257. Position Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs1

BERMUDA MEETINGS—MARCH 21–24, 1957

U.S. Objectives

A.
The most important objective is to restore confidence in the Anglo-American relationship without detracting from the achievement of U.S. policy goals in other areas. With regard to the public, this objective requires reaching the optimum number of agreements with the British on specific U.S.–U.K. problems of a type which can be made public (in contrast with the communiqué and general statement of principles which resulted from the Washington talks with Eden last January).2 As far as Governments are concerned, this objective means re-establishing the practice of prior consultation with the British on the basis of frank interchanges of views wherever this practice was interrupted as a result of our recent difference over the Middle East.
B.
The second objective is to obtain re-affirmation of British support for U.S. policies in areas such as Europe where our policies have been parallel and to obtain their firm support wherever possible for U.S. courses of action relating to other areas, particularly the Middle East and Far East.
C.
The achievement of both major objectives depends on working out mutually consistent policies in the Middle East, Far East, and U.N. operation, for we cannot count on the British indefinitely as close allies in Europe if there continue to be major differences with them in other areas.
D.
In turn, the implementation of these policies requires a clear determination of the respective roles to be played by the United States and the United Kingdom in different areas of the world. The Bermuda meeting offers an opportunity for the President to ascertain the extent of the reduction of British overseas military and economic commitments being undertaken by the Macmillan Government in its vigorous effort to remedy Britain’s chronic economic difficulties. It offers both participants the opportunity to evaluate the impact of this reduction on the influence and position of the western democracies among other peoples and to explore those areas in which it may be desirable for the U.S. to assume responsibilities which the British must now relinquish.
E.
We wish to maintain Britain as an important and effective ally. The President and Prime Minister may wish to discuss defense problems, such as the U.K. contribution to N.A.T.O. and, if consideration of them is sufficiently advanced, some aspects of the Sandys’ talks held here during the week of January 28.
  1. Source: Department of State,BNA Files: Lot 64 D 241, 5A. Secret. Enclosed as Tab A to a memorandum drafted by Dale and sent by Elbrick through Murphy to the Secretary of State. Dulles approved its use as the basis for discussion with the British and other U.S. Government agencies in connection with the meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda, March 21–23. The Secretary also approved Tab B, Department of State modifications to the British suggested agenda for the Bermuda talks. Macmillan wished to reserve certain topics for his personal discussions with the President. Dulles wrote on the bottom of Dale’s memorandum, “I believe Dept shld also study the ‘reserved’ UK items.”
  2. See footnote 2, Document 230.