Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

14. Despatch From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

No. 1363

Paris, January 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Decline of French World Position and Local Reaction Thereto

The national elections of January 2 have not caused directly, nor are they likely to produce, an alteration in France’s world position, except insofar as they have revealed the state of France with brutal clarity to both French and foreign eyes.

Radical changes have, however, occurred in the past two years in France’s stature in the world. Perhaps the present moment of postelection hangover is not a bad time to pull together the various events which have marked France’s decline, and report our view of the French reaction thereto. This might be important in our evaluation as to the importance and utility of this country to us.

Events Marking France’s Decline

While only more recent events need to be discussed in any detail, public awareness here of the decline of France on the world scene goes back at least to the time when it became obvious that the Indochina War could not be won militarily or politically by France. This first great jolt was followed by an equally serious blow to French leadership on the continent of Europe—the rejection of the EDC. There have long been misgivings in other countries about France and a feeling that her real position in the world and the contribution she could make were inconsistent with her worldwide role, usually on a par with the United States and United Kingdom. Even before France’s weaknesses had been so clearly revealed, the U.S. and U.K. had declined Bidault’s suggestion that the three countries should form, in effect, a worldwide directorate, along the lines of the NATO Standing Group.

Much has been said at least since 1952 of France’s overextension because of her triple burden of reconstruction, rearmament and the Indochina War. Fears in this connection have now been realized. Unfortunately, the relief expected from terminating the war in the Far East has not been felt because of the surge of troubles in North Africa. Although deterioration in North Africa had been predicted, hope had existed that France’s errors in Indochina might cause her to avoid the same mistakes in North Africa.

The French decline as a world power is doubtless actually attributable to the long-range attrition of the two World Wars, the polarization of power in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the rise of nationalism in underdeveloped areas, etc., but this undoubted decline, accentuated by the collapse of the empire, has only been fully exposed to public view during the past two years.

The disappearance of France from any role of importance in the Far East dates formally only from the Geneva Conference of 1954 but it was obvious France had lost her position there sometime earlier. Mendes-France is not blamed for the death of the French Empire in Indochina but was only responsible for the funeral arrangements. He also arranged an orderly departure from the French Establishments in India.

The French position in Indochina now has become somewhat analogous to her supposed “special position” in the Near East. In fact, French influence in the Near East was dealt a death blow by the circumstances surrounding the granting of independence to Syria and Lebanon. Nevertheless, successive French Governments continued to press for recognition of this imagined position, and, as late as 1950, France joined in a tripartite policy declaration on this area. France was also to be a partner in the Middle East Defense Organization, which never came into existence. In more recent years, however, there has been a gradual decline in French insistence on her role in this area. While there are occasions when French cooperation and assistance can still be useful on Near Eastern questions, in general it would appear that U.S. policy for these countries should be arrived at independently of France, and consultation with France, as with our other Allies, undertaken as it may be useful on an ad hoc basis. Again perhaps the situation is similar to that in the Far East where French cooperation is doubtless still useful in South Vietnam, and to a greater degree, in Laos and Cambodia, but where this cooperation should no longer be the essential consideration in forming United States policy.

North Africa

The area of principal French concern, outside Europe, has become even more localized than previously, because of the decline elsewhere, on the African continent. Events of the last year in North Africa have been sensational. For a considerable period of time the full implication of what happened did not sink into the French consciousness. The Tunisian Agreements seemed to have quieted the trouble in that Protectorate without removing from French hands the essential elements of political power, and the Moroccan situation seemed to be drifting badly but without any decisive loss for France having occurred. The extraordinary events of late 1955 changed the situation sharply.

While important elements in the French Government of Edgar Faure, and outside it, certainly wished to carry out a liberal policy of political reform in Morocco, the timing of even those most favoring such liberal policies was thrown off by events beyond their control. The Pasha of Marrakech, principal support of pro-French policies, apparently recognizing the handwriting on the wall, and not waiting to see the message spelled out in full, dramatically changed his tactic. The result was the return to Morocco of the exiled Sultan, much earlier than anyone had expected, formation of a Moroccan Government and French promise to undertake negotiations looking toward the revision of the basic relationship between France and Morocco. While much remains to be done, this relationship has already undergone a drastic change, the full import of which is just now being realized in France.

The impact of Moroccan events is now beginning to be felt. For the first time, realistic Frenchmen realize that Moroccan independence—most probably including the attributes of full independence—is just a question of time. It is understood here that when a new Franco-Moroccan treaty is worked out, additional concessions will also have to be made in Tunisia so that the status of the two remains on a par. The future economic relationship is uncertain, and the position of Tunisia and Morocco with respect to the French Union, if they should ever join it at all, is likewise nebulous. What the average Frenchman in the street or in the National Assembly is now finding staring him in the face is the fact that the colonial aspect of the two protectorates is gone or going. Economic agreements, a political tie like that between Great Britain and Pakistan or Ceylon—these friendly relationships are possible. However, the days of the French Viceroys—Juin,² Guillaume,³ etc.—on the Sacred Hill of Rabat are gone forever.

As though the above were not enough, the Algerian situation has plainly become critical. Both Mendes-France and Faure had hoped to tackle North African problems one at a time on the ground this was the only possible political course domestically, but the dynamics of the Algerian problem have made this impossible. There is little clear thinking as to what is involved in Algeria. Frenchmen, like other observers, stress the enormous difficulties involved especially because over 1,000,000 French live in Algeria, many of them descendants of families who have been there for a hundred years. Without attempting to discuss possible courses of action here, it can be safely concluded that Algeria is causing the gravest concern in France today. It is now realized here that the legal fiction that Algeria is an integral part of France is overtaken by events, and tragically disproved. This is of course a further severe blow to France, and to her participation in world affairs.

The comparative resignation with which French opinion is taking these developments is in itself symptomatic. Only a year ago Frenchmen were universally and vociferously declaring that France would never give up North Africa, Algeria in particular, since that would mean “the end of France as a great power.” Today Algeria is more on French minds than any other external problem but with a feeling of resignation that the rest of North Africa has gone and that radical changes in Algeria are inevitable. The effective loss of great power status is tacitly taken for granted, however unhappily or bitterly.

Black Africa: the French Union

With the situation in all three North African territories clearly moving out of France’s control, a close look is now being taken at the remainder of France’s African possessions. There are few illusions on this score. Michel Debré, a leading Senator and defender of the French Union, has steadily pointed out the inroads of Mohammedanism in Black Africa which will militate against the continuation of French control in its present form. The experiment in Nigeria and the Gold Coast is expected to weaken French authority in her Black African territories. It has been noted that as remote an outpost as the island of Reunion would be claimed by Nehru, if, as the Ministry of Overseas Territories expects, the British make some arrangement to turn over neighboring Mauritius to India. Those who are thinking about the problems of France overseas now see a logical train of events which will strip France of all of her non-Metropolitan areas. Newspaper stories that the “Corsican case” will be taken to the UN next are not entirely in jest.

All of the above has given rise to many suggestions for a revision of the French Union in order to cope with these unpleasant realities. The Socialist Party has done the most concrete thinking on the subject, and its plans are far-reaching and look for a complete alteration of the present relationship between France and areas formerly politically subordinate. However, it is uncertain whether the Socialist plans can be brought to fruition, and whether they form a base for a continued stable French Union. As an example of these problems, how could a unified Morocco join the French Union in view of certain violent Spanish opposition?

The Embassy believes that most Frenchmen are discouraged, and believe in their hearts that the liquidation of the entire empire is only a matter of time. A corollary to French thinking is that basically the United States will be pleased when this event has taken place. Likewise, what faith may ever have been placed in the UN has been undermined by this colonial issue, and the UN is generally highly unpopular in France today.

The impact of this shrinking of the French Empire, and its possible eventual disappearance within a relatively short space of time, has been to cause Frenchmen, not unnaturally, to lose interest in extra-European affairs to a very marked degree. There is today, for example, really only a clinical interest in South Vietnam. As French political control has left these areas, business interests have followed, and, needless to say, government budgetary support. Already the problem is posing itself how long the French government will continue the level of its budgetary support to Tunisia and Morocco as political control, and economic privilege, decline in those states.

Even more than a loss of business and commercial interest, there is a psychological lack of continuing interest in areas formerly French. Indeed, a certain satisfaction is felt when the internal political affairs of these states are obviously in a mess as in the case of Syria.

French Policy in Europe

If the Frenchman is then tending to become an isolationist regarding affairs outside the European continent, what is his feeling towards Europe? Here, too, the same tendency is manifest. As, for a host of reasons, West Germany is obviously becoming economically stronger and is eclipsing France, the latter is turning more and more into herself. Again there is a declining interest and concern. Just as North African affairs had reached a critical state, it became apparent, from the referendum of October 23,⁴ that the Saar would also soon slip from French political, and probably later, economic control as well. Though the Saar had been a rallying cry for French nationalists for years and a major stumbling block to the EDC in 1953, the realization that the battle was lost has caused little outcry. Political union of West Germany and the Saar in the near future seems a recognized fact. There is still hope of maintaining temporarily some form of economic union between France and the Saar, but Frenchmen are vague as to what it might be, and not particularly hopeful it will happen at all.

German rearmament is no longer an issue, and played no part in the election campaign. The opponents of German rearmament are not necessarily convinced of the desirability of giving arms to the West Germans. Rather, there is a general feeling that the development of atomic weapons has rendered conventional armament far less important; and that U.S. atomic strength is the ultimate deterrent to any German attacks against France just as it is the deterrent to the Soviet Union. Therefore, there is resignation, and the belief that twelve or even more German divisions will not play any role against France in Europe, even though German strength is obviously growing while that of France remains stationary. Anti-German sentiment exists only in very limited degree, and there is general belief that there is no particular reason for the old differences between France and Germany to cause difficulties for the future. These conflicts seem to have become less important as the principal roles in world affairs have been taken over by the United States and the Soviet Union, leaving mere European quarrels of much less significance, though there would be an outcry if it appeared that the United States was substituting Germany for France in her European plans.

Other than a friendly enough, but rather detached, feeling towards Germany, France pays lip service to European integration: integration is seen in some quarters as a possible means of exercising influence and/or some control over German economic dynamism thus serving to help France maintain her position relative to Germany; however, it is still unlikely any more very imaginative proposals will soon emanate from this country. Mollet has continued his strong support for the European idea and EURATOM in particular. During the electoral campaign, even Mendes-France (probably primarily to please Mollet) gave guarded support to Europe integration,EURATOM, etc. Though this combination will probably dominate the next French government, it is unlikely that any major results will be accomplished in the European integration field under it. Algeria, social programs (especially with a Socialist-dominated government) will absorb the limited time and energy of the government. The fate of Monnet’s recent efforts in this field are also uncertain, though being watched with some interest.

With regard to Britain, there is a feeling of sympathy because of the relative decline of both as world powers. Coupled with this is resentment that Britain has been able to keep a stronger voice in world affairs. Even though France seems to be affected with galloping isolationism, there is sentiment against England for having kept a more advantageous worldwide position.

While there is little first-hand knowledge and less understanding in France of the Soviet Union, there is a continuing tendency to lump the United States together with the Soviets as the two mass powers between which worthy but smaller powers such as France are ground. The feeling is growing that France should have equal opportunity to deal with both blocs and with both major powers. Soviet and U.S. economic policies are equated in spite of their obvious differences in aim. Likewise there is a tendency to take Soviet pronouncements at their face value (except in solidly pro-Atlantic circles) while casting doubt on American policies.

French Policy Towards NATO and U.S.

Without in any way predicting that France has any intention of withdrawing from the Atlantic alliance, it should be noted that the decline of France as a world power, which is now clear to almost all Frenchmen, has lessened French interest in and regard for NATO. NATO was, to some extent, of major interest when France had worldwide concerns and responsibilities. It was always hoped to use French support for NATO as a quid pro quo to obtain the support of her allies in the Atlantic alliance for French objectives in other areas of the world, especially in North Africa. With the apparent failure of France to maintain her position in the world generally, it is not surprising that NATO should seem less important to France, especially given the lack of worry over Soviet objectives which now seems current.

Since NATO is regarded in France as the principal instrument of U.S. policy in Europe, it is equally logical that the result of a declining interest in this organization should be a feeling of a less close community of interest with the United States. While active anti-Americanism, which has always existed, has perhaps not increased, there is probably current less active pro-American sentiment than in recent times. Without necessarily giving too great credence to public opinion polls, the tenor of these recent soundings has consistently placed France at the bottom of the Western European heap so far as devotion to Western policies is concerned. With the decline in attachment to U.S. policies comes also a perhaps willful refusal to understand the motivations of these policies.

It is not possible to make predictions as to the future of French policies, and their course will depend to some extent on the structure of French cabinets. However, it is probable that, under all foreseeable circumstances, France will remain a NATO member, and while not the most active, neither the least active. However, she will be more an observer and less a participant than previously.

There appears to be no interest in a renversement des alliances except on the part of the Communists. There appears to be little interest in French participation in a Nehru–Nasser–Tito neutralist bloc though it is true Tito was the only statesman on whom Mendes-France called personally after the latter’s fall from power. Rather, there is the tendency to accept, unhappily and bitterly, the concept of the “littler” France, the France without a world empire, the France which belongs to the Atlantic community of her neighbors, but does not play a leading role therein. This is a vastly more modest concept of France’s role, and perhaps an underestimate, as the previous concept, in French eyes, was an overestimate, of her real strength and capacity for leadership. The present tendency of Frenchmen to commiserate with each other, always to prefix “France” with “la pauvre”—accentuated since the elections the results of which were unsatisfactory to all non-extremists—may pass, but it is the vogue at present.

France may be said to have entered a period of psychological withdrawal, not necessarily one in which neutralist doctrine will dominate, or one in which French policies will veer sharply, but rather one in which her interest in foreign affairs is diminished, her concern with individual and local problems greater, and one in which there is a national tendency to crawl under the blanket and pull it over one’s head.

General DeGaulle spoke with sad clarity (Embassy despatch 2270, April 22, 1955)⁵ when he said that “unless France can lead the world as a great power, the Frenchman has no interest in anything but his personal affairs.”

How long the present mood will last, or what may change it, is hard to say. The deterioration in France’s world position during recent years is irreversible and will presumably continue further. She might become another Spain (“the Pyrenees march to the Rhine”—and they have been moving fast in the past four years), or another Italy, or another Holland. Yet her metropolitan territory is far more important than any of them, her natural resources much greater, and her national temperament more restless.

Mention should also be made of the permanent institutions of France such as the prefectoral system, the Conseil d’Etat, etc. These are unaffected by elections, and provide the national stability. This administrative apparatus remains intact, and furnishes continuity during difficult periods. The root trouble with the French system is not instability, it is the inability to take and implement major governmental decisions. The international importance of this declines in proportion to the decline in France’s world position. The factors outlined in the Embassy’s telegram 897 of August 31, 1954,⁶ likewise also still appear valid in evaluating France, and in predicting her role in the world will continue to be a substantial one, if not the one we had hoped she would fulfill. Psychological reactions to good or bad news, in the stock market and elsewhere, have a tendency to be cumulative and self-generating. Current pessimism in and about France, including that expressed in this despatch, may well err on the bearish side.

France may become more sound and healthy as the strain of overextension from trying to save a disappearing empire lessens. The feeling of humiliation following the recent elections might lead to the emergence of something healthier. Something not now foreseeable might happen in the relatively near future to restore her self-confidence. That may not happen unless and until the younger generation born of the postwar increased birthrate begins to restore French vitality. It might not happen then.

For a long time to come France will be a difficult and often unsatisfactory partner to deal with but one whose intrinsic, as distinct from its former imagined, importance to the free world cannot be ignored. Patience, tolerance and encouragement on the part of France’s allies, particularly the United States, will be both necessary and fruitful.

Theodore C. Achilles
Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/1–1756. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. McBride, First Secretary of the Embassy, and concurred in by Robert P. Joyce, Counselor of the Embassy. Copies were sent to London, Bonn, Moscow, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Madrid, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Rabat.
2. Alphonse Juin, French Resident General in Morocco, 1947–1951.
3. Augustin Guillaume, French Resident General in Morocco, 1951–1954.
4. Reference is to the referendum of October 23, 1955, in which 67 percent of the Saar’s electors rejected the Statute which proposed the “Europeanization” of the Saar.
5. The memorandum of conversation with General De Gaulle is printed as Document 6. Despatch 2270 transmitted the memorandum.
6. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VI, Part 2, p. 1443.