Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

18. Memorandum of a Conversation, French Embassy, Karachi, March 7, 1956, 1:30 p.m.¹

USDel/MC 7

Karachi, March 7, 1956, 1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Young
• France
  • Foreign Minister, Mr. Pineau
  • Mr. Daridan
  • Mr. Roux
  • Mr. St. Mieux

SUBJECT

• Various Issues in Europe, North Africa, Middle East, and Far East

The Foreign Minister outlined several points regarding European, North African, Near Eastern and Far Eastern problems. He first emphasized to the Secretary his friendly feelings toward the U.S., and pointed out that he had several “family relationships” with America.

Regarding problems in Europe, he made several points. First, he said there had been several misinterpretations of his recent speech in Paris.² The most important error was the statement that he favored neutralization of Germany. Mr. Pineau said that he had never made any such statement and that it was completely contrary to his whole concept. He had made a general remark that the neutralization of any country would be different depending on whether it developed under conditions of general disarmament or of rearmament. He went on to say that he had just had friendly conversations with Chancellor Adenauer and other German leaders.³ Pineau expressed a hopeful confidence that an agreement would be reached between France and West Germany.

As to the integration of Europe, he explained to the Secretary that he wished to follow a cautious, conservative policy because he did not want to have a repetition of the EDC episode in the French Assembly. He pointed out that he had been one of the few Deputies to favor the EDC at the Brussels Conference⁴ and that he had been one of the few members to predict the failure of EDC.

Mr. Pineau said he also wanted to explain the policy of the French Socialists regarding the Communist Party as this was a very important question on which there was considerable confusion. He stated that the Communists have no worse enemy than the Socialists because the latter stand for the genuine improvement in standards of living. However, he had been impressed for several years, and particularly during the recent French elections, that the “peace” propaganda of the Communists is having a great effect on the people. Therefore, he considers that the most effective way to fight Communist propaganda in the West is to be more pacifist or peace-minded than the Communists, though even with that means there should be no illusions as to Communist intentions. Consequently, he felt that the West should spearhead the disarmament movement. Mr. Pineau thought that President Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin was excellent for this purpose.⁵

A related specific problem in fighting Communist propaganda is to increase the circulation of people behind the Iron Curtain. He had mentioned this at the first session of the SEATO Council and thought he should have emphasized it more. Of course, any such wider exchange of persons must be reciprocal. In his opinion, the opening up of the Communist areas to Western ideas would yield enormous results.

Mr. Pineau then said he wished to take up specific problems regarding North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. In general, he regretted the lack of a common policy among the U.S., U.K. and France in all of these three areas.

Regarding North Africa, he said the French Government had given plenty of proof that it was not following a policy of colonialism. It was proposing independence for Morocco and Tunis. The difficulty is Algeria, which is far different from the other two areas. There are no recognized leaders nor any political party with whom to deal. Furthermore, the population in Algeria is different from that in Morocco and Tunis where the majority of the European population are civil officials and can either find other work or return to France following independence. But in Algeria, there are 1,200,000 French citizens who are more Algerian than French. They include persons of French, Italian, Maltese and other origins who have no home but Algeria. If they are expelled, they will be banished from their motherland. Under present conditions, negotiations are difficult if not impossible regarding Algeria. To press for them now would push the European population to the extremity of civil war and France wishes above all to avoid bloodshed. Therefore, the French Government has proposed free elections as the only means to obtain a party with whom to carry on discussions regarding a new status for Algeria. In view of the two different populations, France is now in a vicious circle. Therefore, there must be a minimum of order and security before elections can be held to choose leaders or spokesmen. In the meantime, France has proof that the Arab League, with Communist support, is stirring up the Arab community. Badges have been found in Algeria brought in by the Arab League from Cairo and made in Hungary. The basic question according to Mr. Pineau is that the security of North Africa involves the whole Western world which means that the U.S., U.K. and France should coordinate their policy there.

Mr. Pineau also commented on the military problems in Algeria. The French Government has considered it necessary to increase its forces by withdrawing troops from Europe. Mr. Pineau paid tribute to General Gruenther’s excellent understanding of the French position. Mr. Pineau then suggested that the U.K., U.S. and France should join together to find a solution, the importance of which does not concern only France. He noted that during his talks with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn, the Chancellor had expressed his concern over North Africa since in his opinion any losses to France there would also be losses for Western Europe.

With regard to the Middle East, Mr. Pineau stated frankly that in the view of his Government, the Baghdad Pact had been a mistake because it had led to Arab exasperation and had given the Russians a pretext for intervening in the Middle East. Then Egypt had been able to play off both sides. Mr. Pineau expressed some disappointment over the Conference of Ambassadors in Washington. France is in the embarrassing position of being the only one of the Big Three to send arms to Israel which the French Government has considered advisable in order to keep a balance in the Middle East. Inasmuch as the U.S. and U.K. are taking a different attitude, it appears to the world that there is a divergence with France. Mr. Pineau regretted this and hoped that some coordinated policy could be developed.

With respect to Vietnam, Mr. Pineau also regretted that there was no common policy. There is the impression, perhaps a wrong one, that Diem is being encouraged in an anti-French policy. This is highly embarrassing to France. He admitted that the French Government had perhaps been wrong in not proposing a different solution than the policy of backing Diem. He also said that the French Government had been wrong in not being frank enough with the U.S. and Diem even after they agreed to support Diem. The net result has left France in an inferior position vis-à-vis the U.S. in Vietnam. Now the situation is becoming critical. Diem has not established a national union which he should have. The Vietminh can bring about an extremely dangerous situation by subversion.

Then there is another difficult situation caused by Diem’s demand for the withdrawal of French troops. Although the Geneva Accords are contradictory, they do compel France to comply with such a demand. The French do not regret the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam since they are needed in North Africa. However, the withdrawal does present the French with some difficult legal complications. If the troops are withdrawn that will mean abolition of the French High Command. Then it will be difficult for France to carry out its obligations under the Geneva Accords.

Another problem in Vietnam arises out of the presence of a considerable amount of American military matériel. Mr. Pineau supposed that most of this had been turned over to the Vietnamese as this was the American desire, but he did not know what the Vietnamese had done with it. In any event, he said that the U.S. ought to have control over this matériel and see to its upkeep. Unfortunately, the sending of U.S. military personnel seemed to be contrary to the Geneva Accords. That left only two ways of meeting the problem. The U.S. could send civilian personnel or Diem could ask to retain French military personnel to control this equipment.

Mr. Pineau said that he had had a talk with Selwyn Lloyd who told him of the proposed meeting of the co-chairmen.⁶ Pineau remarked that such a meeting would be useful.

Mr. Pineau brought up the French mission in North Vietnam. He said that his government wished to maintain a cultural and economic mission there under Mr. Sainteney.⁷ By the same token, the Vietnamese want to establish a mission in Paris which, in fact, they already have there.

As to Communist China, Mr. Pineau stated that the position of the Socialist Party is to recognize the Communist regime. However, the present French Government have firmly decided against taking any action under present circumstances. France would have only a commercial mission in Peiping which would be limited to commercial matters and have no diplomatic status. If the Chinese Communists wanted to, they might send a small commercial mission to Paris. Mr. Pineau said that the question of trade with Communist China was in a different category than recognition.

The Secretary replied to a number of points that Mr. Pineau had made. The Secretary expressed his appreciation for Mr. Pineau’s exposition. The Secretary said that it seemed to him that on the basis of Pineau’s remarks, agreement was possible between the United States and France which must keep close and friendly relations as they would be indispensable to both countries.

The Secretary said that he was gratified with Pineau’s statement regarding the neutralization of Germany. Without the controls in the North Atlantic Treaty and the Western European Union, neutralization of Germany would be a trap for the West. It would only produce a very powerful Germany between France and the Soviet Union. An unattached Germany would be very dangerous. Therefore, the Secretary emphasized the vital importance of developing the closest possible integration of Germany—especially military—with the Western defense orbit. Mr. Pineau agreed with these remarks.

Regarding North Africa, the Secretary said that French policy on Morocco and Tunis makes it clear that France has no desire to keep these people in a colonial status when they desire independence and are capable of having it. But as to Algeria, the Secretary said that he did not have sufficient understanding of the problem to speak extemporaneously. He pointed out that it would be desirable if French policies were better understood by the United States so that it might be possible to get a common policy as Mr. Pineau had suggested. The Secretary recognized that Algeria is a different problem from Morocco or Tunis. He did not fully understand the different formula proposed for Algeria. He thought it would be better to postpone consideration of this problem until it could be taken up in greater detail and with more time than is available in Karachi. He assured Mr. Pineau that the United States certainly desires to find a way to support a French position which can be made clearer. The Secretary said that he understood from Mr. Pineau’s remarks that the first phase, at least, of the present French program in Algeria is to use military strength to maintain order and put down insurrection. Mr. Pineau confirmed this impression. He reiterated that the solution used in Morocco and Tunis would bring civil war in Algeria. Consequently, the French Government is trying to establish a special status in Algeria which, in effect, would recognize a state on the basis of a dual population—neither French nor Muslim. Elections would be necessary to form a negotiating party, but could not be held until order was restored.

As to the Near East, the Secretary stated that he could not share Mr. Pineau’s opinion that the Baghdad Pact is the cause of the trouble. He thought it more likely that the Israeli raid on Gaza in February of last year⁸ might have precipitated recent difficulties. But the Secretary acknowledged that the Baghdad Pact had not been handled with the greatest of wisdom by the United Kingdom. We did not join the Pact, but we recognized its existence. The Secretary wondered if it were advantageous to take a negative attitude towards the Pact inasmuch as it is an existing fact and can not be dissolved without serious consequences. It is United States present policy, the Secretary explained, to give moral and material help to the Pact, but not to join it.

The Secretary mentioned the grave problem of Soviet infiltration in Egypt. It was clear that the Soviet Union intended to put its resources in Egypt and this part of the world which, in view of the importance of the oil resources of the Near East, could have a serious effect on NATO if successful. Therefore, it may be necessary to take grave measures in the very near future. Discussion will take place in Washington on this problem in a few days.

Turning to the Far East, the Secretary said that he would see President Diem in Saigon⁹ to urge him to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the International Control Commission and to favor nationwide elections on the basis of genuinely free conditions. The Secretary thought that on a psychological basis, it would be wise for Diem to come out strongly in favor of free elections. The Secretary pointed out that there was no more than a remote likelihood that free elections would ever be accepted in North Vietnam. In any event, we should not press Diem to hold elections unless and until conditions existed which would insure that elections would in reality be free. Mr. Pineau indicated his full agreement.

Regarding U.S. military equipment in Vietnam covered by the Ely–Collins Agreement,¹⁰ the Secretary explained that the United States attaches great importance to examining this equipment, determining its condition, and salvaging as much as possible. He said that it might amount to as much as five hundred million dollars’worth of matériel, although this might be an exaggeration. The United States believes it would be consistent with the armistice to send 350 military personnel on a temporary basis in civilian clothes. They would work under Department of Defense. Their job would be to make an inventory of this equipment and save it from being exposed to the weather and other conditions. The Vietnamese have no facilities for controlling this equipment which they can use. Moreover, the United States is under some pressure to send the types of matériel which may already be in Vietnam. The Secretary also emphasized that the United States is entitled to do this under the agreement with the French. It seems consistent with the crease-fire accord so long as the United States is not adding to the fighting strength in Vietnam. The Secretary said he expected to discuss this with Nehru¹¹ and hoped to satisfy him that it would be consistent with the armistice. Unless Nehru takes a strong stand, the Secretary indicated the United States would proceed with the recovery mission. He expressed the hope that the French would help us. However if Nehru should strongly oppose this project, then the United States would have to reconsider what line to take.

Concerning the training of Vietnamese forces, the Secretary told Mr. Pineau that the United States would consider it a contribution to the common cause if France would maintain training personnel for the Vietnamese air force and navy (220 and 70 men, respectively). French instructors are necessary in view of the severe limitation of approximately 342 American instructors. If the French trainers are removed and can not be replaced by Americans, there would be a serious loss in the Vietnamese military build-up.

Regarding the responsibilities for carrying out the armistice, the Secretary said that the cease-fire accords were loosely drawn and constitute an incoherent area. Vietnam has the right to request French withdrawal, but France and not Vietnam has the responsibility for executing the accord. Pineau replied that if the United States desires to have French military personnel remain in Vietnam, then Diem must request it from France since it is not up to the United States. The Secretary agreed. Mr. Pineau also pointed out the French view that there has developed in Vietnam an atmosphere so hostile to the French that it is almost impossible for them to stay on. As illustration he said that General Jacquot¹² had been arrested and “nearly assassinated” in Saigon by a Vietnamese army patrol a few days ago. This underlined the necessity for Diem to request the French to stay and to make it possible.

Mr. Robertson explained that of some billion two hundred million [dollars?] worth of equipment, about five hundred million has been turned over to the Vietnamese. Much of it is lying out in open spaces. It includes quantities of spare parts needed by the Vietnamese. As a result of the sudden and rapid withdrawal of the French forces, this equipment had been turned over to the Vietnamese without inventory—nobody knows how much. In order to continue the Ely–Collins Agreement, 1,000 French personnel would be needed in addition to 350 Americans. The job of recovery and control would probably take from 6 to 12 months.

Turning to the question of China, the Secretary expressed his appreciation that the French Government was not going to extend recognition. It is an extremely difficult position to try to hold the thin line of the island chain in the Western Pacific. Anything that increases the prestige of Communist China jeopardizes that line. Moreover, the Chinese Communists have not shown any disposition to be friendly even with those who have extended recognition. A case in point is the experience of the United Kingdom. The Secretary told Mr. Pineau that the United States’ talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva were not going well.¹³ The Chinese Communists still refused to give up their right to take Taiwan by force, which the United States would resist by force. It is difficult to tell what the real intentions of the Chinese Communists are. At the moment they have begun talking belligerently again, but it is difficult to tell exactly what this means. Until they show what they want, the Secretary said, he hoped the French would stay with us in not recognizing Communist China. He mentioned the fact that Mr. Lloyd had recently said in New Delhi that the United Kingdom was not now going to press for admission of Communist China into the United Nations.¹⁴ The Secretary emphasized that such admission or recognition would have bad effects on the anti-Communist position in East Asia.

Regarding trade with Communist China, the Secretary explained that the whole question was being restudied following the talks with Sir Anthony Eden. The Secretary said that he did not believe that there would be any great gain to be had by easing trade controls. The U.S. had agreed to make a study to determine if certain items might be eased in the interest of the free world. For instance, it might be shown to be advisable to put rubber on a quantitative list. It will depend on the merits of each case. He felt that any great change would be harmful. Mr. Pineau pointed out that in the French view, there is no logic to different levels for the U.S.S.R. and for Chinese Communists. The U.S.S.R buys things and sells them to China so it amounts to the same thing in the long run. Mr. Robertson pointed out that there was an advantage in the CHINCOM controls because they increased costs, slowed down deliveries, and reduced the amount of strategic materials which could be obtained annually by from 25 to 28%. The Secretary said that while Mr. Pineau’s observation might seem true as an abstraction, there is different result when you break down the list. In any event, the United States is ready to subject each item on the list to the test of reason. Each item should be studied as an individual problem on a rational basis, leaving out emotional consideration. On that basis, the United States feels it can convince France and others not to change.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Kenneth T. Young. Approved by Secretary Dulles and circulated to appropriate U.S. officials on March 8. The conversation took place during the second SEATO Council meeting.
2. See supra.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. The six signatories of the EDC treaty held a conference at Brussels, August 19–22, 1954, but failed to agree to modifications to the treaty that France wanted.
5. For text of President Eisenhower’s letter to Nikolay Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, March 1, 1956, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 530–532.
6. The British and Soviet Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina met in London, April 11–May 8, 1956.
7. Jean Sainteny, French Representative in North Vietnam.
8. The raid occurred on February 28, 1955; 31 Egyptians and 13 Israelis were killed.
9. Secretary Dulles was in Saigon, March 10–14, 1956.
10. Reference is to the agreement on the training of autonomous Vietnamese forces, December 13, 1954, signed by General Paul Ely, French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, and General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower’s Special Representative to Vietnam.
11. Secretary Dulles was in New Delhi, March 9–10, 1956.
12. General Pierre Jacquot, French military deputy to General Ely in Vietnam.
13. Reference is to the talks between U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, and Wang Ping-nan, People’s Republic of China Ambassador in Poland, which took place in Geneva between August 1, 1955 and December 12, 1957.
14. British Foreign Secretary Lloyd visited New Delhi, March 3–4, 1956, on his way to the SEATO Council meetings.