128. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State1
4357. Re Embtel 4340.2 Motivations behind Gronchi’s current maneuvers against Martino date back some time.3 In Embassy view, [Page 408] President continues explore foreign policy variants and criticize government for “subservience” to US in foreign policy field because 1) he apparently sincerely believes some degree East-West distensione less dangerous than holding to rigid Cold War positions, and 2) he may hope capitalize on potential popular appeal pacifism and neutralism and also on Italian sensitivity on questions national prestige to further his own ambitions become leader non-Commie left force or coalition of forces in Italian politics (despite constitutional limitations on office of presidency).
As Department aware, Gronchi apparently desires see change in orientation of DC and Italian Govt toward left through some form of association of DC with PSI, whether through direct PSI–DC association or through Socialist unification and association of unified party with DC in government. His various attempts cause replacement or resignation of Martino may have been designed at least partly in hope of causing PLI to leave govt as way of putting end to center formula possibilities and thus to accelerate realization of “opening to left” of one sort or another. (He has long believed escape from what he considers “center immobilismo” and major reduction strength of Italian Communism can only be achieved through Demo Christian-Socialist cooperation.) Gronchi’s continued operation in this field can only lead us conclude that recently demonstrated weakness Nenni and PSI automists has not changed his basic ideas in this regard.
In recent conversation with Gaitskell, we understand he referred to PSI as “more consisent” with PSDI and suggested that although prospects for Socialist unification through efforts of type made by two parties to date looked extremely dim, they might still be able to get together since “they might be both able associate themselves with some other political formation”. While exact concept behind President’s remarks not clear, they far from reassuring.
Present alignment of forces with DC and Center as whole, however, does not suggest Gronchi will be able reduce [produce?] either 1) change in basic orientation Italian foreign policy, or 2) change in orientation of DC, within which Fanfani’s power appears to be increasing rather than decreasing. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]
While thus no major change in Italian foreign policy orientation as result Gronchi’s efforts appears probable (and it is far from certain Gronchi would attempt execute ideas he now advocates were he to acquire major influence in formulation Italian policy), his maneuvers may 1) result in certain amount confusion in execution Italian foreign policy and minor modifications (on points over which anti-Gronchi [Page 409] forces do not consider battle necessary or worthwhile) and 2) possible cause some acceleration in gradual lessening open identification foreign policy of Italy with that of US (without change in its basic pro-Westem, pro-US orientation), process which to one or another degree has already taken place in most other Western European countries.
Recent increase Gronchi–Martino antagonism to our mind fits into same general picture as recent mild intensification of other long-standing squabbles within government coalition and within Center parties themselves. (PRI departure from government’s majority, De Nicola resignation, intransigent Pastore stand on Parti Agrari, Matteotti resignation, some sharpening church-state friction, etc.) These phenomena, we believe, should be seen against background 1) apparently decreasing degree to which Italians consider PCI menace to domestic security, 2) recent belief (now deflated) that Socialist unification would alter government formula in relatively near future, 3) gradual approach political elections and consequent intensification political rivalries, and 4) weakening of Center coalition as result preceding factors.
Although, as we said above in context Gronchi–Martino conflict, we see little likelihood that these trends by themselves will bring about major change in either domestic or foreign policy of Italy, they may result in period of some confusion and inefficiency.
Another danger inherent in them, however, is possibility that if they continue, they may become intensified beyond limits normal electoral competition, [1 line of source text not declassified] weakening those elements of moderation and restraint on which efficient functioning Ital Center govt, even after next political elections, may in large measure depend.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/4–3057. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.↩
- In telegram 4340 from Rome, April 30, Ambassador Zellerbach provided a summary of a discussion held by the Italian Council of Ministers on April 26 concerning the Middle East. (Ibid.)↩
- When Vice President Nixon visited Italy, he delivered a letter to President Gronchi from President Eisenhower, dated February 28, which conveyed Eisenhower’s personal greetings. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174) In telegram 4057 to Rome, April 5, the Department informed the Embassy of a New York Times story of that same day which indicated that Gronchi’s reply, which the Times reported contained complaints concerning U.S. policies, was blocked from being sent by the Italian Foreign Office. (Ibid., Central Files, 765.00/4–557)↩