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1. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 2

Paris, January 6, 1955— 4 p.m.

2840. Mendes asked me to come and see him last night before his departure today on vacation. He was depressed about the Libyan and Tunisian negotiations3 (details being reported separately). He then took up the Paris Accords and said that first of all he wanted to be sure that the US Government did not misunderstand the final vote in the Assembly.4 He said that in addition to the 287 favorable votes, there were at least 130 or 140 additional deputies who were fundamentally favorable to the integration of the FedRep into the defense of the West, but who had either abstained or voted against the Paris Accords for purely internal political reasons. I told him that the Embassy fully realized this and had reported it, and that I was sure this was understood in Washington.

Mendes then took up the problem of ratification in the Council of the Republic. He said that he thought things looked better there than they had in the National Assembly and that the debate would be [Page 2] much more dignified, but that nevertheless there would be a fight. He said it was vital that there be some progress between the final vote in the Assembly and the time in mid-February when the Council of the Republic was ready to vote. He then mentioned six particular items that would be important in this connection.

1.
He said it would be most helpful if the US assurances re maintenance of troops could actually be issued before the vote in the Council of the Republic.5 He said everybody realized that it had now been promised and the feeling was that there was plenty of time for the US Government to discuss it with Congressional leaders prior to mid-February. If it was not issued, there might be certain suspicions aroused that it would be changed in some fashion from the previous pledge. Mendes further said that he felt it would be most important that the pledge, when issued, follow as closely as possible the exact wording of last spring’s pledge,6 substituting the Paris Accords for the EDC.
2.
Mendes said it was important that there be no further controversy over the Saar and he hoped that the US would impress this on Adenauer so that no new difficulties would arise during the second or third reading in the German Bundestag. He said that he had been very appreciative of the way Adenauer had handled the Saar during the first reading in the Bundestag and he hoped that that could be repeated. He said that he planned to take this up himself with Adenauer, but it of course would be most helpful if we would informally reinforce the representations that he would make.
3.
It would be helpful if the US–UK guarantee to support the Saar up to the peace treaty were issued. Mendes said he did not know the German attitude on this, but he thought that they were also interested in having this guarantee issued. He said that he was going to ask Adenauer to make the joint Franco-German request to the US and UK regarding the issuance of the guarantee, but he said it would be helpful if the US would also informally prod Adenauer on this subject.
4.
He said it was most important that some progress be made on the arms production pool negotiations that are to begin on January 17. He said it would not be necessary for a final agreement to have been reached, but it should be clear to all that the negotiations were making real progress, and that they would result in some sort of an agreement. He said it would be catastrophic if they should break down before the [Page 3] vote in the French Senate. Mendes said he did not know just how the US could be helpful in this connection, but he wanted us to be fully aware of the situation.
5.
Mendes again took up his desire to have US military aid channelled through the WEU arms agency and said he just could not understand why the US was not willing to do as much for the WEU as it had been willing to do for EDC. I repeated the old arguments which did not have much effect on Mendes, and finally told him it was a political problem with us of Congressmen who were reluctant to take an action which they felt would be unnecessarily giving up a portion of our sovereign rights. I said that maybe the Congressmen were unreasonable, but that Mendes should fully understand how strong the views of parliamentarians were when it came to questions of sovereignty.
6.
Mendes then came to what he said was the most important question of all, and that is the necessity that there be some progress in the next weeks on diplomatic preparations for an East-West conference. He said that of the 287 deputies who had voted for the Paris Accords, nearly 100, including all the Gaullists and all the Socialists who had opposed EDC, plus scattered others, had supported ratification primarily because of his pledge to do his utmost to bring about a negotiation with the East as soon as practicable. If there was no progress prior to the vote in the Senate, everyone would think that he had not lived up to his word. Something would have to be done very soon, either by the French acting alone or on a tripartite basis. Mendes said he would much prefer the action to be tripartite, and what he would suggest would be that the three powers invite the Soviets to a conference at some given date in May, and make this invitation contingent on ratification of the Paris Accords by all the major powers. If no agreement could be reached on such a tripartite démarche, Mendes said that he would have to act alone as in the case of the démarche regarding the Austrian treaty. He said that France had not as yet answered the Soviet note threatening to denounce the Franco-Soviet treaty,7 and that it would have to do so in due course. If there could be no tripartite action, this reply to the Soviets would provide the framework for a French initiative. I told him that as he knew this was a very delicate subject. I said that I would pass on his proposal to Washington, but that I knew that United States position was adamant that there could be no conference until ratification had been completed, and also that we felt very strongly that the tripartite position vis-à-vis the Soviets should be maintained and that the appearance should not [Page 4] be given that the Soviets were achieving any success in breaking the united front of the Western powers. Mendes reaffirmed that there was no question of any meeting prior to the completion of ratification by the major powers.

I inquired of Mendes as to whether he was going to make any other communication to my government on this subject, and he said yes, that he was preparing letters to the President and the Secretary answering their messages to him.8 In these letters he was going to refer to ratification in the Council of the Republic and was going to bring up both items five and six above. He was planning to attach to the letters a memorandum regarding the approach to Moscow and was sending the same memo to Churchill. He said that he preferred to handle this matter in the informal framework of these letters to the Secretary and the President, rather than in the form of a formal aide-mémoire. The letters were handed to Achilles at noon today by Parodi. Translations follow by telegram and O’Connor is hand-carrying originals leaving tonight. I will comment on above in separate message.9

Dillon
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/1–655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.↩
  2. For documentation on French negotiations with Libya over the status of Fezzan and with Tunisian nationalists which led to the agreement, signed May 29, 1955, providing internal autonomy for Tunisia, see volume XVIII.↩
  3. The Protocols, signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, bringing the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy into the Western European Union, had been ratified by the French National Assembly in December 1954 and were approved by the Council of the Republic on March 27, 1955; for texts of the Protocols and further documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.↩
  4. For text of President Eisenhower’s statement of March 10, confirming continued U.S. support for NATO, see Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 989–991.↩
  5. For text of President Eisenhower’s message of April 15, 1954, to the Prime Ministers of the six nations comprising the European Defense Community respecting the relationship between the EDC and NATO, see ibid., pp. 1198–1200.↩
  6. Reference is to the Soviet note to France, which was released to the press on December 16, 1954, threatening to denounce the Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance of December 1, 1944, if France ratified the Paris Accords.↩
  7. Regarding Mendès-France’s letters to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, January 6, 1955, see vol. V, p. 119.↩
  8. Ambassador Dillon’s comments are in telegram 2857 from Paris, January 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/1–655)↩