30. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1
2649. In order to explain and assess significance of alarming reports on state of French opinion which we have been submitting recently,2 we should like to summarize certain basic elements which condition French governmental and public psychology at this time.
As Department is fully aware, French state of mind has been abnormal since 1940. It is not easy for population, particularly political and intellectual leaders, of nation which has for centuries been one of world’s great powers, to adjust themselves to fact that their international [Page 90] position must henceforth be second or third rank. Series of defeats and humiliations experienced since 1940, often aggravated by failure to adjust in time to facts of life, have bitten deeply into French pride.
Nationalization of Suez Canal, following prolonged campaign by Nasser to foment opposition to France in North Africa, was last straw. This action produced extreme psychological tension throughout France, explosive character of which was not fully understood in US or elsewhere.
Some violent release became necessary and, since no other effective means of dealing with Nasser was found, military action was almost inevitable. Whether it was reasonable or wise had little pertinence.
Immediate effect of Egypt invasion on French opinion was substantially to release tension, to unite country behind government, and to create monetary [momentary] illusion that old position of France had been restored. Enforced cease-fire and subsequent developments have dissipated that illusion and revived in even more extreme form feelings of frustration, humiliation and rage which existed before. It is not only recognized that French position in Middle East is gone but believed that Soviets are now irretrievably established in that area and their incursion into French North Africa imminent.
Favorite scapegoats for this situation are UN and US. Former, now that its membership has been extended, is considered to be loose conglomeration of nations, radically unequal in size, political aptitude and sense of responsibility, incapable of constructive action. French withdrawal from UN is being very seriously discussed. Attitude toward US is ambivalent in that there remains keen desire to cooperate with us as in past, but [we?] seemed in past three week to have gone out of our way to humiliate them and have, in pursuit of popularity with Afro-Asian states, grossly underestimated Soviet threat to Near East and abandoned our oldest and staunchest allies. Actions which have most contributed to this anti-US feeling are: 1) failure to take rapid action to help meet European oil crisis, which is believed to be economic sanction directed against France and Britain; 2) association with Afro-Asian bloc in insisting upon troop withdrawal before any satisfactory commitments from Nasser have been obtained; 3) refusal to hold high-level tripartite meeting and to work out joint policies for dealing with Near Eastern situation, which in French view affects their security even more than ours.
We report these attitudes in full realization that many of alleged causes are without foundation, others are distorted, and still others stem from tactics we have been obliged to adopt because of Franco-British recklessness. We should like to emphasize most earnestly, however, that these attitudes exist, that they are most deeply felt, and [Page 91] that, if we ignore or minimize them, they are likely sooner or later to burst out in further demonstrations of frustration and recklessness, which could be even more damaging to Western unity and security than was invasion of Egypt.
We realize that French politicians in past have often indulged in much loose talk about fragility of Atlantic alliance, that in many cases they were primarily trying to frighten us, and that from logical point of view alliance is much more essential to France than to US. Unfortunately, as explained above, French people and particularly their leaders are not at present in logical frame of mind and present anti-NATO talk seriously concerns us. French are in state bordering on traumatic shock. If exposed to substantial number further “humiliations” over coming months, they are capable of quitting UN and NATO and retiring into neutralistic isolation from which they would hope to make separate deals with Soviets. This would probably not be true of present government but it might well be of rightwing successor which could emerge, either with or more likely without parliamentary basis, if current attitudes are allowed to spread and deepen.
It is in this supercharged atmosphere that, despite our full recognition of corresponding psychological problems with which Department must cope in Near East, we have recommended earliest possible return to policy of collaboration with French in meeting most urgent political and economic problems. Should we do so in generous spirit, drawing curtain over past and concentrating on future, we feel that rapidly growing anti-Americanism could still be halted without permanent damage to Western alliance. Should we not do so, we may well be confronted in few months with a French Government whose potential for damage to Western security would be infinitely greater than that of Nasser.