Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

5. Summary Paper Approved by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, January 5, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE DETACHMENT OF A MAJOR EUROPEAN SOVIET SATELLITE

Summary

1. Acting on the suggestion of the Board Assistants, the OCB, at its meeting of August 25, 1954, requested the Working Group to review additional possible actions to implement NSC 174, particularly a major coordinated effort by appropriate agencies designed to detach one of the important European satellites from the Soviet bloc. The Working Group was requested to submit a preliminary staff analysis to the Board which would point up the policy and strategic implications and feasibility factors that would be involved in such an effort. At their meeting of August 13, 1954, the Board Assistants agreed that Albania should not be considered as an “important” satellite for the purposes of this study.

2. The Working Group first reviewed existing intelligence estimates of the political situation concerning all of the Eastern European satellites. Then a study was made of the methods that might be used to detach a satellite. U.S. capabilities for such action were reviewed and conclusions flowing from the analysis were drawn. Studies on the vulnerabilities of East Germany and Czechoslovakia were prepared especially for this review.

3. The analysis indicates that the instrumentalities of Soviet dominion in the political, economic and cultural fields, backed by military force, continue to be effective in maintaining control over the satellites. The progressive sovietization of the political, social and economic structure of the satellites, the orientation of the local economies towards the East and the concentrated effort at indoctrination of the rising generation have served further to support Moscow’s control over the satellite areas. The Soviet orbit nevertheless has vulnerabilities which are susceptible to exploitation by the United States.

4. Without attempting to be categorical, it is the opinion of the Working Group that soft treatment cannot be expected to effect the basic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would conform to U.S. objectives; and that therefore, except when relaxations are calculated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within a short time span or to protect the people against the regime under special circumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased against any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities appear. The importance of this subject justifies study of appropriate implementing actions consistent with U.S. policy as it develops.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Board concur in the following:

a. At present, given the strength of the Soviet position, no major Soviet satellite presents vulnerabilities of such extent that their exploitation can be expected to result in its detachment from the Soviet bloc.

b. U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not sufficient to accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by means short of war.

c. Unless the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little likelihood of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war except by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself to possible detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort against this satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it would require a concentration of political, economic and psychological measures directed to this end. A study of the requirements of such a concentrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germany as a target in order that advantage may be taken of any future development making possible the unification of Germany by negotiation on terms acceptable to the U.S.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet Satellites. Top Secret. Submitted to the OCB under a covering memorandum by Staats, January 11, with the instruction that the OCB specified “minimum distribution” of this summary paper. Staats also stated that the OCB “noted the attached subject paper” (apparently the January 5 revised summary of the December 30, 1954 paper) and approved the recommendations in the summary.