Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

117. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 27, 1956¹

Washington, August 27, 1956

SUBJECT

• Visit of Signor Fanfani with the Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS

• Signor Amintore Fanfani, General Secretary of the Italian Christian Democratic Party
• Signor Egidio Ortona, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., Italian Embassy
• Signor Raimondo Manzini, First Secretary, Italian Foreign Office
• The Secretary
  • Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
  • EUR—Mr. Jacob D. Beam
  • WE—Mr. H. G. Torbert, Jr.
  • Mr. A. Jose deSeabra, Interpreter

Fanfani’s Role as a Political Organizer

The Secretary opened the conversation by congratulating Signor Fanfani on his successful job in promoting the organization of the Christian Democratic Party which the latter acknowledged with a statement that he considered he had been working for the good of Italy in a manner which was compatible with the good of the United States. He felt, however, there was always room for improvement in such work. The Secretary observed that in the world in which we live, it was important not only that people should have the right ideas but that there should exist effective organizations through which these ideas could be carried out. Otherwise, small, highly-organized minorities such as the Communists could impose their will on the majority. Mr. Fanfani said that the experience in Italy proved that with hard work, the Communists could be beaten [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The Secretary agreed this has been proved.

The Suez Conference²

The Secretary then alluded to the most helpful role played by Foreign Minister Martino in London. He observed that is was no small task to have achieved agreement of such a substantial proportion of the countries represented at London. Fanfani expressed pleasure that the wishes of the Italian people to cooperate with the United States had been carried out. He said he was also glad to see Spain had come in to the majority group in the last analysis. He asked whether there were good omens for future progress. The Secretary said that with regard to Spain, they were apparently trying to go in two directions at once but had finally come into line. With regard to the general picture, the danger was less but had by no means passed and that a major part of the Suez problem still lay ahead.

In answer to an observation by Signor Fanfani that Shepilov and the Soviets generally had obviously tried to intimidate Nasser in the conference and prevent him from agreeing to anything, the Secretary concurred and mentioned that throughout the conference, the Soviet radio was constantly broadcasting on its Arabic service an exhortation not to accept anything which came out of the conference. India, Indonesia and Ceylon, he said, obviously wanted a settlement although they were not in agreement [as] to the nature of the settlement. The USSR on the other hand wanted to prevent a settlement.

Soviet Cold War Tactics

Mr. Fanfani spent a few minutes describing the present Soviet move as a carrying out of Lenin’s quotation about the “road to Paris leading through Asia”. He saw this as merely another step in a continuous cold war process since 1945 which at one time was aimed through the Balkans and Italy, then after being stopped in Greece, turned to Prague and now may be trying an end-run into Europe through the southern shore of the Mediterranean, thus beginning a new and serious phase of the cold war. He thought the French might have initially misjudged this situation and attempted to use it to create a diversion from their Algerian problem. With the British, they are handicapped by history in their relationship with the Arabs and it is fortunate that the United States can take advantage of its record in dealing with the situation. This Suez position is really the keystone of European policy. The Spaniards finally saw this and came into line. Mr. Fanfani agreed with the Secretary and mentioned also that they probably thought they saw an opportunity to bring the Gibraltar problem to the fore.

The Situation in the Italian Socialist Movement

The Secretary produced the clipping from this morning’s New York Times describing the Saragat–Nenni meeting³ and asked Mr. Fanfani what he thought of it. Fanfani stated that Saragat had told him of his intention to hold this meeting and had promised him to be cautious and limit his discussions to matters of foreign policy. Mr. Fanfani was awaiting with interest more detailed reports which he expected to have by telephone from Italy, particularly the editorial reaction of Saragat’s own paper. He noted that Nenni originally had made statements relatively favorable to the West on the Suez question and then had switched back to support Nasser on the same day he met with Nenni. This was part of his zig-zag tactics.

Nenni had hoped that the Christian Democractic Party would have its Congress next spring and thus be forced to take a stand on the opening to the Left situation which might be right by that time. Fanfani had decided, therefore, to have the Christian Democratic Congress in October before the PCI and PSI conferences. Preparatory regional congresses of the Christian Democratic Party were starting September 2 and Nenni’s present moves might be partly to create confusion at these meetings.

Nenni, somewhat disappointed by the outcome of the administrative elections, is now out to make all the trouble he can and hopes to be able to promote national elections in the spring of 1957, first to take advantage of the crisis in the PCI, second to bolster prestige of the Socialist movement—either PSI or PSDI—and third, as a means of breaking up the Center coalition. He feels that early elections would be propitious for these ends. It is possible that the PSDI may withdraw from the government and thus force elections. Saragat has been completely loyal to date and there is no reason to think he personally will change his views but he may not be able to control the pressure from his own Left wing. Present Italian public opinion takes a very suspicious view of Nenni but if he were to announce his separation from the PCI, this might affect public opinion even though we know there are no effective guarantees that the separation is definitive.

In response to this statement and as a concluding remark, the Secretary noted that it was not appropriate for him to comment on personalities in Italian politics but as a general proposition, he would say that opposition to Communism in a political leader depends on belief. Leaders who were capable of being converted from Communism had ample opportunity and received ample encouragement during the past ten years and one must view new converts as of this late date with a certain degree of dubiety.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/8–2756. Confidential. Drafted by Torbert on August 29.
2. On August 14, Secretary Dulles flew to London to participate in a 22-nation conference on the Suez situation. For extensive documentation on the Suez crisis, including the London conference, see volume XVI.
3. See supra.