103. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 29, 1956, 7 p.m.1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Secretary Dulles
  • President Gronchi
  • Foreign Minister Martino
  • Minister Luciolli
  • Ambassador Brosio
  • Ambassador Luce
  • C. Burke Elbrick
[Page 341]

After referring in appreciative terms to his conversation with President Eisenhower on the previous day,2 President Gronchi proceeded to emphasize and expand upon various points he had raised in that conversation. He said that in the present state of the East-West struggle it is vital to strengthen the solidarity of the Western World and he was happy to hear that President Eisenhower agreed with the broad lines of this policy. He would like to emphasize the fact that Europe cannot move rapidly toward the solution of its problems, and particularly toward integration, without United States support. It is a stubborn fact that European organizations such as EURATOM need direct support from the United States. He felt that Italy could speak frankly on this matter because it has fought for integration and believes in it. Present Soviet tactics throughout the world are more insidious now and seek to show that the Soviet Union advocates strengthening independence of newly established countries and improving the inferior situation of underdeveloped areas. In proposing policies to combat this new Soviet offensive Italy was not speaking for itself alone but for the interests of the entire Western world. President Gronchi said that he had raised two points with President Eisenhower on the previous day. The first was the role that Italy should play in the strengthening of the solidarity of the North Atlantic alliance. He said that Italy could act as an intermediary in matters concerning countries outside the alliance perhaps better than the United States, France or the United Kingdom in view of the fact that some countries might be suspicious of these great powers. The second point he had raised was the question of the means of carrying out economic cooperation. Italy is no longer seeking economic help as it has in the past but it desires public investment loans which would in turn provide the necessary inducement for private investors. He realized there may be certain difficulties in connection with U.S. public opinion, and possibly the Congress, but he felt that the United States Government could be instrumental in guiding public opinion and particularly if the Italian Government is willing to make certain “changes” to create a favorable opinion here.

The Secretary agreed that it is important for the Western powers to further the concept of unity in Europe and the United States would support such measures. We must be careful, however, that we support something the European countries want and that we do not impose something they do not want. The United States had supported the EDC and the Secretary himself had been criticized at times for too strong support of that concept. We also supported the Western European Union and contributed to the establishment of that substitute for the EDC. We have already indicated that we are willing to support the EURATOM project and this had been discussed with the British recently. [Page 342] While the British look on this in a different light, we will continue to support the idea irrespective of the British attitude if the European countries themselves want it. The Secretary felt that the Congress would authorize a liberal contribution to any plan for the utilization of atomic energy in Western Europe, but in matters relating principally to Europe the European nations should take the initiative themselves.

The Secretary then turned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He said that it is possible to develop the North Atlantic Council into a broader body than the purely military one and remarked that Minister Martino had taken the initiative in the recent Ministerial meeting in Paris where a decision had been taken to explore ways and means of achieving this end. We are somewhat disappointed that this exploration has so far not been very productive. The Secretary shared President Gronchi’s view that Italy could play a more important role in the solution of some of our Mediterranean problems. As President Gronchi knew, an Ambassadorial group had been established in Washington to discuss arms shipments to the Near East, and Italy, through the Secretary’s own efforts, had been brought into this group. This was good evidence of the sentiment in this country regarding Italy’s possible role in solving Mediterranean problems.

With respect to Italy’s economic problems the Secretary pointed out that the normal procedure would be to get financial support from private sources. Government loans should be regarded as exceptional, particularly when ample private capital exists for participation on a reasonable basis. For example, in the past two years private American investors have invested over two billion dollars in Canada and a like amount in Venezuela. If conditions in Italy afforded reasonable opportunities without excessive risks American capital would be prepared to go into Italy. It is generally felt here that the emergency which existed at the time the Marshall Plan was formulated is over and Italy should now create the necessary conditions to attract private capital investment. As for public funds, the task would be easier if a wholehearted effort were first made to obtain private funds. We are appreciative of Italy’s efforts and accomplishments over the past ten years. There has been no dramatic shift in the political situation, however, and the Communists seem to be as strong now as ever. The Secretary assured President Gronchi that there existed a great reservoir of good will and affection for Italy in the United States and to draw on that reservoir is Italy’s choice and not our own. In this country we cannot order the expenditure of public funds as is the case in the Soviet Union— representative governments do not operate in this way. What is needed, in order to bring about a closer relationship, is something more dramatic on the part of the Italian Government which would stir the American people to press Congress for action and this cannot be [Page 343] done unless the Italian Government’s action encourages it. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] Here things are done because the American people want them and the President would see as he went about this country that the Americans are responsive to good will.

President Gronchi said he would speak very frankly even though his words might seem a little harsh. The Secretary’s remarks reminded him of an Italian proverb, “The dog chases his own tail.” As for action in the political field he wished to point out that Italy could not act more energetically than it has in the matter of European integration, and as for economic affairs Italy does not want foreign aid. Public opinion in this country apparently is not convinced regarding Italy’s anti-Communist program and President Gronchi felt the U.S. Government should shape or lead public opinion in this respect. In Europe the only danger in the present situation is one which might be caused by inaction and the President thought there would be no real danger of Communism in Italy if present programs are continued. As he had said today in his speech before the Congress, there is need for greater faith and trust in his country.3 He felt that if the first move to render assistance to Italy came from the American Government private investments would logically follow.

The Secretary said that there is abundant evidence here that the United States has trust and faith in Italy and we are willing to make every effort to facilitate Italy’s task and to promote Italo-American cooperation.

President Gronchi said he would like to continue the discussion tomorrow.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Elbrick.
  2. See Document 101.
  3. For text of President Gronchi’s address before a joint session of Congress, February 29, see Department of State Bulletin, March 12, 1956, p. 419.