Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

123. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 29, 1957¹

Washington, May 29, 1957

SUBJECT

• Atomic Energy Discussions

PARTICIPANTS:

• Federal Republic of Germany
• Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor
• Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador
• Wilhelm Grewe, Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs
• Interpreter, Mr. Weber
• United States
• Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, AEC
• Adm. Paul F. Foster, AEC
• Dr. Charles L. Dunham, AEC
• Dr. Goudschmid, AEC
• Dr. Merrill Eisenbud, AEC
• Gen. Herbert B. Loper, Defense
• Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, AEC
• Mr. Richard Kirk, AEC
• Amb. James Bruce, Embassy Bonn
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR, State
• Mr. Jacques Reinstein, GER, State
• Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE, State

Lewis Strauss opened the conversation by telling the Chancellor how glad he was to have the opportunity to discuss atomic energy matters with him. He mentioned the talks the United States had had with the three Wise Men of EURATOM earlier this year and how that project promised to speed the atoms-for-peace program. He said that the short time the Chancellor had at his disposal would not permit any comprehensive coverage of the atomic energy field and suggested that the best way to proceed would be for the Chancellor to ask questions. Admiral Strauss mentioned that Merrill Eisenbud, a distinguished member of the AEC staff, would be available for a period in Bonn to develop in greater detail for the Chancellor any of the matters covered this morning. He also said that Dr. Bishop, the AEC representative in Paris, could come to Bonn for consultation if the Chancellor so desired.

Chancellor Adenauer thanked Admiral Strauss for his kind words and offer of expert advice and agreed that it would be best for him to ask questions at this meeting. He said that there were two recent events in Germany which had caused concern, First, the statement by eighteen well-known scientists warning against the harmful radiation effects of tests and urging the German Government to set a model for the world by refusing to equip its forces with nuclear weapons. The Chancellor said he had discussed this matter with five of these scientists, led by Dr. Hahn. One would not expect to have scientists reverse themselves publicly—the best one could expect would be silence. The Chancellor said that he noted that there was great difference among scientists in their estimates of the risk of danger from nuclear testing. He had asked two German generals to join him with the five scientists to explain the military situation. The scientists had not previously thought through the military situation.

The second episode had been the Albert Schweitzer appeal. The Chancellor said that Schweitzer’s prestige was very great in Germany—that he spoke almost with the authority of the Bible. Schweitzer’s statement that radioactive fallout from testing would harm the human race had caused great concern in Germany.

The Chancellor said that some months ago a scientific committee had been set up to consider the radiation question and had come up with a conclusion differing from Schweitzer’s. Their results will be published after a few months’ delay so as to avoid any appearance of being intended as a rebuff to Schweitzer and the eighteen scientists. The Chancellor then asked Admiral Strauss what results U.S. studies had come up with in regard to the possibility of harm from tests.

Admiral Strauss first pointed out that Merrill Eisenbud of the AEC staff was an expert on radiation and would be able to fill in any details the Chancellor might want. He pointed out that there had been Soviet agitation against testing since the early days of the atomic energy program. Two and one-half years ago the National Academy of Science, an independent agency, had begun a study of the radiation question. It had reported that it found that even if testing continued at the same rate as at present, humans would only receive 1/100 roentgen over their normal reproductive lifetime; as opposed to this, they would receive seventy times as much radiation from normal background sources and from medical x-rays. The British Medical Research Council had reached similar conclusions; but the agitation against testing continues.

Admiral Strauss stated that naturally the Albert Schweitzer statement had given us concern. We had found out that the Editor of the Saturday Review of Literature had gone to Schweitzer and persuaded him to make the statement after presenting to him the alleged scientific basis for the statement. Schweitzer was reluctant to make the statement, but agreed to do it on condition that it not be used to weaken free nations in the face of peril from the Soviet Union. On publication, the statement of this condition was omitted. The radioactivity of fish and plankton in the Columbia River was owing to Phosphorus–32 coming from the cooling water in the Hanford plants. It is not a by-product of weapons testing and the figures concerned are not in point in discussing the Strontium–90 question. Admiral Strauss said that he felt Albert Schweitzer had been deceived unintentionally and that his scientific arguments were unsound.

Admiral Strauss then pointed out that owing to the development of “clean” weapon design techniques, radioactive fallout could be greatly reduced. We had pursued this development for humanitarian and tactical purposes.

Chancellor Adenauer asked if we had made any attempt to contact Albert Schweitzer in an effort to get him to take back any erroneous parts of his statement. Admiral Strauss pointed out the fact that Dr. Libby had written a very respectful letter pointing to the errors in the Schweitzer document, but there had been no response. Chancellor Adenauer said that in view of the great response which the Schweitzer appeal had evoked in Germany, he wondered if it would not be possible to obtain a retraction from Schweitzer. Admiral Strauss added that the Schweitzer statement had had a great effect also in the United States, that the reaction exceeded any previous intervention of this sort and that it might well be that we should send people to visit him.

Chancellor Adenauer then asked about the problem of depositing of radioactive wastes from power reactors. He said that Prime Minister Macmillan of the United Kingdom had told him that dumping radioactive wastes in the sea could have unforeseeable effects and therefore the U.K. intended to dispose of its wastes in coal mines. Chancellor Adenauer asked what could be done to handle this problem.

Admiral Strauss said that these wastes may become very valuable and therefore one must find a way to store them in a recoverable form. Certainly, one should not dump them into the sea promiscuously. Some of the fission products have half-lives of thousands of years. We are studying the interchange of the waters of the seas between depths and surface waters. We will study the ground burial problem, but even here great care must be taken to avoid seepage owing to porosity and to avoid contaminating underground streams. He concluded that waste disposal was a considerable problem but soluble.

The Chancellor then asked if the U.K. had an H-bomb, admitting that this might be a difficult question to answer. Admiral Strauss said “I believe so, but can’t say so categorically.” The Chancellor asked if nuclear tests are necessary for the development of weapons systems, and whether or not a one-year suspension of testing would do irreparable damage. Admiral Strauss said that he could answer the first part of this question in the affirmative without hesitation. The second part he could only answer with qualification. All U.S. tests have specific purposes. For example, the current test series is directed at proving up small weapons to defend cities against aerial attack and to develop “cleaner” weapons. He said the second part of the question is tied into the disarmament negotiations and so very difficult to answer. In view of General Loper’s great experience with the testing matter and with disarmament, he asked him to answer this phase of the question. General Loper said that testing is a necessary part of any research and development cycle whether for a war item or a peace item. We know of no way to completely rid ourselves of atomic weapons, since one cannot determine scientifically that the other side had actually eliminated all their weapons. We assume that atomic weapons will be with us from now on. It is inevitable that improvements will come from weapons research without testing. There will be a lower degree of reliability, but even without testing, weapons will be improved. So what is gained by ceasing tests if such development continues anyway? We feel that the danger of testing is not so great as to warrant non-completion of the research and development cycle by testing. The United States is not an aggressive nation. We are interested in developing weapons for defense. This is a much more complex problem than development of weapons for offense, where the problem is merely to produce a fairly limited number of big weapons. We want to develop deliverable weapons for use against submarines, airplanes, intermediate range ballistic missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles. We very desperately need defensive weapons.

Chancellor Adenauer asked if Congress would publish its report on the fallout hearings now in session. Admiral Strauss said that he expects this report to be out before the end of this session of Congress. He also said that a new weapons effects handbook would be published by the Department of Defense late in June.

Chancellor Adenauer asked about the prospects for thermonuclear controlled reaction. He said that German scientists were predicting that something quite revolutionary was in the offing in this field. They referred to work being done at Columbia University. Admiral Strauss mentioned that Dr. Bishop, who was present at this meeting, had until recently been in charge of the controlled thermonuclear program in the United States. For five or six years, we have believed that it was theoretically possible to produce high enough temperatures—in millions of degrees—and contain the gases in closed spheres by the use of magnetic fields and cause the fusion of light elements. After we do this, we might produce large amounts of power without uranium. We have a very active program involving five laboratories in the United States. The U.K. and USSR are also pursuing this idea. It will be a number of years before it can be proved up in practice. Admiral Strauss added that we welcomed the fact that German scientists were working in this field and said that we would be glad to exchange information with them. Chancellor Adenauer expressed his gratitude for this offer and asked if the price of uranium had not come down as a result of prospective advancements in controlled thermonuclear power. Admiral Strauss suggested that long before thermonuclear power was competitive, any existing uranium mines would be worked out.

Chancellor Adenauer thanked Admiral Strauss for the information developed during the meeting which he had found most instructive. He reverted to the great prestige of Albert Schweitzer and how important it would be to get him to admit inaccuracies in his statement. He felt that millions of people had developed fears as a result of the Schweitzer statement. Admiral Strauss thanked the Chancellor for his kind expressions. He said we had no present means of contacting Albert Schweitzer. We would have to develop some. We would study the Chancellor’s advice on this score with great care.

Admiral Strauss then introduced Merrill Eisenbud to the Chancellor.

The Chancellor said he personally knew Schweitzer and was concerned that after his many years in the service of humanity this recent episode which had instead of relieving suffering instilled human fears, was most unfortunate. In order to keep Schweitzer’s memory pure, he thought it would be desirable to attempt to get him to clarify his statement.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Secret. Drafted by Smith.