Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

168. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, September 27, 1955— 6 p.m.

1234. From Elbrick. Two-day conference Northern European Chiefs of Mission held here produced imaginative constructive exchange of views highly beneficial to all concerned.² Principal conclusions follow:

1. Soviet policies, notably Porkkala cession,³ have made deep impression on public opinion all Scandinavian countries which uncritically welcomes apparent lessening of war danger. Press and governmental leaders generally still skeptical of Soviet intentions and there is still no evidence they intend to support decreased scale of defense programs. However, there are strong neutralist currents in Denmark and potentially in Norway. Combination of Geneva atmosphere,⁴ Soviet political and cultural offensive, economic pressures and reports of defense cuts in US and UK may eventually lead to irresistible pressures to reduce defense expenditures. Group felt best psychological counter in north to present Soviet campaign is to plug line real test Soviet intentions yet to come on important questions such as German reunification.

2. Public emphasis on basic Western strategy of main reliance on deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and capacity to deliver them makes domestic justification by these govts of their marginal military contributions increasingly difficult.

3. Pressures on Social Democratic govts to increase social-welfare expenditures are ever present and persuasive justification for maintenance of present level of ground forces and defense expenditures is required.

4. Swedish military strength is important and favorable factor in area [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. Since Sweden will maintain its alliance-free policy we should not try to change it and should not unnecessarily embarrass Swedish efforts to maintain it.

5. New Finnish-Soviet treaty⁵ considered not likely in future to alter customary Finnish attitude of caution in dealing with Soviets or to be likely to dilute basic Finnish public sympathy for free world policies.

6. Norway has key position in relation to Iceland and Denmark, and latter are influenced by Norwegian advice or example. Any actions tending to weaken Norwegian support for NATO, such as pressure for Spanish membership or premature stationing German officers at Afne, would have adverse repercussions going beyond Norway.

7. Continued US defense aid and OSP are required in Norway on sufficient scale to prevent loss of defense production base so laboriously built up with substantial US investment. Despite Denmark’s economic capacity to make larger defense expenditures, it should also be considered for defense aid on political grounds.

8. Development of non-military aspects of NATO, admittedly difficult, genuinely desired in Norway and Denmark and would contribute to offsetting adverse trends noted above.

9. UK has same objectives as US in Scandinavian area and we should work closely with UK representatives in area to achieve them.

10. Concern in Scandinavian countries over apparent protectionist trend in US trade policies led to recommendation by group that authoritative expositions of US policies and of actions which are in line with announced liberal trade policies would be useful in countering effects of recent isolated cases of apparent “back pedaling”. Advance notice and explanation all such actions essential if Missions and USIA are to exploit effectively and rebut criticism.

11. USIA should step up cultural activities with first-class US talent. USIA representation allowances are very low and make it impossible for its representatives to do their job effectively. Means should be found to continue Fulbright programs to Sweden and Denmark.

12. Application of fifty-fifty shipping clause to such programs as those under Title I of PL 480 works to serious detriment of immediate objectives of programs and of broader US interests in area.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1441/9–2755. Confidential.
2. For documentation on European Chiefs of Mission meetings in 1957, see vol. IV, pp. 571 ff.
3. Reference is to the agreement signed by the Soviet Union and Finland, September 19, 1955, by which the Soviet Union agreed to return the Porkkala naval base to Finland.
4. Reference is to the hopes for a reduction in East-West tensions following the Heads of Government Meeting at Geneva, July 18–23, 1955.
5. The Soviet Union and Finland signed a protocol on September 19, 1955, extending their 1948 treaty of friendship and mutual assistance for 20 years, until 1975.