Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

29. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council¹

Washington, August 31, 1955.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENEVA FOR U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAMS

I. Assignment

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency have been instructed by the National Security Council to

“prepare, on an urgent basis for consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board, a study on the psychological implications arising out of the Geneva Conference as they affect U.S. information programs relating to the European Satellites and the International Communist Movement.”

II. The Post-Geneva Situation

At this early date it is difficult to assess in detail, or on a documented basis, all implications of the Geneva Conference for the audience of the U.S. information programs. Certain results of the Summit meetings, however, are clearly of direct significance to American information activities. The more important of these are:

a. An atmosphere of conciliation was created at Geneva resulting from the generally friendly tone struck by all participants, and the repeated stress on the urgency of international cooperation if a durable peace is to be achieved. In the eyes of the world, the United States emerged from the Summit Conference more clearly as a country dedicated to the earnest pursuit of peaceful solutions to international problems, sincerely willing to cooperate to this end even with the present rulers of the Soviet Union. This has been well received by most of our allies and friends in the free world, except for Nationalist China and Korea, but has had discouraging implications for our friends in the satellites. For many of our audiences, the basic implication is that, unless and until the “acid test” of forthcoming negotiations should prove otherwise, the United States does not intend to question Soviet intentions in seeking peaceful solutions to East-West problems.

b. At Geneva the Heads of Government of the Four Powers instructed their Foreign Ministers to undertake further discussions on a number of questions, beginning in October. Meanwhile, various disarmament proposals made at Geneva are to be given consideration by the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, which will reconvene August 29.² These forthcoming discussions will presumably be initiated in the tone of conciliation struck at the Summit meetings. The fact that these discussions are scheduled in itself places a responsibility upon the U.S. Government information programs to avoid actions which in the eyes of the world might detract from the strong moral position achieved by the United States at Geneva. This must be kept in mind while carrying out the further responsibility of bringing pressure upon the Soviets, in advance of the October meeting so as either to induce them to make substantive concessions or make clear to the world their unwillingness to do so.

c. Despite their friendly tone at Geneva, Soviet leaders have as yet given no public evidence of their willingness to yield on any substantive issue brought up at Geneva. This fact is most obvious to our satellite audiences. The grip of the Soviet Union on its satellite empire remains firm; Soviet leaders have, in effect, publicly indicated that they do not at this time intend to relinquish effective control of the captive territories or peoples. Internal popular opposition to industrial and agricultural controls, combined with the new Soviet tolerance of the Titoist “heresy,” may well present the Soviet regime with increased difficulties. But the military forces of the Soviet-Communist bloc and the conspiratorial apparatus of international communism still represent an undiminished threat of great magnitude to the free world. Even though tensions which might lead to war in the near future have been relaxed, we can expect that communist tactics of subversion, economic penetration, insidious propaganda and political agitation will continue unabated. It is important therefore that superficial and possibly even a few substantial concessions which might be made at the subsequent conferences, be not looked upon as proof that the Soviet intentions have undergone any fundamental change.

d. Expert opinion is agreed that the morale of the captive peoples has probably deteriorated as an aftermath of Geneva. Satellite populations placed exaggerated hopes in the Geneva meetings, and wishfully looked for some evidence of Soviet yielding to the West. They undoubtedly have received an over-simplified impression of the readiness of the United States to cooperate with the present Soviet leaders, which will tend to increase feelings of hopelessness with regard to their eventual liberation from communism. This impression will give support to communist propaganda efforts to convince the Eastern European peoples that they cannot hope for effective intervention by the West.

In the absence of any new evidence to the contrary, satellite peoples are apt to regard the apparent American acceptance of Soviet good faith either as political naivete, or as a first step toward abandonment of their interests. They are likely to feel that the manner in which the satellite question was dealt with at Geneva (including the failure of the British and French to support the President’s initiative) was weak and unconvincing in contrast to the strong and united Western position on German reunification. Latent suspicions regarding the sincerity of professed Western intentions to bring about the liberation of Eastern Europe have therefore probably been strengthened by developments at the Summit meetings. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Geneva for the captive peoples is the clear and unmistakable evidence that the Western powers, even the United States, will not resort to war, or threat of war, to liberate Eastern Europe. The resultant loss of hope, however unrealistic, for early liberation, by force if necessary, which is still widely held among the captive populations will undoubtedly lead to weakening of the spirit of resistance.

On the other hand, Western proposals at Geneva for wider exchange of ideas, publications and persons offer a possible new approach to the satellite peoples. This approach would have to be combined with strong reassertions that political freedom and national independence must be restored to Eastern European countries. Precise and imaginative proposals for breaking down the isolation of the Eastern European people could be used to induce a gradual relaxation of communist controls, and to reduce the severity of the pressures now exercised upon individuals.

Any official exchange program would risk suggesting that the U.S is reconciled to the status quo and is willing to confer respectability upon puppet leaders. Consequently such a program would have to be carefully presented to satellite audiences so as to avoid such an impression. But it would appear that the West stands to gain from wider circulation of Western ideas, books, magazines and newspapers, and from any reduction of radio jamming by the communists. A wider exchange of persons, however, has some risks. Satellite exchangees undoubtedly would be handpicked by the communist regimes, and for the most part, consist of hard core activists. Nonetheless, it might be possible to circumvent intentions of the communist regimes by such proposals as the exchange of visits by relatives or other groups which would be technically difficult to pack with agents.

e. At Geneva it was asserted that the U.S. regards international communism as a major source of tension and that the Soviet Union is in a position to reduce this tension. Since Geneva there has been no indication that the conspiratorial activities of international communism have been reduced in any significant way, or that the leaders of the Soviet Union have ceased to exercise effective control over the international communist movement.

As long as this situation continues, we cannot relax our efforts to combat international communism with all effective means at our disposal, and to make clear Soviet responsibility for communist efforts at subversion, dissension and disorder throughout the world. Here a genuine dilemma arises, at least for official U.S. information media. If we are to be realistic about the source and control of the world-wide communist conspiracy, we cannot avoid tracing responsibility to the Soviet Union, and in certain contexts, to individual leaders of the Soviet Union—with whom we shall be negotiating over the next few months. To what extent can the aims/motives and operations of international communism be attacked and questioned, without reflecting on the good faith and intentions of individual Soviet leaders? The question of Soviet good faith and the aim of international communism to dominate the world cannot be realistically separated. To resort to euphemisms and circumlocutions in treating the problem of ultimate responsibility can only result in a note of hypocrisy, which our audiences will be quick to recognize.

Perhaps this dilemma can be partly obviated by directing our efforts at inducing the Soviet leaders first to disavow publicly any connection with international communist subversion and then to condemn such activities.

Because Soviet leaders must, if confronted with the question, disavow any official connection with the whole field of international communist conspiracy and subversion, the dilemma referred to above may be more apparent than real, since, if the Soviet leaders disavow such activities, they cannot take umbrage at public attacks against those activities.

It is, of course, too much to expect that we could induce the Soviet leaders to condemn, as distinct from disavowing, publicly communist subversion, but there would be value in obtaining their disavowal, even though patently false, of any connection with international communist subversion. Their mere disavowal of connection with the international conspiracy would, since world public opinion knows they are directly responsible for such conspiracy, condition public opinion to demand more from the Soviet leaders than words on the substantive issues at the October meeting. Furthermore, their refusal or failure to condemn communist subversive activities would tend to become a glaring fact which could be widely exploited.

III. Proposed Lines of Approach

The various considerations treated above emphasize the need for making the position of the United States clear to the satellite peoples as we approach the forthcoming meetings. Briefly, we do not consider that the relaxation of tension and a more peaceful atmosphere permit us either to scrap programs for individual and collective self defense, or to tolerate covert aggression and to sanctify the injustices of the status quo. Rather the spirit of Geneva means an opportunity for peaceful change which will dispel fear and remedy injustices. Therefore, if the atmosphere of Geneva is perverted by the Soviet leaders either into a cover for covert aggression, or into an excuse for perpetuating present injustices either at home or in the captive countries, then that atmosphere cannot continue.

On the other hand, at this moment in history, we cannot afford to appear, in the eyes of the world, as condemning all offers of the Soviet Union even before testing for sincerity. We should emphasize the positive aspects of U.S. policies. We should not emphasize direct charges and allegations against the Soviet Union, but rather we should make such points by indirection.³

We should closely follow developments in the satellites and elsewhere, drawing attention to any failures by the Soviet or satellite regimes to live up to the peaceful protestations made by Soviet leaders at Geneva, and to their subsequent exhortations to put the “spirit of Geneva” into practice. Our output should reflect the fact that the U.S. reciprocates the present Soviet attitude and demeanor of conciliation. But we should make clear that a continuation of the present atmosphere depends upon Soviet and satellite actions which clearly show their willingness to bring about a peaceful change. This means the elimination of the present injustices under which the captive peoples suffer, and the curbing of the conspiratorial activities of International Communism.

a. Continue to Restate our Basic Position on the Satellites.

We should on suitable occasions restate our basic position on the satellites, namely that Soviet domination of the peoples of Eastern Europe is one of the major sources of East-West tension, and that the continuation of this control obstructs the achievement of genuine peace. We hold that the captive peoples must be given political freedom and national independence. A high level statement, preferably by the President, should be used on some appropriate occasion in the near future to reaffirm this position clearly and strongly, and to point up the fact that at Geneva the United States did not acquiesce in the status quo in Eastern Europe.⁴ We cannot reconcile ourselves to continued Soviet domination of the satellite states and will continue to support the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to truly independent national existence, and to a standard of living representing a greater share in the product of their own labor.

b. Comment Objectively on Internal Developments in Satellites.

We should not hesitate to comment objectively, and where appropriate, unfavorably, on internal developments in satellite countries, such as the agricultural crisis of the communist bloc, even when such comment reflects directly on the actions of the Soviet Government, or of top Soviet leaders. We may utilize anniversaries of past Soviet actions, such as the Hitler-Stalin pact or the Soviet takeover of the various satellite states, to point up past communist duplicity and ultimate Soviet responsibility for the imposition of an alien rule upon unwilling Eastern European peoples. This should be done without engaging in polemics, name-calling or personal attack on Soviet leaders.

We should also invite attention to actions and statements by both Soviet and satellite regimes since the Geneva meeting which conflict with Soviet declarations that the spirit of Geneva must be put into practice. Should satellite regimes take a more conciliatory approach in East-West relations, or should they relax oppressive controls over their people, such moves should be welcomed as essential first steps, and further steps in this direction encouraged. We should point out, however, that such actions do not come anywhere near satisfying the legitimate spiritual and material demands of the satellite peoples, and that much more can and should be done.

c. Show That German Reunification in NATO Is No Threat to Eastern Europe.

We should make special effort in our output to bring out clearly the fact that German reunification and rearmament within NATO will in no way represent a threat to Eastern Europe, particularly to Poland and Czechoslovakia. In countering Soviet assertions to the contrary, we should emphasize the defensive nature of the Western alliances, stressing the point that retention of the satellite areas is not required for purposes of Soviet national security. As the risk of war has diminished, so have become downgraded the security reasons for the Soviets holding on to East Germany and maintaining a tight rule over the satellites.

d. Avoid Undue Optimism, But Build up Pressures for Change.

In approaching the forthcoming meetings of the Foreign Ministers, we should avoid expressing undue optimism. We should, however, encourage the building up of pressures on the part of the satellite peoples for peaceful change in their economic and political status. We should stress the fact that the American government and people expect some developments along these lines from Soviet leaders, and are watching closely for signs of evolution in the satellites toward greater national independence. Such developments will be watched as a barometer of Soviet real intentions. This note of expectancy on the part of the U.S. should be coupled with stress on the necessity for the Soviet leaders to follow their fair words with genuine deeds if the atmosphere of relaxation which they seem to desire is to continue.

e. Build up Pressure for Increased Contacts for People with the Free World.

Parallel to this we can gradually build up pressure for a program of breaking down the isolation of the captive peoples from the West, by penetrating Eastern Europe with books, magazines, and newspapers, by exchange of personal visits, and by elimination of communist jamming of Western radio programs. This should be done without suggesting our acceptance of the status quo. We must make clear that we believe the only permanent solution for the satellite countries is the restoration of individual liberty and national independence to the captive peoples. We should point out, however, that by breaking down their isolation, and restoring normal contacts with the outside world, we hope to bring about the easing of the controls under which they now suffer.

f. Continue Offensive Against International Communism.

We should not relax our efforts to expose the strategic aims of international communism, its tactics of subversion and duplicity, its vast network of agents, front organizations and propaganda activities. We should continue to document our case that international communism is a major source of world tension, which inevitably complicates all efforts to achieve permanent peaceful solutions to East-West problems. We should be careful to keep our attack within the context of the communist movement as such, although we should not be reticent in pointing out that the Soviet Union is the control center of international communism, and that responsibility for ending the communist conspiracy rests primarily on the Soviet Union.

IV. Recommendations

a. It is recommended that the proposed lines of approach under III above be approved as interim post-Geneva guidance to U.S. information programs with respect to the satellites and international communism.

b. It is further recommended that U.S. information programs take immediate and continuing action, in line with the foregoing, to put pressures on the communist leadership in advance of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files, Miscellaneous, 1954–1955. Top Secret. According to a cover sheet by Gleason, September 2, this report was prepared by Allen Dulles and Streibert and submitted to the OCB on August 31. The OCB considered, approved, and transmitted it to the NSC for the information of the Council members. In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, August 20, MacArthur explained that this paper was revised in light of the Secretary’s “post-Geneva policy statement,” an apparent reference to a paper entitled “United States Post-Geneva Policy,” August 15, printed in vol. V, p. 551. MacArthur also noted that CIA and USIA were “champing at the bit to get this guidance out.” MacArthur asked Dulles to read the paper and stated that he and Murphy had read it and believed that the “tone and tenor are all right.” Dulles concurred in the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/8–2055)

   According to a note from MacArthur to Merchant, August 22, attached to the MacArthur’s August 20 memorandum to Dulles, the Secretary’s approval was subject to Merchant’s concurrence. Merchant noted his concurrence on the August 22 note.

2. The language here is apparently that of a draft prepared prior to August 31.
3. The last sentence of this paragraph was not included in the text of the report as submitted on August 31. At the OCB meeting of September 7, Streibert reported that “the President had gone over the paper rather carefully (Psychological Implications of Geneva for U.S. Information Programs) and had suggested certain ideas which Mr. Streibert felt would be taken care of adequately by adding at the end of the first paragraph under Section III on Page 4 after ‘cannot continue’ the following one sentence paragraph: ‘We should emphasize the positive aspects of US policies, and avoid direct charges and allegations against the Soviet Union, making such points by indirection.’” At the next OCB of September 14, this addition was approved. (Notes of OCB meetings of September 7 and 14; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes)
4. Note: Since the cutoff date of this document, the President made such a speech before the American Bar Association in Philadelphia on August 24. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding this speech, see footnote 2, supra.]