Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

26. Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State, Washington, June 18 and 19, 1956¹

Washington, June 18 and 19, 1956

SUBJECT

• Conversations between French Foreign Minister Pineau and the Secretary, June 18 (10:15 a.m. to 12:40 p.m.), and June 19 (3:06 to 5:40 p.m.)

PARTICIPANTS

• (For both meetings)
• Americans
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, American Ambassador to France
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor
  • Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • Mr. Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
  • Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Director, Office of Special International Affairs, (OASD), (ISA)
  • Mr. Benson E.L. Timmons, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs
  • Mr. Jameson Parker, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
• French
  • Mr. Christian Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic
  • Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to the United States
  • Mr. Roland de Margerie, Director-General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Jean Daridan, Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Pierre Baraduc, Director of Press Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Georges Le Henaff, Chief of the Foreign Minister’s Office
  • Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister of French Embassy
  • Mr. Pierre Millet, Minister of French Embassy
  • Mr. Jean de la Grandville, Counselor of French Embassy
  • Mr. Roger Vaurs, Director of Press & Information (French Embassy), New York
  • Madame Denise Leger, Secretary
• (Second meeting only)
• Americans
  • Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs
  • Mr. Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor
  • Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning
  • Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
  • Mr. Kenneth Young, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
• French
  • Mr. Jacques Vimont, Minister of French Embassy
  • Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor of French Embassy
  • Mr. Maurice Perouse, Financial Counselor of French Embassy

1. East-West Relations and French Visit to Moscow:

The Secretary opened the discussion by expressing his great pleasure, both personally and in the name of the U.S., in the presence of Mr. Pineau in Washington. He said that the U.S. had never forgotten that France was our first ally. Whenever a member of the French Government comes over here, he is a welcome guest both in the eyes of our Government and of our people. These sentiments are as strong and as lasting as ever. He said he was glad that Mr. Pineau was here today and he hoped that these sentiments would lead to a fruitful discussion of problems of mutual interest to our two countries.

Mr. Pineau expressed his thanks to the Secretary for his words of welcome. He said he was glad to be back in the U.S. which he had also visited in his former capacities as Minister of Food and of Public Works. He said that family links with this country meant that part of his heart was in the U.S. He was happy to find himself once again working with the Secretary, with whom he had already had the opportunity to exchange views in a spirit of mutual sympathy and understanding. He felt that this meeting presented a great opportunity for useful discussion.

The Secretary said that he wished to add that he had this day been to see President Eisenhower who had asked him to extend his best wishes to Mr. Pineau and to tell him how much he regretted that his state of health did not permit him to receive Mr. Pineau as he had planned.²

Mr. Pineau said he regretted not to be able to see the President but understood the reasons, and that the French people send him their best wishes for his recovery.

The Secretary then turned to the list of the topics for discussion and suggested to Mr. Pineau that he open the talks by telling him about the trip to Moscow which he and Prime Minister Mollet had recently made.³

Mr. Pineau said that the talks had been conducted with Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov. It was important to note that the first of these had played a dominant role and had taken the lead throughout. The discussions had been cordial and frank except for some characteristic sallies by Khrushchev.

The first topic discussed had been that of disarmament. The French representatives had reviewed the plan of synthesis submitted by the French representative Mr. Moch ⁴ in London. Khrushchev had spoken contemptuously of the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament and had said that its work was unrealistic. He had said that the reduction of 1,200,000 men under arms by the Soviet Union was a reality. Pineau had answered that the Soviet gesture was fine but that he thought Khrushchev would appreciate that France was not in a position to make a similar one in view of her heavy obligations in Algeria. He had also pointed out that what was needed was the reduction of armaments as well as of manpower. This had led to a long discussion of the topic of control. The Russians had dismissed the President’s plan for aerial inspection⁵ which they called a form of spying. They repeated their willingness to accept inspection in the form of key control-points on the ground. The French representatives said that France was willing to participate in both forms of inspection. The discussion had then turned to the possibility of nuclear disarmament and control on which the Russians were very skeptical. Though Khrushchev did not actually say so, he gave the impression that the Soviet Government does not consider that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through negotiations in the UN or any other international organization, but that this goal could only be reached by the USA and the USSR eventually mutually agreeing between themselves to undertake disarmament as the result of the elimination of tensions and the restoration of confidence.

The next subject discussed in Moscow was the reunification of Germany. The Soviet representatives expressed their wonder that the French should be in favor of this, in view of what France had experienced at the hands of Germany. Mr. Pineau had replied that both he and Prime Minister Mollet had already stood for the reunification and against the dismemberment of Germany in 1943, during the war. Thus there had been no change in their opinion on this issue. A second reason why France favored German reunification, he had told the Russians, was that a situation in which half of Germany was democratic and half Communist created political friction and tension and thus made Germany a factor of instability in Europe. At this point Khrushchev asserted that he preferred to have 20 million Germans on his side, rather than 70 million Germans against him even if the country were neutralized. He had added that even a disarmed and neutral Germany would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union could not afford to sacrifice the social and economic gains which had been achieved in the Eastern Zone or to incur the loss of prestige. Mr. Pineau commented to the Secretary that Khrushchev undoubtedly had the effect on the satellites in mind.

Mr. Pineau added that he regretted that Chancellor Adenauer had informed the press of what he and Mollet had told him about the foregoing exchange with Khrushchev because the Russians can always deny having said this, without being embarrassed by the revelation.

The French representatives had then discussed Euratom and the Common Market with the Russians. Khrushchev said that if the West persisted in proceeding with the integration of Western Germany, the Soviet Union would be forced to take action and that in this connection the West might remember that it would not be for the first time if the Soviet Union were to sign a treaty with Germany. Mr. Pineau said that he told Khrushchev that he was aware of this but that if he remembered correctly, the first time had not brought the Soviet Union much luck.

The next subject discussed had been the Middle East, where the conversation had taken a slightly more hopeful turn. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union had sent arms to the Middle East in order to counteract the Baghdad Pact. The Soviet Government was prepared to support an agreement on a general embargo on shipment of arms if the US and UK were prepared to undertake to stop sending arms to the Baghdad Pact.

On the Far East and Indochina, the Russians said that they had considered calling for another conference in Geneva on Far Eastern matters but had given up the idea. The general impression which the Russians made on the French in this field was that the Soviet Union intends to maintain peace in that part of the world, and that it had tacitly agreed to a postponement of elections in Vietnam.

With regard to the “Pineau Plan”,⁶ the Russians had expressed general support of the principles on which the Plan is based but stated that they had not discussed any specific organizational details.

Algeria was then discussed, and the Russians said that they did not wish to repeat the Indochina experience in North Africa. This experience had resulted in the presence of the US being substituted for the French presence, and this had not made things any better. The Russians had let the French understand that they were willing to extend some support to the French position but without making it too obvious. They seemed to want to reconcile the French and the Arab positions. In the end they had expressed some support of France in the language of the communiqué.⁷

The talks revealed clearly that in the economic and social fields the Soviet Union wants to move ahead and increase exchanges of all kinds. Specifically they want to buy the new French jet transport, the “Caravelle”, and to order French television equipment for the expansion of their television network. They also want to diminish the restrictions imposed under COCOM and CHINCOM. Mr. Pineau told the Secretary that the French Government feels the same way, and said so to the Russians, who were also told that Mr. Pineau would raise the subject in Washington.

With regard to cultural relations, the Russians not only want a great increase in the artistic and intellectual fields but also in the technical field.

Mr. Pineau said that his conclusions following his visit to the Soviet Union were that, in Soviet eyes, the primary and determining factor in the development of Soviet policy today is the economic factor. Stalin acted as a brake which slowed down the economic development and evolution of the country. This development has not been brought about by new measures since the death of Stalin, but the removal of Stalin has permitted it to take place. The chief need is that of industrial and agricultural equipment. Soviet standards of living are low. The average worker’s standard of living is only one-third to one-half that of the French worker. In the opinion of the French, the Soviet Union has assumed heavy obligations with regard to Red China, and large commitments toward certain other countries including Africa, which may weigh fairly heavily on its shoulders. Mr. Pineau said he thought that the situation was such that the Soviet Union would surely stand to gain from a peaceful development of its economy. The question was whether we should help the Russians to re-equip themselves or not. If we do not, Mr. Pineau said, they will succeed in re-equipping themselves anyway, even though it may take—say ten years longer, but they will be doing it against us. Therefore, the question arises whether we should help them in the hope of furthering the prospect for peaceful evolution within the Soviet Union. He said this was a delicate matter.

As evidence of changes which had taken place and which he had observed personally, Mr. Pineau mentioned the following:

(1) Khrushchev had told him personally that the State had in the past come to play far too preponderant a role in the life of the country. He had said he would rather lose both arms than permit the State to continue to play this successive role.

(2) Mr. Pineau said that there had of late been real trends toward the economic and juridicial decentralization of State control in favor of the individual Soviet Republics. The question was whether there had been a comparable political evolution. Mr. Pineau said that this was not the case. The Communist political dictatorship was still absolute. However, there was a new tone in the life of the country which could not be ignored.

(3) A prominent Socialist colleague and friend of Mr. Pineau’s, Professor André Philip,⁸ had been invited to lecture at Moscow University and his talk had been given without any censorship whatsoever.

(4) Mr. Pineau said that the Secretary had perhaps heard of his experience when he went down to Erivan in Armenia. He had been met at the railroad station by some 500 French citizens of Armenian extraction, or who had married Armenians, and who had been there since 1947. This crowd had sung “The Marseillaise” and waved flags and, breaking through the police barriers, had rushed toward him and asked him to make it possible for them to leave and go back to France. Not only had the police not reacted, but the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Vinogradov, who was accompanying Mr. Pineau, said that it was quite understandable that these poor people should wish to go to France since their standard of living in Erivan was so inferior to that in France.

Mr. Pineau said that, while it was undoubtedly true that everything in the Soviet Union has not changed, it would be a mistake to think that this means that nothing has changed. His Government felt that the West should increase exchanges with the Soviet Union and particularly with countries in the periphery, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which there have been signs of political change. Mr. Pineau said he thought that this political evolution was a factor in the Soviet attitude toward the reunification of Germany. He said that he would like to discuss further what actions might profitably be taken in this general field.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Pineau for what he termed a fascinating account of his trip and said that it was also a significant story in terms of the problem of what our policies should be. He noted that Mr. Pineau had not yet indicated specifically what conclusions should be drawn from the premises he had expounded. He thought that it might be useful, if he set forth for Mr. Pineau’s benefit our own estimate of the Soviet position. He would not wish to dispute the facts reported by Mr. Pineau, and he was prepared to accept the view that there are forces at work within the Soviet Union which may be leading the rulers of that country, perhaps against their will, in the direction of a diminishing role of the State in the country’s economy, and, to a certain extent, of decentralization and of providing a somewhat greater measure of personal security against the shocking and arbitrary types of acts portrayed by Khrushchev’s speech. There might also be a somewhat greater degree of tolerance of independence in certain limited areas. These developments, he said, were not primarily brought about by the change of personalities of the head of the Soviet Union, though this played a certain role, but because of an evolutionary process inherent in the industrialization of a nation. As industrialization takes place, you have to educate more people better, they know more, think more and demand more. In modern industrial training the thoughts of the workers cannot be limited to the requirements of their machines. As they see the fruits of their industry, they feel that they should obtain more for themselves. As they see the blunders due to excessive centralization they tend to ask for and support greater decentralization.

While we accept the picture gained at first hand in a country where there is a certain process of evolution, we must consider carefully whether this process is sufficiently strong to be, one might say, irreversible so that we can base our actions in the future on the assumption that it will go on indefinitely and constitute a basis for a society which will be both peaceful and which will give up expansive and subversive policies with regard to other countries.

The view held here, the Secretary said, was that it would be dangerous and reckless for us to assume that the process under consideration was sufficiently assured to be considered irreversible and to justify our making our own plans on this assumption. It was important, he said, that we should continue to follow our established policies in the main, though allowing for some shift of emphasis.

In the field of disarmament we have noted the Soviet announcement of a reduction of 1,200,000 men. We are not able to verify this reduction, but we are inclined to accept it as real because it seems to be a logical step for the Soviet Union to take. We ourselves have been reducing our own armed forces in the recent past. In 1953 we had about 3.6 million men under arms and now we have about 2,850,000. In undertaking this reduction we did not feel we were weakening our military establishment, nor did we boast of it as a disarmament step. Modern technological conditions tend to require a correspondingly smaller number of men in the military force. In fact, our military power has increased in recent times and we think the case is the same with regard to the Soviet Union.

We are deeply concerned, the Secretary said, at the increase in the nuclear power of the Soviet Union and of what appear to be feverish efforts on its part to increase its nuclear stockpile. We believe that it has a capacity for megaton power as well as for smaller nuclear weapons. Its efforts in long range transcontinental missiles, bombers, and submarine production are tremendous. What Mr. Pineau had said about the Soviet attitude toward the Disarmament Subcommittee of the UN confirmed our view that the Soviet Union is not prepared to consider seriously genuine measures of control and limitation of nuclear weapons. It only talked about banning the atom bomb. The Secretary recalled the President’s proposal in his letter to Bulganin in March on reserving future nuclear production for peaceful purposes only. Bulganin’s recent reply ignored entirely this proposal by the President.⁹ The Secretary said he hoped, and it might well be, that nuclear weapons would never be actually used, but this did not mean that they do not have their use. The Secretary at this point used the game of chess as an analogy. He said that in theory the aim of a chess player is to take the King of his opponent but, in fact, the King is never taken. When one player achieves checkmate, his opponent is forced to give up. In a similar way it might be said that the Soviet aim is to be able to put the free nations of the world in a posture where they would have no alternative to either giving up or to being destroyed.

This must be prevented. The US cannot achieve this alone because of the need for the availability of retaliatory power, which cannot be provided only from the American continent. Diversity of location is necessary in order to provide potential retaliatory strength which could defy a surprise assault. This is why we believe it would be extremely dangerous if free nations were to feel that recent developments in the Soviet Union justify the West in reducing its efforts to maintain its military strength. To do so would make it possible for the Soviet Union to say “checkmate” to it.

The Secretary said that the National Security Council considers that so long as the Soviet Union continues on its present course of increase in its military strength, we must increase, and not diminish, our own and continue to depend on the cooperation of our allies in these efforts. He gave the following theoretical example to illustrate the value of overseas bases: for one plane costing $1 million located at a spot reasonably near the Soviet Union you would require ten planes, costing $10 million, in order to achieve the same capacity if launched from the US. The Secretary said he hoped the day would come when the Soviet Union would be less despotic and would not be in a position to launch an unheralded attack or say “checkmate” to others. The free countries of the world cannot have an aggressive policy because of our democratic systems which prevent it. Therefore, we must not slacken our efforts. With regard to economic and cultural relations, we also believe, for the above reasons, that the free nations must refrain from helping the Soviet Union to win the race it is running against us. We feel strategic controls must continue. As regards specific items, we are always willing to have these studied by technical experts who can determine whether specific items are strategic. We should take every reasonable opportunity offered by cultural exchanges to bring new ideas into the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union is trying to penetrate and subvert the newly-independent and less-developed countries. It will use cultural exchanges for political purposes directed more against the latter countries than against the long-established political systems of the West. What is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. The Russians will use what they achieve with us for their particular purposes in third countries. We must measure what we do in cultural exchanges in terms of the impact on third countries. Our aim should be to introduce into the Soviet Union thoughts and knowledge which will accelerate the process of liberalization, but we are not prepared to say that all exchanges under any conditions are per se good. We must estimate what each kind of exchange will do to the USSR, to us, and to third countries.

The Secretary said that there are other matters which Mr. Pineau had raised which would be the subject of further discussion, and he concluded by thanking Mr. Pineau for the extremely valuable and authoritative account of his trip to the USSR, which confirmed what we ourselves had felt about the course of events in that country.

Mr. Pineau, in reply to the Secretary, said that the French Government fully understands the preoccupations of the US Government which it shares in great measure. He said that there were various aspects of the problem on which he would like to comment:

(a) With regard to military security, the French Government shared our views that it would be highly dangerous for the West to disarm in such a way as to give the Soviet Union the temptation to act by military threat. Disarmament was desirable but only if accompanied by control.

(b) Mr. Pineau said that he also shared the US views with regard to the political aspects of East-West relations. However, Tito had said to him something to which he attached great importance, to the effect that while he could not guarantee that the evolution in the Soviet Union is irreversible, though he believed it to be so, he was sure that the West could influence it, if not in the field of disarmament, at least in the economic and cultural fields. Mr. Pineau then said that he wished to emphasize that he had not said to Khrushchev that strategic controls should be abandoned. He agreed that technical experts should meet and consider specific items which might be withdrawn from the COCOM list. Mr. Pineau then said that the problem of cultural exchanges with the Eastern bloc varies according to every country. France cannot escape Communist propaganda, which is prevalent and continuous. It does not matter how many Soviet visitors come to France, and the French Government feels that there is great advantage in multiplying visits of Frenchmen to the Soviet Union since their reports on their return make good propaganda for the West. He felt that there should therefore be different national programs of exchanges which should however be broadly coordinated and emphasize special features for each country.

In general, he said that it was important for the sake of public opinion not to dismiss the talk of peace and relaxation of tension, but at the same time to retain a firmly anti-Communist stand internally. Summarizing his view, Mr. Pineau said that security requirements should be maintained, Europe should be built up, and exchanges should be increased.

The Secretary said he wished to say something which he hoped Mr. Pineau would not consider presumptuous. He would like to suggest that in any public statements he might make, he should state that military defense and security are still important. The press of this country, he said, has had the tendency to attribute to Mr. Pineau the view that he no longer considers the military aspect of East-West relations important. So if Mr. Pineau could say in essence what he had said this morning to the Secretary, this would help to correct the impression which had been created.

Mr. Pineau said that when he states that the military issue is now less important than the economic issue, it is because he feels that the form taken by the Soviet offensive will be in the economic field, in order to promote penetration and subversion. He said that the Soviet peace offensives do have an effect upon public opinion in Western Europe. It is not enough to say that we do not believe in them. This is why Mr. Pineau has emphasized the issue of disarmament: in order to show that the West is pressing for it and that it is the Soviet Union which is refusing. Mr. Pineau said that we should not set security and the economic fields one against the other. It is a matter of relative emphasis.

The Secretary agreed and said that the Soviet Union is trying to obtain complete mastery in the military field so as to be able to checkmate the West. The reports of rapidly increasing construction of submarines, long-range missiles and bombers are most disturbing and we cannot allow the Soviet Union to get away with this. The cost of our military effort, he said is already upwards of $40 billion and is likely to go up. This effort cannot be minimized and deserves recognition both in the military and in the economic fields, which constitute a two-pronged effort. Neither one should be ignored at the expense of the other.

Mr. Pineau said that he had given a talk a few days ago in Paris which concerned itself with these varied problems. There was an English translation of the text of his talk which he would make available to us.

2. NATO:

The Secretary recalled that at the last Ministerial meeting it had been agreed that the scope of NATO should be developed. The US thinks that this should be primarily in political terms, which does not exclude consideration of economic factors. He doubted whether NATO should be converted into an operating economic organization. There were already many of these, such as OEEC, GATT, EPU, etc., and it was not desirable to superimpose an economic organization on top of a military one. He said that while we believe that economic matters in terms of their political impact could be discussed appropriately in the Council, the US did not believe NATO should operate in the economic field.

The Secretary said that greater use should be made of the Council within the broad field of political consultation concerning many problems which it would be better to discuss in common first before action is taken by any one country, rather than the other way around. For example: problems concerning relations of individual countries with the satellites, or estimates of the nature of the evolution taking place in the Soviet Union. It is a question of how to determine which actions should be delayed in order to permit discussion first, and which actions should be taken first. Speaking purely tentatively the Secretary said that the US is prepared to consider enlarging the scope and authority of our delegation to NATO, and having a representative spending part of his time in Washington and then exchanging posts with our representative in Paris. This would enable the representative in Washington to attend the Cabinet and National Security Council meetings and thus to be fully informed at the highest level on all matters pertaining to our national policies.

The Secretary mentioned that the Canadian Foreign Minister, Mr. Pearson, had come to Washington a week ago and that he had had an exchange of views with him.¹⁰ He recalled that Senator George had accepted an important appointment in connection with our desire to strengthen NATO ¹¹ and that a study group had been set up in Washington to concentrate on this problem. This shows the importance we attach to this matter. The Secretary said he felt that unless progress is made to strengthen NATO, the North Atlantic Community will tend to fall apart. Organizations, like living organisms, must develop or else shrink and wither. He said the time had come to put the emphasis on further growth. He did not think that this required any new organization or amendment to the treaty, but rather willingness on the part of members to discuss more matters in common. The US has no concrete proposals to make at this time. This is primarily the role of the three Ministers who were named at the last Council meeting.¹² The Secretary said he felt that the purely military aspects of the NATO alliance had about served their maximum capacity to draw together members of the Atlantic Community and to create an esprit de corps. While these aspects should not, of course, be neglected, they cannot now provide the invigorating stimulus which the organization needs. This role was fulfilled by the military aspects after the Korean aggression when it seemed that this might be the prelude to an aggression against Western Europe which, like Korea, is another peninsula attached to the great Eurasian continent. The Secretary reviewed the great and dominant role of Western civilization over the past one thousand years and how international dissensions had weakened the strength of the West and had thus precipitated the challenge to the West which we are facing. He said that there was much to be done to strengthen the Western Community of free nations.

Mr. Pineau expressed his agreement with the Secretary’s remarks and said that the emphasis of Soviet policy in the economic field meant that NATO must be given a greater political and economic role.

He recommended that this role take two principal forms: first, a real effort by the members to inform each other of what they are doing and how they view problems of mutual interest; and second, expanding political discussion and holding more carefully prepared meetings of the North Atlantic Council. He said he realized that certain problems were more difficult to discuss and settle than others; e.g., the problem of Cyprus has a direct impact on three NATO members. But he said that he had found a certain degree of willingness on the part of the three members concerned to consider the possibility of discussing this problem within the Council. If this could be achieved it would certainly constitute a great stimulus to further progress of this kind.

The Secretary mentioned that we had taken the initiative in having the matter of the reply to the letters sent by Bulganin to various NATO members discussed in the Council, and that this discussion had already started.

Mr. Pineau said that he thought that more could be attempted in the field of economic cooperation within NATO under two principal headings:

(1) It should be useful to discuss the political aspects of problems which were within the field of action of purely economic organizations. He gave as an example of this the desirability of making it possible for the Common Market to be established by graduated steps, which would require a modification of GATT.

(2) He suggested that there might be certain large joint undertakings which would be of concern to several members of NATO and which would be of strategic benefit to the whole NATO area. He mentioned as an example the idea of a tunnel under the English Channel which would have great advantages and might help to bring the United Kingdom into a closer relationship to the rest of Europe.

The Secretary said that we should certainly not exclude the kind of economic thinking alluded to by Mr. Pineau, but he was not sure that the UK would appreciate the idea of a tunnel under the Channel being put on the NATO agenda. The Secretary said he saw a danger in attempting to take steps which might seem to turn NATO into a substitute for agreements between countries. Any development of NATO should not be such as to suggest that it could be a substitute for close agreements between members, such as Euratom and the Common Market. NATO should remain essentially as a forum in which political consultation can take place.

3. Pineau Plan:

Mr. Pineau led off the discussion by saying that he was not going to repeat the substance of the Plan, which had already been submitted at the North Atlantic Council meeting in May. He wished, however, to stress a few points for the benefit of US public opinion and especially Congress.

(1) In his view the organization proposed would not have as its goal the suppression of bilateral or multilateral aid agreements, e.g.: between the US and other countries. He would illustrate what he meant by saying that if in one year the US were willing to devote 6 percent of its foreign aid program to the implementation of the plan he had in mind, this would be excellent. Even this 6 percent would be accounted for to Congress and subjected to inspection.

(2) There was no question of suppressing projects and arrangements which had already been started within existing UN organizations.

(3) Mr. Pineau said he wished to explain his conception of what are neutral countries. He thought that there was much loose language on the subject. He considered neutral countries to be those which do not belong to bilateral or multilateral pacts with Western countries. Such neutral countries as India, Cambodia and Laos are the ones which would derive the greatest benefits from the Plan he had proposed. He thought it was important to ask ourselves whether we should consider that because neutral countries are not already bound to us by pacts, this meant that they were against us. Or, on the contrary, are we going to consider such countries as being still with us, because they have not signed pacts with the other side? He felt that the answer to this question would determine whether his Plan was useful or not. He said that neutral countries in Asia were being subjected to a tremendous economic offensive by Red China and the Soviet Union. If we do not help “neutrals” these may be forced into the Soviet orbit. If we do give them help they may be saved.

Mr. Pineau said that Indo-French relations had become closer since his visit to New Delhi.¹³ He then announced that an agreement was being signed today between France and India whereby the latter would buy 125 “Mysteres” fighter aircraft. He stressed the significance of this saying that the West should make a tremendous effort in the direction of countries like India.

(4) Mr. Pineau said that if it is decided that a massive effort of aid to neutral countries should be undertaken, the character of this aid should be as multilateral as possible, rather than bilateral, in order to remove the fear of becoming too dependent on one country.

The Secretary said in reply that he had not thought of the Pineau Plan as raising primarily the question of our attitude to the so-called neutrals. He thought that the position of the US on this question was quite clear. The word “neutral” was used in many senses. It might be said that Switzerland was the only truly neutral country because it had refused to join the UN on the grounds that the principles in the Charter were inconsistent with true neutrality. The Secretary believed that the most important thing is that the countries of the kind mentioned by Mr. Pineau should not become an asset to Soviet Communism, to be used against us. He said that we are interested in them both as human beings and in the sense that if they were dominated by the Soviet Union it would be used against us. He said that we are perfectly willing to aid them and we have in fact quite substantial programs of aid in India, Cambodia and Laos; also a loan program of $25 million to Burma, as well as $100 million under the Agricultural Surplus Disposal Act to Indonesia, and we have an aid program for Yugoslavia. Thus while there are sharp differences of opinion in Congress and other countries as to whether we should do this or not, and while the Secretary could not guarantee the outcome of the foreign aid program for this coming year, it was certainly the view of the President and the Secretary that aid should be used to help the so-called neutral countries to remain outside the USSR control.

The Secretary said that the major objections to the idea of multilateral aid to the UN could be raised not on this ground, but with regard to how such a program would be administered, and whether it would in fact provide a cover behind which international Communism could carry out activities of subversion. Since the UN embraces certain Communist members there is ground for a fear that this might be the case. He said that the US had no clear judgment on this yet. As to the coming year, the US aid to the UN, still frozen in Congress, might amount to somewhere around $40 or $50 million. The Secretary went on to say that we will probably undertake a review of the whole foreign aid program between now and the next session of Congress and that the question of the desirability of developing a multilateral aid program under the UN would be carefully considered. He could not foretell what the results would be but he could assure Mr. Pineau that careful consideration would be given to the Pineau Plan. There were differences of opinion over here: Ambassador Cabot Lodge, who is at the UN, is inclined to favor the idea whereas some others are opposed. The Secretary thought it was unlikely that we would have settled views before the next session of Congress.

In conclusion, Mr. Pineau said he would like to make one or two brief observations. He said that if we ask the average man in the world what the total of US aid is versus the total aid given by the Soviet Union, he would have no idea. He thought that this showed the advantage of centralized statistics with wide publicity which would indicate clearly the extent of participation of each country. He also wished to tell the Secretary that Mikoyan had personally explained to him the secret of the success of Soviet aid. He had said that when the Soviet Union gives aid to a country it also agrees to buy the commodities which that country is trying to sell. By so doing the Soviet Union always has public opinion in that country with it, because it identifies aid from the Soviet Union with selling its own produce, whereas cold statistics of aid do not touch many people’s emotions.

The Secretary closed the discussion of the first session by observing that the US has had some experience with surpluses itself, and that it might be difficult to explain to the American public why we were buying more from other countries.

4. North Africa:

Mr. Pineau opened the discussion on North Africa at the Secretary’s invitation. Referring to Tunisia and Morocco he said that there had been some difficulties in the last few weeks in the matter of diplomatic representation. The situation was a delicate juridicial one pending the ratification of the Conventions between France and these two countries.¹⁴ However, the problem had been solved with regard to the exchange of ambassadors. The outlook for future negotiations was not unfavorable but there will be delicate points to be settled in the bilateral relations with these countries. Mr. Pineau said he would keep us informed and he asked us not to allow Morocco and Tunisia to play us off against France. He said these two countries have budgetary deficits and will be turning to everyone to ask for aid. This meant that it was most important to coordinate our approaches.

Mr. Pineau turned to the subject of US bases in Morocco. He said these could not be treated as part of the Convention which had been signed with Morocco, because this would have broadened its character too much. The Convention had to be limited to the subject of diplomatic representation in order that it should not be necessary to have it ratified by the French Parliament. The problem of the bases concerns both foreign affairs and defense, which have not yet been the subject of negotiation. The only aspect of defense which had been settled was that of the Moroccan Army.

Mr. Pineau said that the question of the bases could not be settled without US participation and that the talks would have to be tripartite.

He said that the exchange of letters between the French and Moroccan Governments,¹⁵ which had accompanied the Convention, had no bearing on the problem of the bases which should be settled in a separate Convention. He said that the French Government was ready to proceed with further discussions with us on the subject at our convenience.

The Secretary said that the US Government considers our agreement with the French Government on the bases in Morocco¹⁶ to be valid for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that responsibility should be assumed by the Moroccan Government. He said that practically speaking it was essential to obtain the agreement of the Moroccan Government, which could not be ignored whatever the legal situation might be. He said that the US is not disposed itself to invite any negotiation because our position is that our base agreement with the French Government is still valid. We would prefer the talks to be tripartite. However, if the Moroccans preferred to talk on a bilateral basis, we would reserve our position and inform the French Government in order to consult on the situation which might result.

Mr. Pineau said that this was a delicate point. If the talks were bilateral it would be difficult to reconcile this with the Secretary’s argument that the commitment made with France was for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty. There was also the practical aspect of the danger of the Moroccans being “rapacious” and asking more and more in return for the bases, especially if talks were conducted outside of the present agreement.

The Secretary said he did not mean to imply that the US was prepared to start bilateral talks, but only that we do not wish to exclude at this time the possibility of having bilateral talks. As he had told Mr. Pineau already, we would keep the French Government informed.

Mr. Pineau said he wised to emphasize that the Franco-US Base Agreement conferred not only certain rights but also certain obligations, which the Moroccan Government is incapable of carrying out.

The Secretary said he assumed the French would inform us in the same way that we would inform it, of any approach or discussion with the Moroccans, and Mr. Pineau agreed.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Pineau whether he had any views on Tunisia and Morocco joining the UN. Mr. Pineau said France was prepared to take the initiative in proposing them as members and the Secretary said he thought this was a good idea. Mr. Pineau observed that no time had been lost, since the Franco-Tunisian Convention had only just been concluded. He pointed out that admission could not take place until the General Assembly meets in November. The Secretary remarked that Security Council approval could be obtained at any time and that the Arab States might sponsor their admission if France did not act promptly.

Mr. Pineau turned to the subject of Algeria and stressed the considerable military effort by France which had resulted in the military situation now being under control (“repris en main”). He said there was no longer any risk of a military victory by the rebels. However, France was far from having solved the internal security situation and this would be a long and arduous matter. This did not mean that France would refuse any and all negotiations with the rebels, but France would certainly not negotiate under the auspices of outsiders such as Egypt. The negotiations would have to be with France only.

He said that there were two stages: (1) A cease-fire with those fighting; (2) The question of the future status of Algeria.

The latter could not be negotiated with the fighting rebels, who cannot be said to represent the Algerian population. The case had been different in Morocco and Tunisia which had governments and established political parties. It was difficult for France to say what the basis for negotiations would be, since France would wish to start the negotiations at the point where the others would want to leave off.

Mr. Pineau said that he would now give the Secretary a very general and confidential indication of what seemed to the French Government to be the basis for the future relationship between Algeria and France. He gave three examples: One of the States within the US; a German Land within the Federal Republic of Germany; and a Soviet Republic within the USSR.

Mr. Pineau said that there had hitherto been no official contact with the rebels. There had been informal contact and discussions in which the French had learned that the rebels feared reprisals if they put down their arms. The French Government had been at pains to give assurances to the rebels on this point.

Summing up the French Government position, Mr. Pineau said that it was not asking for help, but for understanding on the part of its allies and for the avoidance of any action adverse to French interests with regard to Algeria. He asked whether the US Government could talk to certain countries which were financially obligated to the US, e.g.: Libya, which asks the US for money while permitting traffic in arms into Algeria. He said it would be very helpful if the US could influence the Libyan Government to put an end to this, but that France would ask for nothing else.

The Secretary asked how big this volume of traffic is said to be. Mr. Pineau said that it was not large now but that it is increasing and could be expected to continue increasing. He added that there was also some arms traffic coming in from Northern Morocco with the connivance of the Spanish Government. Mr. Pineau added that the Spanish Government was being “imprudent” in this matter and that its conduct was unfortunate particularly in view of the moderation of the French Government and its desire to help the Spanish Government in Morocco.

5. Middle East:

Mr. Pineau said that he would not attempt to discuss the whole question of the Middle East. He said he had two principal aspects in mind. First, the problem of Israeli-Arab relations and the role of Egypt. Second, the problem of arms deliveries to Israel. On the first point the French Government had been seriously disappointed by the recent Soviet vote in the Security Council, which had been contrary to what the Soviet Union had said to the French representatives in Moscow.¹⁷ He suggested that it would be desirable that various courses of action should be foreseen within the scope of the Security Council, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. He said that there should be a determination of possible UN action, and increased consultation among the allies in event of hostilities in the area, with particular study of the Egyptian attitude.

Mr. Pineau spoke at some length on the current trend of Egyptian policy and on the danger of Egypt linking her policy to that of the Soviet Union. He said that Colonel Nasser had perhaps started his flirtation with the Soviet Union in order to mark his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, but he had gone much further in this direction. Mr. Pineau suggested the possibility of studying this problem, either among ourselves or in NATO, because of the possible danger to the Mediterranean area. He said that he did not consider the situation to be extremely urgent or dangerous now, but that it was better to take measures at this time than too late. He said that Tunisia and Morocco, which are not particularly sympathetic to Egypt, are already worried. He said he thought the problem should be certainly studied together with the UK because the policies of the three Western Governments were not sufficiently coordinated.

Mr. Pineau then stressed the difficulties created for France by her being the only Western country which has been helping Israel with arms shipments. The Israeli Government had been indiscreet and had publicized these arms deliveries. A further complication had been that although France had notified the Washington “organization” (Ambassadorial Committee on Arms Shipments to the Near East) of all requests which France had received for arms, she had not received replies from the Committee, and as a result each country was going ahead on its own.

Mr. Pineau alluded to 24 F–86 fighter planes which Canada had been advised to deliver to Israel. France had not heard of what had happened to this shipment. He said that France had received important orders for arms shipments to Saudi Arabia [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. The French Government would like to know whether the US had also been asked by Saudi Arabia to sell arms to her [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

The Secretary said that it was possible that the problem of Egypt might be usefully discussed in the North Atlantic Council, and considered even in broader terms in view of the strategic importance to NATO countries of the availability of oil. He said that the West draws some 2-½ million barrels a day from the Middle East and that if this flow were curtailed, it would be a very serious matter both for the economy and for the military aspect of the West. There are two problems: (a) The political problem; and (b) the problem of delivery of the oil, which is in practice under the control of Egypt and Syria, both of which are exposed to Soviet influence. If delivery of the oil were interrupted, there are not enough tankers to ship more than half the oil needed around the Cape, and we could not compensate for the balance from this side of the Atlantic. Therefore, said the Secretary, such a discussion would be consistent with the desire to broaden the scope of NATO. There was also the possibility that Egypt would become a base for hostile operations, and a gateway for the penetration of Africa. The Secretary said he had discussed these aspects of the problem with Foreign Minister Pearson.

With regard to arms shipments to Israel, said the Secretary, Mr. Pearson had told him that the Canadian Government has been considering the request for some F–86’s, but it had not so far acted favorably on the request, and the matter would be taken up later within the Canadian Cabinet, where there seemed to be some differences of opinion.

The US had been sending some small stuff to Israel which was useful but not spectacular. Since April we had shipped $2.3 million worth of goods, including some commercial aircraft.

The Secretary noted that there was a strong feeling in the Arab world that Jewish influence in the US is so great, particularly in an election year, that it can dictate US policy in favor of Israel and against the Arab world. The Secretary said that we have been concerned not to appear to confirm this opinion, and that this is one of the reasons why we do not want to make large shipments to Israel or to the Arabs at this time. Also, we like to think that we are able to exert some influence on the Arabs and we think that we have been able to do so. We do not want to throw away this asset.

With regard to Saudi Arabia, we have an important, though not indispensable, base there, of which the agreement is in course of renegotiation. We also have very important oil interests there. Saudi Arabia, said the Secretary, is the only Middle Eastern country which has obtained substantial supplies from the US. We have followed the principle of refraining from supplying arms to Arab countries with frontiers contiguous to Israel. Saudi Arabia is remote from Israel, and its armed forces are located far away from it with deserts in between. It is also a fact that the US has been a traditional supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia. We recently shipped 18 medium tanks to that country, in spite of British unhappiness, on a reimbursable basis. We had told the British that we felt that if we did not supply arms, the Saudi Arabs would get them anyway. They have been asking for arms in connection with the renegotiation of the base agreement. We are prepared to let them buy some modest quantity of arms in connection with the renegotiation. The UK opposition to arms shipments to Saudi Arabia is probably due to the fear that these might be used in a conflict with the UK such as that of the Buraimi Oasis. The Saudi Arabs were getting from the Egyptians some arms of British origin which have been displaced by Egyptian orders of arms from Czechoslovakia. In conclusion, said the Secretary, our position was that it was not possible to prevent Saudi Arabia from getting arms and that it is therefore better that it should obtain them from a free country.

Mr. Pineau stressed that he was not criticizing US supplies to Saudi Arabia but only wanted to know what the US policy was. He did not wish to discuss US election matters. He only wished to express his thought that US supplies to Israel might make Nasser pause and reflect.

The Secretary commented that the news from Cairo in connection with Shepilov’s visit¹⁸ was unsatisfactory. He said that if the renegotiation of our agreement with Saudi Arabia regarding Dhahran Airfield were satisfactorily concluded, it was possible that the US might then consider changing its present policy with regard to arms shipments to Israel.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Pineau whether he could specify on what subjects there had been delays by the Washington Committee of Ambassadors, as he had stated. (At this point the French Ambassador spoke into the Foreign Minister’s right ear with a certain anxiety of facial expression.) Mr. Pineau replied to the Secretary that the question of the Mystere fighters had taken a long time but he did not wish to take up details but only to stress the importance of the principles of greater coordination and faster action.

6. European Integration:

Mr. Pineau opened the discussion by saying that the French Government had felt that the agreement on the principles of a settlement of the Saar problem had been a very useful development.¹⁹ The Secretary said that he wished to repeat what he had already said to Mr. Pineau: that he considered this had been an act of farsighted statesmanship by France which constituted an assurance of future peace within Europe.

Mr. Pineau reviewed the results of the Venice conference of May 29²⁰ and the agreement which had been reached, providing for a conference in Brussels on June 26 to start drafting treaties for Euratom and the Common Market. He stressed that we must foresee certain difficulties but he felt that success would come if certain errors were avoided such as: giving any appearance of revenge by the former supporters of the EDC. The French Government felt that ratification of Euratom and the Common Market must be separate. Euratom should be ratified first. If people tried to go too fast and make Euratom depend on the Common Market, this would create difficulties.

Mr. Pineau said that his Government was in favor of Euratom exercising control over fissionable material. He thought that while Chancellor Adenauer might personally agree to this, there was opposition in Germany. With regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, he said that the French Parliament was reluctant to commit France never to make an atomic bomb. France was in favor of a moratorium at the expiration of which the matter would be reconsidered. It would admittedly be difficult to draft such provisions in the treaty, but otherwise there would be a risk of the failure of Euratom. It was not going to be an easy matter in any case since the French Government would have against it both the Communists on the left, and the Poujadists on the right.

With regard to the Common Market, Mr. Pineau said that a major difficulty was the need for harmonization of social legislation between members. Spaak had proposed a series of graduated steps of four years’ duration each, but Pineau said he had recommended that progress be recorded not on the basis of a fixed time table but of the fulfillment of certain goals, such as the lowering of tariffs and harmonization of social legislation. Another difficulty, he said, was the inclusion of overseas territories within the Common Market area in order to prevent a gulf being created between a metropolitan member and its overseas territories. Moreover, this poses problems of investment which France cannot carry alone and she therefore welcomes multilateral participation in an overseas investment program. Mr. Pineau said that if these major difficulties could be solved, success would be assured, but if not, the price might be failure.

Mr. Pineau asked the Secretary specifically whether he could tell him what Chancellor Adenauer thinks about these matters.

The Secretary said he first wanted to tell Mr. Pineau how gratified the US is by the progress made on the prospects for Euratom and the Common Market. The President was personally very deeply interested, as Mr. Pineau knew, and had stressed the theme of European unity in his London speech in 1951,²¹ of which the Secretary had given Prime Minister Mollet a copy. The Secretary said that he himself also had long signified his interest in, and support for European unification, e.g.: in a speech he had made in Paris in November 1948.²² Now that the USSR was entering the economic field it was most important that the European countries themselves should build up peaceful atomic energy and a Common Market, in order to lower the cost of production and improve Europe’s competitive position in the face of the emergence of the Soviet Union as an industrial power in the world. The President had referred to this matter in his recent Texas speech in a passage written with his own hand.²³ The US did not wish to thrust itself forward in a matter of primary concern to Europe, but we were deeply interested.

These matters had been discussed with Chancellor Adenauer while he was here²⁴ and the Secretary felt he could say that he had told Adenauer that, in his view, there should not be a legal link between Euratom and the Common Market and that progress which can be made in one of them should not be held back because of slower progress with the other. The Secretary said the US would undoubtedly have a closer relationship with Euratom than with individual countries. He considered the control function of Euratom important, particularly since Germany under the Brussels Treaty had renounced the use of atomic weapons. Chancellor Adenauer had mentioned his fear that control by Euratom might lead to socialization of the atomic energy industry. The Secretary said that of course we are not sympathetic to socialization either. However, in the US there is strict government control over all fissionable material, and so far as the question of releasing such material to private industry is concerned, this will probably be done by retaining title to the material, and continuing to exercise strict controls. The Secretary said he had made it clear to Chancellor Adenauer that the US Government favored similar action by Euratom. If Euratom did not, however, retain actual title, then the control to be exercised should be as complete in all respects as if title were retained. The fundamental problem is the establishment and maintenance of adequate controls.

Mr. Pineau said that the socialization of industry would certainly not be a matter to be decided on, or imposed by Euratom, but of decision by individual countries according to the internal policies of their governments. What was important was absolute control of the use and disposal of fissionable materials. Mr. Pineau insisted again on the question whether Adenauer had expressed a personal point of view on Euratom and the Common Market. The Secretary said he had the impression that the Germans would prefer to tie together Euratom and the Common Market and that Adenauer was opposed to the title to fissionable material remaining in Euratom from fear that this might lead to the socialization of industry. The Secretary said he had told Mr. Adenauer he did not think this fear was well grounded, but of course he did now know whether he had convinced him. However, Adenauer’s initial approach had been negative on the above two points.

7. Franco-US Trade:

The Secretary raised two points: (1) The liberalization of dollar imports into France, and (2) the French compensatory tax on imports from the US. He stressed to Mr. Pineau the difficulties which the Administration faced in implementing its liberal trade program. Protectionist minority groups made their voice heard and their influence felt. It was hard to argue against local groups which publicized their grievances. While the whole country would benefit from more liberal trade it was difficult to illustrate specific advantages in a dramatic way. He said it would help the US Government greatly to defend and maintain more liberal trade policies if France could take favorable action on the two points he had mentioned.

Mr. Pineau said that on the basis of what had been France’s international exchange position in 1955, the request of the US would be justified. However, two adverse factors had crept in this year: (1) The extensive damage caused by the frost last winter which amounted to the value of about 200 billion francs. As a result, France faced the need to buy wheat, cereals, and other produce. (2) A tendency of the general price levels to rise, partly as a result of the damage caused by the frost, and partly because of a rise in the cost of steel related to the Coal and Steel Community program. There was also the problem of commitments entered into by France with other countries which would become members of the Common Market. Mr. Pineau admitted that the compensatory tax was an adverse factor in so far as the US was concerned, but said that it was not discriminatory against the US. He proposed that the matters raised by the Secretary should be referred to experts, taking into account the present French economic situation on which he was prepared to give all the information required.

8. Indochina:

Mr. Pineau lead off by saying that the results of the London Conference had been satisfactory.²⁵ The Soviet Union had given up any idea of calling a conference on Indochina and seemed agreeable to the postponement of the elections in Vietnam. Mr. Pineau referred to the Geneva Agreements and to the difficulties arising from the fact that Vietnam had not signed them so that the matter of the withdrawal of the French expeditionary corps still needed to be settled. He asked the Secretary to what extent the US felt that France should continue to play a military role in Vietnam. He said he thought that it might be useful for France to continue to do so in view of the fact that the US had not signed the Geneva Agreements. Mr. Pineau then said that he was anxious to conclude the pending military negotiations with the Vietnamese Government. He recalled that in Paris the Secretary had suggested that France should maintain instructors in that area and there were difficulties in this respect which should be settled.²⁶ Mr. Pineau mentioned the problem of the transit through South Vietnam of small amounts of military material for the base in Laos given to France under the Geneva Agreements. He also said that the Vietnamese were applying overly elaborate clearance procedures for French ships stopping at Saigon, whereas the French had requested that the Vietnamese limit themselves to the shorter procedures governing allied shipping.

The Secretary said that he was not sufficiently conversant with these matters to discuss these specific points but that the Department would be glad to look into them and do what we could to help. The US wanted Franco-Vietnamese relations to be good. Prime Minister Diem, he said, had many virtues and some defects, among which might be mentioned suspiciousness and obstinacy. We also occasionally had difficulties with him because of this, but we were convinced that his virtues outnumbered his defects.

The session concluded at about 5:30 p.m. This marked the end of the substantive discussion between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Pineau. A final session was held on Wednesday morning, June 20, from 10:00 a.m. to about 12:00 noon, of which the first hour and the last twenty minutes were attended by the Secretary and Mr. Pineau, and which was entirely devoted to revising and approving the final Communiqué.²⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 712. Secret. Drafted by Tyler on June 21.
2. President Eisenhower had undergone surgery on June 9 and was in Walter Reed Hospital until June 30. He saw Pineau for 20 minutes on June 20. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Appointment Book)
3. Mollet and Pineau were in Moscow, May 15–19.
4. Jules Moch, Permanent French member of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and the Subcommittee of the Commission, which met in London, March 19–May 4, 1956.
5. For text of President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal, see vol. V, p. 450.
6. Reference is to Pineau’s proposal, made during the North Atlantic Council meeting, May 4–5, 1956, at Paris, that NATO members jointly request the United Nations to establish a World Economic Development Agency; see vol. IV, pp. 51 ff.
7. For text of the communiqué issued at the end of the visit of Mollet and Pineau to Moscow, see The New York Times, May 20, 1956, p. 2.
8. Professor of Political Economy at the University of Lyon.
9. For text of Bulganin’s letter to President Eisenhower, June 6, see Noble Frankland, editor, Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (New York, 1959), pp. 591–593.
10. Lester Pearson visited Washington, June 9–11, for wide-ranging discussions on matters of mutual concern to the United States and Canada. Memoranda of these discussions are in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D199.
11. Senator Walter F. George became Special Ambassador of the United States to NATO on January 3, 1957.
12. For documentation on the appointment of a committee of three “wise men” by the North Atlantic Council to advise it on political coordination, see vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.
13. Pineau was in New Delhi on March 13.
14. Reference is to the diplomatic accords giving independence to Morocco, May 20, 1956, and to Tunisia, June 15, 1956.
15. For texts of the letters, May 20, 1956, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, p. 714.
16. For text of the French-U.S. agreement, December 22, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1768–1770.
17. Reference is to the June 4 Soviet vote in favor of a British resolution on the Middle East. For extensive documentation, see volumes XV and XVI.
18. Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov visited Cairo, June 17–22.
19. See footnote 3, Document 17.
20. The conference was attended by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
21. For text of General Eisenhower’s speech before the English Speaking Union at London, July 3, 1951, see Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, pp. 163–165.
22. Dulles addressed the American Club of Paris, November 18, 1948; see The New York Times, November 19, 1948, p. 12.
23. For text of the President’s address at the Baylor University commencement ceremonies, May 25, 1956, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 526–537.
24. For documentation on Adenauer’s visit to Washington, June 12–14, see vol. XXVI, pp. 106–126.
25. See footnote 6, Document 18.
26. A report of the Secretary’s conversation with Pineau in Paris, May 2, 1956, is printed in vol. I, p. 676.
27. For text of the communiqué, June 20, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 405–407.