Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

132. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the German Ambassador (Krekeler) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1957¹

Washington, October 23, 1957

SUBJECT

• Various Subjects

Ambassador Krekeler called on Mr. Murphy following his return to Washington from extended leave. The following subjects were discussed.

Call on the Secretary of State

Dr. Krekeler said he had not seen Chancellor Adenauer since the elections. He had had an extended discussion with Foreign Minister Von Brentano. Dr. Von Brentano had asked him to see the Secretary of State as soon as possible and to seek Mr. Dulles’ views on the question of German relations with Eastern European countries. Ambassador Krekeler said that apart from the question of German relations with Yugoslavia, the German Federal Government was still confronted with the question of what it should do about Poland in particular, and possibly other Eastern European countries. He said that no decisions on this subject had been reached as yet. From the German viewpoint, the problem had two aspects. One was what the Germans could get out of the establishment of relations. The other was what the chances were of an evolutionary development in Eastern Europe. Mr. Murphy said the Secretary’s time was taken up at the moment with the visits of Mr. Macmillan and M. Spaak,² but that an appointment could undoubtedly be arranged for the following week.³ He said that he would inform the Secretary of the Ambassador’s desire to discuss German relations with Eastern European countries.

German Force Build-Up

Ambassador Krekeler said that the German military authorities were very pleased with the results of the recent maneuvers. They were particularly satisfied with the performance of the conscripts. In fact, he had received one report that the conscripts had turned out better than the volunteers. The Ambassador indicated that his information had come directly from the military and that he had not seen Defense Minister Strauss prior to leaving Bonn. Mr. Murphy asked how the build-up of German forces was progressing. Ambassador Krekeler was unable to provide any specific details but stated that the program for the next fiscal year would be fulfilled. He remarked that it was important to go forward carefully, indicating that the Iller River incident had caused some feeling about pressing the build-up too rapidly.

Visit to the United States by Defense Minister Strauss

Mr. Murphy asked whether Ambassador Krekeler had any information as to Herr Strauss’ plans for visiting Washington. Ambassador Krekeler said he had no specific information on this subject. He doubted, however, whether it would be possible for the Defense Minister to come during the current calendar year due to the need for the Germans to get their build-up plans to NATO during the Annual Review.

Support Costs

Mr. Murphy asked if there were any new developments on support costs and if the Ambassador had had any discussions on it in Bonn. The Ambassador said he knew of nothing new. He remarked that the United States had reserved the right to raise the matter again during the latter part of this year. Mr. Reinstein pointed out that the agreements which had been concluded in June⁴ had not yet been ratified by the Bundestag. Ambassador Krekeler said he had been unaware of this fact.

Break in German Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia

Mr. Murphy said that the Yugoslav Ambassador had called on him on the previous day to protest the attitude of the United States Government with regard to this matter. The Ambassador had also taken the position that the Federal Republic had no right under international law to break off relations with Yugoslavia, suggesting that such a step was appropriate only as a preliminary to going to war. Mr. Murphy said he had pointed out to the Ambassador that the United States Government had in a friendly way pointed out to the Yugoslav Government before they recognized the GDR the difficulties which would be certain to arise if such a step were taken. We also pointed out to the Yugoslavs that the German Government had made its position on the subject very clear and that the only exception which it recognized was the Soviet Union. Ambassador Mates had alleged in response that the German Government followed a different policy in dealing with large powers and in dealing with small powers. Mr. Murphy had pointed out to him that the German Government had made an exception in the case of the Soviet Union because of the fact that it was an occupying power. In addition, it had the difficult problem with regard to the repatriation of German nationals in the Soviet Union. Mr. Murphy said that he had made it clear to the Yugoslav Ambassador that he knew the German Government deplored the fact that it had had to take the step of breaking off relations with Yugoslavia, as we did, although we found the German position entirely understandable. The Yugoslav Ambassador had claimed that pressure was being exerted on the Yugoslav Government and that the Yugoslav Government could not have its policy dictated from the outside. The Ambassador had even said that this constituted an intervention in Yugoslav internal affairs.. Mr. Murphy said he had told the Ambassador that he could not follow this reasoning. On the other hand, the recognition of the Soviet Zone regime did constitute an action by the Yugoslav Government involving German internal matters.

Mr. Murphy asked Ambassador Krekeler whether he had had an opportunity to discuss this matter when he was in Bonn. The Ambassador said that he had seen Foreign Minister Von Brentano before the Yugoslav action had been taken. He stated that it was his personal view that Marshal Tito had been frightened by the events in Hungary. He was concerned that the liberalization process would get out of hand and undermine his own position. He thought that Tito had been driven for essentially internal reasons toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He doubted very much whether the Yugoslavs had gotten anything in exchange for their action in recognizing the GDR.

Ambassador Krekeler said that the Yugoslav recognition of the GDR was only one symptom of a change in the Yugoslav position which he was inclined to feel was now somewhat like that of the Chinese. Mr. Murphy said there was a danger that the trend in Yugoslav policy might go farther than the Yugoslavs actually wanted. He thought we should be careful not to push the Yugoslavs into the Soviet Bloc. Ambassador Krekeler said that he felt part of the explanation of the Yugoslav position was the attitude toward Khrushchev. He thought Tito was anxious to help Khrushchev maintain his position. The Ambassador expressed some skepticism regarding the degree of Yugoslav understanding of the requirements for reaching a European settlement. He said he thought it was of some significance that the Yugoslavs had consistently taken a position against European integration, not only for themselves but for the other countries involved. They had frequently warned the Germans against becoming involved in Western European arrangements.

Mr. Murphy said that he was not clear why the Yugoslavs had chosen this particular time to take the action. He had asked the Yugoslavs about this both before and after the action had been taken, but they had been unable to give any answers. The Ambassador had said to him the previous day that the Yugoslavs always felt this was the right thing to do, and that Yugoslavia was much like a man about to dive into a swimming pool. At some point he dives.

Ambassador Krekeler remarked that if the Yugoslavs had really been interested in establishment of German relations with Poland, it was difficult to see why they had recognized the GDR, since this was not helpful in terms of the development of German relations with Eastern Europe. Mr. Murphy said this point had been made to the Yugoslavs at the German request prior to their taking action. Ambassador Krekeler said that one thing which struck him about the Yugoslav action was that the Yugoslavs had not discussed the problem as they saw it with the Germans beforehand and merely pronounced their intention to the German Government. He pointed out that Foreign Minister Von Brentano had made a particular point of this in his press conference on October 21. (Ambassador Krekeler gave Mr. Murphy the Foreign Office version of the Brentano press conference, which will be translated and distributed separately.)⁵

Mr. Murphy asked what the Federal Government now intended to do. Was it contemplated that a trade mission would be maintained in Yugoslavia? Ambassador Krekeler said that he did not think so. The Germans had asked the French to represent them in Belgrade. He said that they would not violate the undertakings which they had given Yugoslavia in their trade and payments agreements, indicating that he had in mind specifically the credit given to Yugoslavia by the German Government in recognition of Yugoslav war claims. Mr. Murphy indicated that he thought the German action in asking the French to represent their interests in Yugoslavia had been a wise one and reflected the very good state of relations between France and Germany.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10–2257. Confidential. Drafted by Reinstein.
2. Prime Minister Macmillan visited Washington, October 22–25, for discussions with President Eisenhower; for documentation, see vol. XXVII, pp. 788 ff. Secretary-General Spaak visited Washington on October 24 to discuss NATO matters with Eisenhower and Dulles; for documentation, see vol. IV, pp. 172 ff.
3. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, Krekeler met with Dulles and Reinstein on October 29 at 2:30 p.m. No record has been found of the conversation.
4. See Document 126.
5. Not found attached to the source text.