase Asian representation.

On admission Communist China UN, several sources confirm conference considered United States opposition a “fact of life” and that unwise press early admission. CRO described participants as unenthusiastic regarding United States policy but not inclined challenge it at present. United Kingdom especially understanding United States position, although not defending it.

According CRO, Foreign Office and Canadians, defense talks basically exposition of United Kingdom need curtail commitments. Sandys expressed view to Ambassador that Commonwealth representatives cheerfully accepted need revise British policy along present lines, although they of course would like increased forces available their protection. Australia concerned over effect in Southeast Asia and Pakistan in Middle East. Separate United Kingdom talks with Australia and New Zealand held July 10 dealt with Southeast Asia. Details not yet available.

Conference itself discussed Southeast Asia very little, and probably since Diefenbaker unfamiliar issues, future of International Control Commission not dealt with. Nehru expressed usual criticism United States policy regarding Laos accusing United States intervening domestic situation by using threat withdraw aid. United Kingdom supported United States general policy again countering Nehru’s arguments. Emphasized Geneva Agreement did not envisage equal parties in Laos but recognized only Royal Laotian Government.

Economic issues loomed large among questions on which little progress possible. According CRO, Diefenbaker sought trade and economic conference as “something to take home.” He naturally disappointed when officials pointed out that issues should be defined and success reasonable prospect before calling meeting.

Extension and acceptance invitation Finance Ministers meet Ottawa after International Bank session September to discuss conference was thus partial compromise.³ Diefenbaker’s opposition United States surplus commodities program overseas and investment activities in Canada aired in conference as well as in public statements. Prime Ministers of certain underdeveloped countries unfortunately found his criticism United States foreign investment activities persuasive. Meeting of senior economic officials of Commonwealth on July 8–9 was devoted to discussing and explaining British point of view regarding Free Trade Area and Common Market. Apprehensions concerning effect of FTA/CM proposals on agricultural products especially in Africa were aired. India also opposed for doctrinal reason that Common Market would extend French imperialism. CRO hopes that most apprehensions quieted.

Bilateral discussion took place on Ghana’s desire for financing of Volta River scheme. Sum clearly beyond United Kingdom capacity at present. Nkrumah⁴ and Diefenbacker also discussed problem though latter reportedly only made sympathetic noises. CRO hopes number of countries and even aluminum companies can be interested in project. CRO takes dim view of International Bank’s views, terming its letter “mouldy” document.

Question of time and location future Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference discussed inconclusively. United Kingdom unwilling commit itself to sequence of overseas meetings, in view among others of political problems meeting in South Africa or Ghana. Weather and climate also factor to PM’s. For example, Menzies would refuse come England in winter and Ghana in summer. Moreover, United Kingdom hopes avoid set pattern meetings each year. Hence, no decision reached on time and place next conference.

Pattern individual performance continued much as reported earlier. In eyes CRO Macmillan did exceptionally well. His relaxed Edwardian manner combined with obvious mental qualities secured sympathetic reaction all participants, especially Nehru. Present session contrasted sharply with tension habitually surrounding meetings chaired by Eden. Macmillan’s capacity sum up and obtain consensus meetings went far create good atmosphere. As mentioned previously, lack of inquest on Suez important contributing factor to harmony. CRO characterized Suhrawardy⁵ as “brash but competent and articulate beyond belief.” He took every opportunity score points against India’s policies. Yet Pakistan-Indian relations not bad during meetings. Nkrumah as “new boy” continued deport himself well. CRO thinks he was sensitive to storm he kicked up in Ghana by referring in public to fellow countrymen as ignorant. Welensky⁶ contributed something on economic matters and was possibly a bit garrulous. Macdonald⁷ of New Zealand carried his full weight. Menzies reflecting his good health and fact having done homework was strong influence. Louw⁸ was more pleasant than had been expected. Nehru was less dogmatic than on previous occasions. Feeling isolated over Kashmir, he seemed rather subdued and tired, and reflected his great need for money. In Middle East discussion Nehru admitted Baghdad Pact purely defensive but claimed public opinion in Middle East and India felt otherwise and pact therefore bad.

Since Commonwealth more a state of mind than formal organization, and since Prime Ministers meeting more a family discussion than formal conference, true significance of recent session will only emerge with passage time. Officials of UK and other participating governments have all described conference as real success, although even CRO, which naturally interested party such verdict, declines list achievements in specific terms. Nevertheless several significant points emerge:

1. Prior this conference, Commonwealth wracked by political disagreements of major nature: India and Pakistan were severely split over Kashmir; deep cleavage existed over Suez; and considerations of color were potentially divisive. Nevertheless, Prime Ministers discussed problems in remarkably harmonious manner. Kashmir did not disrupt meeting; Suez was buried; and color did not become bar to collaboration. At minimum, Commonwealth survived difficult period without debilitation. At maximum, intangible centripetal forces binding Commonwealth together may have been somewhat strengthened.

2. Each nation brought particular economic problems to conference, and these were of greater long run importance than most of political issues. With exception Canada, members face shortage capital and are concerned over trading pattern. Even though clear that Commonwealth itself cannot solve these problems, each member continued have confidence that this association would assist in developing commerce and industry.

3. Most of important political problems centered around India. Most members inclined be pro-Pakistani on Kashmir issue, and even those deploring British attack Suez were critical India’s actions during crisis and its flirtation Communist bloc. Despite Nehru’s isolation on these issues and his preoccupation financial problems, he gave considerable indication he continued feel Prime Ministers conferences worthwhile.

4. Somewhat to discomfit skeptics, conference not marked by divisions along color lines. Ghana accepted by South Africa, and two Prime Ministers even had private lunch together at South African initiative. Conference agreed without dissent to admit Malaya at appropriate time. Discussions on disarmament, Kashmir, Suez, admission China UN etc., did not divide group by color. While gravity economic problems apparent to all, and there was much pulling in many directions, differences of views not based on race.

5. By his outstanding chairmanship, Macmillan did much maintain Britain’s primacy in Commonwealth for time being. No member gave any indication of wish abandon or weaken this association.

6. British public comment generally characterized meeting as friendly, affable but inconclusive and gave usual criticism about platitudinous communiqué. Nevertheless, general recognition given to importance conference in reestablishing personal relations and confidence and giving opportunity for straightforward discussion on matters common concern. At same time, meeting a substantial change from old concept of Commonwealth as association where solidarity manifested on major political issues. Conference now affords opportunity for candid exchange of differing views. While these differences often seem outweigh similarities, Commonwealth continues show unusual capacity weather political and economic crises.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.13/7–1157. Secret. Repeated to Wellington, Canberra, New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, Pretoria, Accra, Salisbury, and Ottawa.
2. None printed. (All ibid., 741.13)
3. The Finance Ministers of the Commonwealth met at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, September 28–October 1.
4. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghanaian Prime Minister.
5. Huseyn S. Suhrawardy, Pakistani Prime Minister.
6. Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
7. Thomas L. Macdonald, New Zealand Minister of Defense and External Affairs.
8. Eric H. Louw, South African Foreign Minister.