286. Agreed United States–United Kingdom Paper1

BEM D–3/3a

THE PROSPECT OF A PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

(Working Level US–UK Paper)

Recommendations

(i)
It must be recognized that the chances of progress towards a permanent settlement, or even a comprehensive modus vivendi, of the Palestine question are at present very remote.
(ii)
The policies of the two Governments should therefore concentrate on the piecemeal settlement of various particular problems as they arise and the gradual creation of a better atmosphere in which a final political settlement would be possible. The United Nations could be used to keep up the pressure on the parties for a solution of particular problems.

There is a common United States and United Kingdom interest in bringing about a permanent settlement in Palestine. So long as Arab-Israel relations continue in their present state, it will be impossible2 to get the Arab countries to pay proper regard to the Soviet threat or to put on a stable basis the cooperation between Middle Eastern and Western countries which is necessary for the interests of both. The Russians will exploit the dispute to strengthen their own position in the area and to weaken that of the Free World.

2.
The following seem to be the possible means of reaching a settlement:
(i)
Negotiations, with or without the United Nations or other third parties assisting. This can be ruled out at present. The two sides are too far apart and too intransigeant.
(ii)
An imposed settlement—a comprehensive and equitable plan worked out by a third party and imposed by the use of force or threat of force if necessary. The United Nations devised such a plan in 1947,3 but failed to provide the necessary force then, and could not be expected to do so now; nor would any outside power other than the Soviet Union, whose intervention in this way would at present be wholly in favor of the Arabs and would lead to complete Soviet domination of the area.
(iii)
A possible variant on (ii) might be the use of political and economic pressure in the form of promised rewards to, or penalties, against Israel and the Arab states. Whilst offers of certain inducements—e.g. loans for compensating refugees, economic aid for resettlement, guarantees of agreed frontiers—are still open and would play a part in any settlement, it would not be possible to secure acquiescence by any combination of such pressures.
(iv)
The “long haul”—a piecemeal settlement of various particular problems as they come along—e.g. Gaza, the Gulf of Aqaba, the Suez Canal, and perhaps a piecemeal attack on the refugee problem.
3.
For the time being, (iv) is the only possible avenue of progress. Recent events have to some extent assisted this process by reopening particular issues which were unsatisfactory features in the status quo ante—e.g., the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip.
4.
Another consequence of recent events is that the United Nations is likely to play a bigger role not only in trying to prevent eruptions but also in promoting a settlement. The Secretary General and his UNEF Advisory Committee have acquired a major role in this. Within the United Nations framework, there may be advantage to be gained from associating more countries in the attempt to find a solution. The United Nations could also be used to maintain pressure on the parties in favor of a solution of particular probems as suggested in paragraph 3 and against any violation of the staus quo.
  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 62 D 181, CF 856. Secret. Prepared by Donald C. Bergus, Officer in Charge of Israel–Jordan affairs.
  2. (US would prefer “very difficult”) [Footnote in the source text.]
  3. Reference is to the U.N. General Assembly resolution, adopted November 29, 1947, which provided for a plan of partition with economic union.