Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

182. Memorandum From Edwin G. Moline of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Jones)¹

Washington, November 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position on Current Scandinavian Civil Air Negotiations²

1. The Scandinavian Delegation is interested not only in making permanent SAS’s right to the polar route terminating at Los Angeles, but will undoubtedly also seek to have San Francisco as a second point of origin and destination on this route.SAS’s desire to have such rights in San Francisco is supported by the Scandinavian delegation on the grounds that within a number of years SAS will be severely handicapped in competing with domestic carriers who have begun to operate another polar route (to Paris) and with access to several points of origin and destination. SAS will probably ask for the designation of San Francisco as a substitute for Chicago. (SAS had landing rights in Chicago under the existing air agreement but has not used this privilege.)

2. The domestic airlines, most notably Pan American Airlines, oppose granting SAS the use of San Francisco. The real reason, of course, is that the airlines, as commercial enterprises, do not wish to see competitive enterprises achieve a stronger position. The reasoning offered by the domestic airlines for opposing the anticipated Scandinavian request for the use of San Francisco is that the Air Agreement with the Scandinavian States³ was intended to secure roughly equal advantages for the Scandinavian and U.S. carriers. But in fact the Scandinavian carriers have secured great advantages and the American carriers have gained very little from the existence of the Air Agreement. The domestic airlines contend that granting SAS rights in San Francisco would further unbalance an already unbalanced situation.

3. The domestic airlines have no desires in connection with rights in Scandinavia that might serve as a counter-concession against the Scandinavian request for the use of San Francisco. In fact, it has only been under the prodding of the State Department that Pan American has made any significant use at all of U.S. rights under the existing Air Agreement.

4. The BNA representative on the U.S. delegation has informed the other members on the delegation that, aside from aviation-economic and technical considerations, his office would favor granting landing rights at San Francisco to SAS because of political and psychological considerations. These considerations derive from the necessity for the United States to practice the economic liberalism and the willingness to sacrifice in the interest of free world cooperation, that we have constantly urged upon the European powers; and our retreat from these principles whenever a domestic commercial interest may suffer would seriously endanger the American position of moral leadership among the free nations of the world.⁴

5. At the moment it appears that most members of the delegation are impressed by the domestic airlines argumentation, and by the potential Congressional and political support available to the domestic airlines. It is believed that strong intercession by the highest levels in EUR may be required before the negotiations have been completed.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.57A94/11–857. Confidential. Drafted by Alexander C. Johnpoll of BNA.
2. The Ambassadors of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden informed the Department of State on January 22, 1957, that their governments wished to revise existing air transport agreements. The memorandum of their conversation with repesentatives of the U.S. Government is ibid., 611.5894/1–1557. Documentation on the negotiations, which began on Novemer 6, 1957, and culminated in an agreement signed on July 8, 1958, is ibid., 611.57A94. For text of the 1958 Agreement, see 9 UST 1005, 1009, and 1012.
3. Reference is to the agreement relating to the establishment of an air route between Scandinavia and the United States by way of Greenland, signed August 6, 1954. (TIAS 3013–3015 and 5 UST 1411, 1422, 1433)
4. The attached text of a speech to be delivered by Mr. Dillon on Nov. 9 raises this issue, in the marked passages. [Handwritten footnote in the source text. The attachment is not printed. For text of Dillon’s speech before the Western States Council at San Francisco, November 9, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1957, pp. 877–881.]