Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

3. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)²

Washington, January 4, 1955.

SUBJECT

• OCB Working Group Paper on Possible Detachment of a Major European Satellite³

In August the OCB instructed the Working Group on NSC 174⁴ to prepare an analysis of the possibility of detaching a major European satellite of the Soviet Union. The Working Group has throughly canvassed the situation in each of the major European satellites (excluding Albania) and has come to the following conclusions:⁵

a. At present, given the strength of the Soviet position, no major Soviet satellite presents vulnerabilities of such extent that their exploitation can be expected to result in its detachment from the Soviet bloc.

b. U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not sufficient to accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by means short of war.

Assuming that the purpose of the OCB in making this assignment was to accomplish, if possible, the detachment of a major European satellite, the Working Group further concluded that “unless the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little likelihood of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war except by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself to possible detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort against this satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it would require a concentration of political, economic and psychological measures directed to this end.” A study of the requirements of such a concentrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germany as the target in order that advantage may be taken of any future development making possible the unification of Germany by negotiation on terms acceptable to the United States.

With respect to general policy toward individual satellite countries looking toward the accomplishment of U.S. objectives, the Working Group further expressed the view that soft treatment cannot be expected to effect the basic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would conform to U.S. objectives; and that, therefore, except when relaxations are calculated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within a short time span or to protect the people against the regime under special circumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased against any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities appear. The importance of this subject justifies study of appropriate implementing actions consistent with U.S. policy as it develops.

The summary of the paper contains in Paragraph 4c, last sentence, the following statement “Such a concentrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germany as the target.” This sentence was added after consideration of the paper by the Board of Assistants and since it constitutes a policy recommendation should not be considered to be a recommendation of the Working Group.

Recommendations:

It is recommended

(a) That you concur in conclusions a and b.

(b) That you support the studies recommended in 4 c and 5.⁶

2. Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Subject Files, IV. Top Secret. Drafted by Stevens.
3. Dated December 30, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, p. 142. Annex A, entitled “East Germany”, is printed ibid., vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1707. Annex B, entitled “Czechoslovakia”, is not printed.
4. For text of NSC 174, “United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” December 11, 1953, see ibid., vol. VIII, p. 110.
5. Conclusions a. and b. are identical to those in paragraphs 4a and 4b of the December 30, 1954, OCB Working Group paper cited in footnote 3 above.
6. There is no indication on the source text whether Hoover accepted these recommendations. Hoover subsequently remarked on the OCB Working Group paper during the OCB meeting of January 5; see infra.