Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

3. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 24, 1955—midnight.

4086. We have for some time been pondering problems of Franco-US relations after French ratification of Paris Agreements completed but have not until now considered ratification sufficiently assured to warrant presenting our thinking to Department. We now think time has come to do so.

In our opinion paramount factor is consolidation and strengthening of NATO alliance. Of only slightly less importance are encouragement of European unity, developing real Franco-German rapprochement, and maintaining Franco-US relations not only with respect to Europe but in furtherance of US interests in North Africa and Southeast Asia. We accordingly hope that these factors will prevail over any impulse to release pent up resentment over lengthy delays in French action. Time article last December forecasting such unfortunate Washington reaction was widely and unfavorably noted in France and subsequent predictions along same line have loomed large both in Communist propaganda and in non-Communist French fears. There are several areas to which this problem may apply particularly.

1. Germany: Naturally US Government will wish to expedite German rearmament as much as possible and presumably restoration of sovereignty to GFR will reduce to minimum French opportunities for obstruction. In light of importance of encouraging delicate plans of Franco-German rapprochement we hope however that when arguments arise we will not give appearance of always siding with Germans.

2. Big power meetings: Germany will henceforth presumably seek, with good reason, increasing representation in meetings at Foreign Minister level or lower level, which since war have been held tripartitely, in connection with any possible East-West talks. French will probably not be too happy with this in view of major importance they have long attached to special US-UK-French relationships based upon world-wide responsibilities. We believe, however, balance can be found between inclusion of Germany as full equal in any future discussions concerning German reunification or European questions immediately affecting Germany on one hand, and tripartite discussion of non-European and more general European problems on other.

3. NATO: Longstanding French desire for something in nature of political standing group has recently been revived in search for counter-balance to German NATO membership. What they seek is maximum influence on US policy with respect particularly to North Africa and Indochina plus public recognition of French as standing alongside UK in position of special influence on US. While anything resembling political standing group (aside from traditional big three meetings) seems thoroughly undesirable and there should be no question of our giving any blank checks to French with respect to any area, it would nevertheless be worthwhile to utilize this French desire by strengthening NATO in political field, which would be to our advantage as means of securing support of French and other NATO countries for our own policies and giving us additional opportunity to influence theirs. This [garble]present trend of political discussions in NATO but possibly emphasizing and accelerating them by specific recommendations, perhaps in next NAC. USRO of course has more specific thoughts on this problem.

Question of German membership in SG will undoubtedly arise in time. French will undoubtedly plead, as they have since 1949, special US-UK-French position of world-wide responsibility and availability of armed forces to influence events in far parts of world. Since Germany has no non-European responsibilities and will not for some time have effective armed forces in being, we hope this problem can be approached gradually and tactfully.

4. European unity: Present French Government recognizes that Paris Agreements provide practical basis both for bringing about real Franco-German rapprochement and renewed efforts toward progressive development of European unity. Now that urgent problem of German rearmament appears about to be satisfactorily settled, we believe progress toward such rapprochement and unity can be achieved more rapidly if pace is not forced too much by US and if we recognize frankly that progress on each side which Paris Agreement represents proved possible only in Atlantic framework. Initially we recommend that US statements upon completion of French ratification (about which we are telegraphing separately)² should avoid appearing to force pace on either point.

5. North Africa: This is spot where French are most nervous over their position and sensitive as to US policy. We must remember that our strategic and security interests in this area are over-riding and can be effectively served only through stability and continuing French operation. Any change in our current dual policy of supporting French presence in Africa while continuing to seek accelerated French concessions of autonomy would be undesirable.

6. Indochina: Current US-French difference on policy with respect to Vietnam, Cambodia and perhaps Laos are gradually being lessened. There have been indications that French may be hoping for more favorable US policies with respect to this area following French approval of German rearmament. While US policy probably not susceptible of shift in this direction, it should at minimum avoid shift in opposite direction.

7. Aid: When ratification occurs we will immediately recommend that OSP freeze³ (and any other freezes except cutback of equipment to 12 division level) be forthwith rescinded to restore France to normal competitive position. We think it important to complete aid programs prior to FY 55 in fair and orderly fashion, in order that there will be no impression that aid is being cut off or new difficulties being raised now that France has approved German rearmament. Question of FY 55 aid for FEC now under discussion should of course be decided on own merits and handled in such way as to avoid any false impression.

Our conclusion is not that US policy should be changed in any material respect as result of French ratification but rather that it is intrinsically sound in furtherance of long range US interests and should not be changed at expense of France when ratification has been completed. Controlling considerations seem to us to be:

(1) the need for full utilization of both German and French strength for successful defense of Western Europe,

(2) importance of French cooperation to US strategic interests outside Europe and

(3) overriding need of wholehearted cooperation and unity in NATO.

USRO concurs in portions this message dealing with NATO. USOM/F concurs in paragraph 7.

Achilles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.00/3–2455. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Luxembourg, Moscow, Rome, Brussels, and The Hague.
2. The text of a proposed U.S. statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 4085 from Paris, March 24. (Ibid., 740.5/3–2455)
3. For documentation on the U.S. decision in September 1954 to freeze the placing of offshore procurement contracts in France, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VI, Part 2, p. 1436 ff.