Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

134. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1957¹

Washington, July 17, 1957

SUBJECT

• General Political Review

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• The Italian Ambassador
• Sig. Perrone-Capano, Counselor, Italian Embassy
• John Wesley Jones—EUR

The Italian Ambassador called on the Secretary to say goodbye before departing for Italy on his summer holidays. The Ambassador said that the new Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Pella, would be most interested to have the Secretary’s views on a number of current problems. The Ambassador went on to say that Italy was now entering a pre-election phase since, constitutionally, elections must be held not later than June 1958. Depending upon the stability of the present Government they would probably be held next spring but there was always a possibility that national elections might be called this autumn. In these circumstances Signor Brosio wanted the Secretary to understand that from now on the entire Italian domestic political scene would be dominated by considerations of the national election.

Turning to Italo-American problems, the Ambassador said that there were three elements in the U.S. domestic political scene which were of particular interest to Italy and would have an effect upon our countries’ relations. He said that without taking up the Secretary’s time or going into detail he would refer to them in general terms only. Namely, they were: (1) the apparent trend in the U.S. toward greater protection of U.S. products to the detriment of Italian exports to the U.S.; (2) uncertainty regarding our immigration policy, and (3) the use of the Development Loan Fund, envisaged in the pending Mutual Security legislation. With respect to the latter the Ambassador wondered whether, in considering Italy, the U.S. policy would permit access to the Fund for long range economic projects in the underdeveloped south of Italy or whether it would consider using the highly developed technical skills of the industrialized north in projects outside Italy, principally in the Middle or Far East.

The Secretary replied that we did not consider Italy an underdeveloped country; that most countries had depressed areas within their frontiers. With respect to the Ambassador’s query the Secretary was of the opinion that Italy fell more appropriately into the latter category of countries. The Ambassador expressed his gratification and understanding of this policy and pointed out that Italy not only had the skills but also was more welcome in certain areas of the world, particularly the Middle East, then certain of her European neighbors. He added that he would not fail to inform his Foreign Minister of the possibilities of Italo-American collaboration in this framework.

The Ambassador then put several questions to the Secretary for the purpose of obtaining an elaboration of the latter’s press conference remarks the day before.²

The Ambassador complimented the Secretary on the soundness and perception of his remarks on the recent dramatic changes in Moscow.³ He recalled that the Secretary had placed the greatest emphasis on their internal political significance. The Secretary replied that it was not wise to discuss publicly all of the implications of the Moscow shifts. It was too early to state categorically whether the elimination of the opposition group in the Presidium would have its effect on Soviet foreign policy. The Secretary did not rule out this possibility, given the volatile nature of Khrushchev. The “traditionalists”, who have been ousted from the Presidium, were the cold, calculating, chess playing type. They had not made their moves in the international game without careful reflection. Khrushchev, on the contrary, seemed to act and react on impulse. It was possible that he might decide to take risks, such as the reunification of Germany might imply for the Kremlin, where Molotov and others like him would never do so. The Secretary recalled the sudden decision of the Soviet Government to accept an Austrian Treaty. For some reason, which was still obscure, the Kremlin had decided to agree to an Austrian settlement, although in retrospect it would seem that the balance of advantage lay with the West, for example: the Western orientation of independent Austria, the exposing of Hungary to a free and democratic neighbor. Consequently, we would have to wait and see whether the new balance of power in the Kremlin might ultimately be felt in the international field.

The Ambassador referred to the Secretary’s remarks on the creation of a NATO stockpile of atomic weapons. He asked particularly for clarification of the phrase “within the next few weeks” which the Secretary had used in referring to a decision on this project. The Secretary reviewed the origins of the proposal, made by the French Foreign Minister at the last NATO Ministerial meeting in Bonn, and the subsequent study in Washington of this problem, involving as it does pertinent US legislation. He said that a special study had been undertaken by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and that it was hoped that their findings would be available within the next few weeks. It was obvious that the results of such a study would be essential in reaching a conclusion involving how best to handle this matter, either within the framework of the present legislation or in seeking new legislation.

The Ambassador referred to that portion of the Secretary’s remarks yesterday dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute. He wondered whether the Secretary could expand somewhat upon his reference to other nations playing a more useful role in terms of good offices than might be possible for this country. The Secretary replied that the two countries (except Jordan) most intimately involved in any settlement with Israel, because of their contiguous territories, were Egypt and Syria. As the Ambassador could well understand, our influence in those countries at the present time was of doubtful value. However, we would welcome any “volunteers” who might feel that they could be useful in such a situation. The Ambassador asked if the Secretary had in mind such a country as Pakistan to which the Secretary replied “possibly, or perhaps your country (meaning Italy)”. The Secretary also suggested the possibility of using the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations in an effort at settlement of the problems between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

On parting the Secretary asked the Ambassador to convey his personal good wishes to Signor Pella, the new Foreign Minister at Rome, and added that he would look forward to seeing the Ambassador on his return to Washington in September.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Jones.
2. For the transcript of the Secretary’s July 16 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1957, p. 228.
3. Reference is the announcement made by the Soviet Government on July 3 that Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov had been expelled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party from their government and party positions.