133. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State1
483. For the Secretary from Bruce. Chancellor Adenauer has been confirmed in power for another four years. Even in the event of his death or retirement, his party, the CDU/CSU, could be expected to maintain its position as the dominant force in West German politics during that period.
The question as to who might succeed him, if he should relinquish his office, remains unanswered. It has frequently been posed. On one occasion, he is said to have responded: “Look at Churchill. He had designated Eden as his heir apparent; I shall not make a similar mistake.”
It is to be anticipated and hoped that the United States will, for a considerable span of time, be dealing with Adenauer, who will control a majority in the West German parliament. If the “old fox” remains on the scene we can make assumptions that might well be unwarranted in case of his removal from it.
The recent Adenauer campaign was characterized by a frank and repeated avowal of his loyalty to American foreign policy. The assertions of independence of the United States, of suspicion of its motives and intentions, so clearly manifested in certain other European countries, evoked no imitation in the Federal Republic. The Chancellor was constant in his theme: namely, that there are two great power complexes in the world, the USSR and the USA. Germany, a second, or even third rate power, must make its choice between the two, and its selection must be alliance, friendship and fidelity to the USA and an unswerving adherence to the NATO alliance. In private, [Page 316] he expressed the opinion that the United States should exercise greater leadership in NATO, and cease to be so tender about the national susceptibilities of other members.
In short, while Adenauer continues in authority, and directs his almost authoritarian prerogatives to the ends in which he sincerely believes, it is probable that occasions will seldom arise likely to precipitate a marked division of interest or objective between our two countries. Even if there should occur clashes of temperament or opinion, they should be capable of sub rosa settlement.
The position occupied by the FedRep in Europe, geographically, economically and financially, together with its as yet unrealized military potential, would be disturbing if one entertained doubts as to Adenauer’s future attitudes toward foreign policy. These will be determined, I believe, by his estimate of the wisdom with which he thinks American foreign policy is being conducted. He must be fully sensible of the peculiar and favorable posture of his own country, and how a tempting oscillation between East and West might contribute to its superficial benefit.
No such hesitation, however, as far as one can presently speculate, has been cherished by him (though it may have entered into his calculations). Moreover, despite its startling achievements in other fields, the FedRep has not yet regained its prestige in political affairs. Its governors are ambitious to serve as mediators, or as second best to influence the play of events in the Middle East, as well as in Africa. Freed of the erstwhile taint of colonialism, no longer possessors of territories, their brutal management of dependent peoples almost forgotten, they toy with the pleasing idea that they are less suspect in the Arab and African countries than are other nations still exercising suzerainty in those murky localities.
Torn by a feeling of guilt toward the Jews, to whom they are in course of making periodic financial atonement, they have not yet decided whether to accord diplomatic recognition to Israel, or to rationalize their refusal to do so by asserting the greater usefulness of their role as impartial and uncommitted observers of regrettable national rivalries.
In relation to the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, their future course of action is also not resolved. Intrigued by the possibilities inherent in the Polish situation, and, in lesser degree, elsewhere, much study has been pursued by them as to how best they might maneuver to their own and allied advantage by an increase in their trade, and more formal relationships in that area. The recent recognition by Yugoslavia of the so-called East German Republic and the swift Federal Republic riposte to this action has postponed whatever plans were being evolved by Adenauer and his counselors in this connection. Nevertheless, it may be expected that a resumption of attention [Page 317] to such relationships will again be brought under advisement. The historical trend of preoccupation with Turkey and lands farther east has begun to reassert itself. Delegations of responsible Germans have begun to investigate commercial opportunities, especially in Turkey and Iran, and their government can be expected to support, with ample credits, undertakings of a nature which might promise ultimate advantages to its citizens.
Everywhere, the FedRep is expanding its thrust outward, taking moderate but adventurous risks. Its preferred partner in these fields would be the United States. I believe we should have intimate conversations at an early date with German administrators to ascertain whether a combination in some places of our outlays might not be of mutual benefit, and likely to advance our political objectives. In the domain of economic aid, consultation, and possibly joint action, with the Germans might multiply the effectiveness of our present programs. In conjunction with them and other allies, we might enter into arrangements with rich native governments, such as those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran to sponsor and participate in area development schemes, instead of bearing alone the burden of supplying manpower and funds for such purposes, with little assurance our efforts will be rewarded even by so evanescent a tribute as short-lived gratitude.
It would be idle to dwell on the possibilities of fruitful cooperation between the Germans and ourselves if the result would be to weaken our indispensable ties with older and more proven allies. But such would not be the case, if we could arrive at an understanding with Germany, prosperous of [to?] our associates, subject to the multilateral endorsement and participation of others. It seems to me unwise to await longer a concerted movement, of which there are no apparent signs, conducive to a broadening of Western influence in the satellite and other worlds, when a commencement to that end might be made in partnership with the only friendly nation now [able?] to afford like ourselves a venture of this scope.
There is much talk of “grand designs” and careless paternity of other resounding phrases. But while Adenauer is still alive and active, should we not search out his designs, if any? To do so would not be difficult, for the Germans are not the least vocal of peoples. They labor under a subdued sense of guilt, and will not be the first to extend an invitation. Their dynamism is extraordinary, but it has been chiefly devoted to an animation of their domestic concerns. I think it can be harnessed to broader uses, consonant with US aims. I shall not in this telegram suggest how this might be done, but call your attention to an imperfectly utilized source of strength and [Page 318] energy, which, although at present not being dissipated, is too exclusively devoted to narrow national aspirations.2