22. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

4446. Eyes only for Dulles from Stassen.2 Under constant exposure to European press and European personnel have reflected on French situation with relation to US interests and submit for such consideration as you may wish to give it, this concept—

The US could obliquely suggest through US Embassy Paris or through State Washington that if the French brought forward a new program for assisting in the economic development of the less developed areas that have French language and French cultural background, the US would cooperate in such a program. It could include Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, Syria, Lebanon, Tunis, Morocco (Algeria), Haiti, New Caledonia, French Equatorial [Guinea]. It might be called something like the Mollet Plan for the Economic Development of Areas with a Cultural Association with France. The French need a psychological lift, a new external concept with some hope and prestige and an esprit de corps for maintaining and expanding their own economic relationship to the rest of the world without colonialism. It would be somewhat like what the Colombo Plan has done for the British.

The French tend to sink in gloom about the loss of colonies, and to be slow to grasp economic potential which not only could be maintained, but sometimes improved as in the case of the British in India. The French tend to have suspicions that the US is trying for selfish reasons to replace France in areas of traditional French interest. The French Socialists want to emphasize the economic side but do not seem to know how to accomplish it. They are dangerously open to a Soviet advance of economic development partnership. It seems in the US interest to move first and to do so prior to Mollet’s visit to Moscow.3 It would appear that US participation could entirely take the form of French francs generated through the use of US surplus agricultural products particularly in view of decreased European food production resulting from the severe winter. It would be important that the [Page 49] concept be first publicized as a distinctly French initiative and later by pre-arrangement given some support by the US.4

Barbour
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 851.05100/4–556. Secret; Priority.
  2. Stassen was in London attending meetings of the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.
  3. Prime Minister Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau visited Moscow, May 15–19.
  4. In telegram 6081 to London, April 12, the Secretary rejected Stassen’s proposal because he considered that the problem of declining French prestige should be viewed in terms of combatting Soviet economic offensives rather than as merely a French problem, and he doubted whether Congress or the American public would support such a U.S.-financed scheme. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5–MSP/4–1256)