Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

32. Memorandum From George T. Lister of the Office of Eastern European Affairs to the Director of the Office (Beam)¹

Washington, September 28, 1955.

SUBJECT

• The Satellites and Geneva

Since the Geneva Conference the Polish Communist propaganda machine has obviously been making an all out effort to exploit the so-called “Geneva spirit” to its own advantage, both in Poland and abroad. Sometimes the propaganda is adroit and indirect, sometimes it is blunt and brazen. Although not always expressed in words as plain as these, the main lines are:

1. Those Poles who awaited a Third World War (that is, a change in Poland) had their hopes dashed by Geneva; these people have never understood the real facts of the international situation; they listened to VOA and RFE, they refused to accept reality, etc.

2. Poland is like a loving mother who is ready to forgive her erring children and anxious to have them with her; all except a ridiculous few who are self-deceived can now, after Geneva, see that the present regime is here to stay; it is easy and advantageous to return to Poland, etc.²

Usually it is not difficult to detect a note of triumph and malicious glee in these statements.

Thus the Warsaw regime is trying to demoralize anti-Communists at home and abroad, not so much by what was actually done at Geneva but rather by the Communist interpretation of that Conference—“the spirit of Geneva.”

I believe that with some minor differences the same line is being used in other satellites.

The President and the Secretary have recently reaffirmed our policy on the satellites.³ However, there may be a danger that these statements will be discounted, not only by our friends but by our enemies, if they are not followed up in actual negotiations at the next Geneva meeting. It may then appear that, our original stand on the satellites having been rebuffed by Bulganin, we have abandoned all hope of really achieving anything in their behalf in our desire to come to terms with the USSR.

Presumably the Soviets will take the position that the satellites are sovereign countries and that we should negotiate with them directly. But I think that our main purpose will have been achieved if we show clearly, at Geneva, that we feel that there can be no real relaxation vis-à-vis the USSR without a satisfactory settlement of the satellite question.

At all events I am afraid that the Communist propaganda machine has been so active, clever and well coordinated since the Geneva Conference that we must now take a stubborn stand on the satellites at the next Geneva meeting or suffer a major psychological defeat in Eastern Europe.

1. Source: Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 58 D 386, Policies. Confidential. Beam wrote the following note on the source text: “Mr. Lister, Thanks. I assume we will not fail to remind the Sovs of the satellites again at Geneva. J.B.”
2. When the London Government’s “Premier”, Hugo Hanke, returned to Warsaw the Communists were careful to have him include in his first public statement a reference to “the shock caused by the Geneva Conference” to the Polish émigré leaders and to state that “the Geneva Conference became a real disaster for our London circles.” [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Apparent reference to Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ most recent public remarks on the satellite question and the Geneva Conference. Regarding Eisenhower’s statement, see footnote 2, Document 28. Dulles’ statement on the satellites and Geneva was made in an address before the U.N. General Assembly, September 22 (text in Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1955, pp. 523–529).