191. Editorial Note
A separate memorandum of the conversation recorded supra covered discussion by Dulles and FRANCO of Yugoslavia. This memorandum reads as follows:
“The Secretary raised the question of United States policy toward Yugoslavia. He said that he did not expect General FRANCO necessarily to agree with our policy, but that he would like to make sure that he understood it. He said that since Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet orbit, the United States had granted it very substantial military and economic aid. This was not because we had any sympathy for Communism or the Communist Government which Tito headed in Yugoslavia. The Secretary said, however, that he felt it was important that if any satellite detached itself from Moscow, it should find benefits available from the West. He said that it was classic Communist doctrine with respect to the colonial or dependent areas to follow what [Page 553] might be described as a two-stage operation. The first phase was to detach the colonial or dependent areas from the Western powers by an appeal to nationalism. The second phase was time to absorb or, as Stalin termed it, ‘amalgamate’the detached areas into the Communist community. The Secretary said that he believed that in the process of disintegrating the monolithic structure of the present Communist empire, it might well be necessary for us to follow a somewhat similar two-stage program. The first stage would be to encourage nationalistic forces within a satellite with a view to promoting its separation from the control of Moscow. This would result, if successful, in the establishment of a nationalist Communist state, such as Yugoslavia, which was attached neither to the East nor the West. To do so required the offer of inducements and in effect setting up of an intermediate situation, in which such a state which had broken away from Moscow would be able to maintain its independence and procure economic and other benefits from the West, as well as from the East. The second stage, which might require a considerable period of time, would be the gradual modification of the Communist structure of the detached state.
“The Secretary concluded by saying that he was anxious that General FRANCO should understand that the economic and other benefits which we had accorded Yugoslavia were due neither to an approval of Tito’s regime nor an indiscriminate showering of benefits on any European state but fundamentally based on a long-term strategic plan of the United States.
“General FRANCO replied that he could understand this reasoning and that there was great merit in it. He expressed the fear, however, that the pursuit of this policy would set up dangerous forces in certain Western European countries. Specifically, he said, however, that he feared it would give prestige to the Communist Parties in certain Western European countries who could orchestrate the appeal to patriotism or nationalism with the appeal to social reform. In other words, he feared that the acceptance and, in fact, the economic support of national Communism in a detached satellite would improve the position of the Communist Parties in Italy and France, for example, even though it might encourage a separatist movement in other satellites.
“The Secretary acknowledged this risk [5½ lines of source text not declassified].
“General FRANCO gave the appearance of being genuinely impressed with this line of argument.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 572)