Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

208. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Embassy in Germany¹

Berlin, October 25, 1957—6 p.m.

462. Reference Berlin telegram 452 to Bonn repeated Department 489.²

1. Action has been taken to insure that shipments over which American agencies might exercise influence will not be made by train.

2. We are informed that, during conversation this morning, Federal Republic representative plenipotentiary in Berlin Vockel told representative of interested German organization that shipments of political materials to West Germany should not be made by plane. Vockel referred to Tagesspiegel article this morning which described current difficulties being experienced with parcel post trains and indicated that packages containing items being questioned would no longer be sent by mail train but, on advice of postal and customs authorities by air instead.

3. Vockel is reported to have argued that Allied rights re air communications with Berlin are guaranteed by agreement with the Soviets, and that there is danger that the Soviets or GDR might use such shipments as a starting point to whittle away such rights. In this connection he cited October 10 article in East German publication Deutsche Aussenpolitik (ourtel 350 to Bonn).³ He is then quoted as saying that, in view of recent hasty American curtailment of similar shipments on military trains in reaction to protest from East, he feared Americans would likewise retreat should pressure be exerted re air shipments.

4. At noon today Vockel called meeting in his office of all German political organizations operating in West Berlin. Due to short notice not all represented. He repeated essentially same statement as he had made earlier. In response to query he said he had nothing further to add, and was leaving for Bonn tonight for several days.

5. Seems clear from Vockel statements, as well as from other indications locally, that Germans have in their minds connected our termination of HICOG 12 shipments with specific assumed Soviet pressures. These, they think, began with detachment US mail car at Marienborn on September 19 to which extensive publicity given (ourtel 290 to Bonn).⁴ Bundespost Minister Lemmer has been quoted by several people as asking “How can we expect Bundespost to take risks if United States unwilling to do so?” Bundespost has reportedly been advising shippers to send cargo of type being questioned by “Schnellpost dringend” (urgent fast mail), which would automatically result in its being put on the Bundespost car attached to American military trains, allegedly with intent to shift burden of responsibility for carrying on to US.

6. Head of German Foreign Office representative Berlin has asked us for copy of Soviet protest re postal shipments existence of which he learned from Senat official (governing mayor informed in general of protest but not given copy by British chairman liaison officer). We told him that text had been forwarded to Embassies Bonn which would undoubtedly appropriately inform Federal Republic. If Embassy intends passing copy to Federal Republic may wish take opportunity to correct misconceptions being spread by Vockel and perhaps shared by other German officials.⁵

7. Opinion here is that enforcement of ban on air shipments would be serious blow at operations of organizations concerned.

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–2557. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. This telegram transmitted the text of a note from the Acting Soviet Commandant reporting that seven mail trains had been detected transporting propaganda materials of various West Berlin firms, and demanding that this use of interzonal trains be stopped. (Ibid., 762.0221/10–2457)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 762.0221/10–757)
4. See footnote 4, Document 206.
5. On October 28, the Embassy in Bonn reported that it would, at the regular quadripartite meeting on October 30, attack the ideas presented by Vockel and Lemmer. (Telegram 1338 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–2857) This position was concurred in by the Department of State on the following day. (Telegram 1173 to Bonn; ibid., 762.0221/10–2857) At the quadripartite meeting with the West Germans, all three Allied Powers stressed that they had no intention of giving up their access rights to Berlin either on the surface or through the air. (Telegram 1396 from Bonn, October 31; ibid., 762.0221/10–3157)