Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

206. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Embassy in Germany¹

Berlin, September 21, 1957—noon.

293. Subject: Berlin access.

1. Four-hour meeting of political advisers with Kotsiuba late today² covered number of subjects, in view of urgency we are reporting tonight on freight car situation, and will follow tomorrow with telegram on documentation of passengers and other subjects discussed.³

2. While earlier today Ambassador Bruce agreed that meeting with Kotsiuba might be cancelled, as recommended by USAREUR, he did not feel that we would refuse to participate if British or French showed strong desire to hold meeting. At discussion later this morning of political advisers, British and French both made it quite clear that they considered cancellation of meeting highly inadvisable, especially at last minute and urged strongly that it be held as scheduled. As a matter of fact, British had wished to use occasion specifically to raise question of freight cars with Kotsiuba. In light of instructions from Ambassador re necessity of British and French concurrence to cancellation of meeting, American political adviser agreed go ahead with meeting. Moreover, subsequent message was received from Kotsiuba himself stating that he would not reply to protest from Colonel Connor (see para 5 USBER tel 290 to Bonn rptd Dept 318),⁴ but would explain entire situation during meeting with political advisers which he was shortly to have.

3. Kotsiuba was in extremely assured mood and gave impression of talking with complete confidence re his authority to discuss all aspects Berlin access problem. At beginning of meeting, he indicated that, after finishing with documentation question, he would like to discuss matter of freight cars privately with American political adviser. In response to this, he was told that since British and French also had interest in subject, and indeed since French had had refrigerator car removed from their train previous night, they likewise wished participate in discussion.

4. Kotsiuba began by saying he did not wish today to question right of Americans to attach freight cars to military passenger trains. He said that quadripartite agreements provided for definite number of military passenger trains and military freight trains. He noted that number of freight trains authorized was not being fully used by US, but that instead incorrect practice was being followed of attaching freight cars to military passenger trains. He reiterated he did not wish to argue about this practice per se, but added that, if necessary, he would raise question at future meeting of political advisers. He then announced that trains would tonight be permitted to pass freely with freight cars attached, but he could not agree in future with system of documentation presently being used for such attached freight cars. He said that on regular military freight trains documents were provided stating that cargo carried was war material or material needed by army. However, as far as freight cars attached to military trains were concerned, documentation seemed to be German which had led Sovs to believe that cargo was being carried in interests of certain German firms. He then stated he wished warn Allies that, if in future such attached freight cars did not have same documentation as cars on regular freight trains they would not be permitted to cross border. Present system, he added, would only remain in operation until 1500 hours Sept 21. Kotsiuba then for third time made point that for present he was not objecting in principle to idea of attaching freight cars to military trains but merely to inadequate documentation.

5. While wishing to avoid any substantive discussion of question, American political adviser felt he could not leave matter simply hanging at this point. He stated position outlined Embtel 146 to Berlin, rptd Dept 937,⁵ and added that Sovs seemed to be laboring under number of misconceptions. In any event, deadline set seemed completely unreasonable. To this Kotsiuba responded that, as generous gesture, he would fix deadline at 2400 hours Sept 21. After further protest on part Allied political advisers re unreasonableness of setting deadline, Kotsiuba set time limit of 2400 hours Sept 22, and then finally 2400 hours Sept 23. It was pointed out to Kotsiuba that, as communicated to Shilov in his absence (see USBER tel 213 to Bonn),⁶ present practices re freight cars had been in effect for more than ten years. This, it was stressed, gave Allies certain indubitable rights as to present usages.

6. British political adviser asked question re baggage cars to which Sov officers at Marienborn had objected although they were always attached British trains. Kotsiuba replied that Sovs did not oppose attaching baggage cars to passenger trains, as this was normal procedure.

He then once again came back to point which he obviously considered significant that military freight trains could not carry goods for German firms. Here discussion of freight cars concluded.⁷

Gufler

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9–2157. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Kotsiuba returned from leave at the beginning of September and immediately informed the Western political advisers of his desire to meet with them. The meeting was held on September 20.
3. Telegram 294, infra.
4. Telegram 318 reported on rail access to Berlin, noting that freight and mail cars were being threatened with detachment from Allied trains. Paragraph 5 reported that Colonel Connor had protested the detachment of a mail car which was subsequently moved to Helmstedt. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9–2057)
5. Telegram 146 from Bonn to Berlin instructed that the Western Allies should make a strong representation to the Soviet military authorities about a message from the Reichsbahn forbidding attachment of freight cars to passenger trains. (Ibid., 762.0221/9–1957)
6. Not printed. (Ibid, 762.0221/8–2857)
7. On September 23, the Embassy in Bonn reported that it had sent a message to Kotsiuba noting that the documentation on the freight cars attached to passenger trains was the same as that for freight trains, and that it was made available to Soviet officials at checkpoints. The message concluded that Kotsiuba should issue appropriate instructions to allow trains to pass unheeded. (Telegram 974 from Bonn; ibid., 762.0221/9–2357) A followup report on September 24 noted that the British and French had sent similar messages and that the trains to and from Berlin that night had been routinely passed by Soviet officials. (Telegram 331; ibid., 762.0221/9–2457)