Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

275. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Leverich) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)¹

Washington, November 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Future US Policy Toward Hungary

Background:

A year has now passed since the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution. During this period US policy on the Hungarian question has been aimed primarily at: (a) exerting pressure through the UN and world public opinion on the Soviet Union to bring about some amelioration of the repressive situation in Hungary; (b) circulating as widely as possible a true picture of events in Hungary so that the nature of Soviet imperialism and the failure of Communist ideology may be widely understood, particularly in the non-committed areas; (c) making clear to the world at large and to the Hungarian people that the US views the present Hungarian regime as unrepresentative and as completely subservient to the Soviet Union. We have achieved considerable success in publicizing the lessons of the Hungarian Revolution and by now we have established beyond any doubt our attitude toward the Kadar regime. We have not been successful, however, in forcing the Soviets to yield to public pressure and adopt a more liberal and humane policy in Hungary. The Kadar regime, in the words of our Legation in Budapest, has “now largely accomplished its physical consolidation”; the position of Kadar, himself, following his recent return from Communist China appears to be stronger than ever before; a terroristic policy of suppression has been maintained; and Soviet troops continue to occupy Hungary actually in increased rather than decreased numbers. Meanwhile, there are signs that our potential for exerting pressure through world public opinion is decreasing as the Revolution itself fades into the past. We are thus faced with the likelihood that our aim of bringing about in the immediate future any real liberalization in Hungary largely through the pressure of world opinion is not attainable.

It would appear then that we should henceforth pursue somewhat more flexible and realistic objectives. We would define these as sustaining the morale and aspirations of the Hungarian people to the extent possible, encouraging whatever liberal forces and tendencies may appear in Hungary, and making clear to the people and to the regime, itself, the advantages of a “national” orientation as opposed to total Soviet domination. The pursuit of these objectives may well require some modifications in our current tactical policy toward the Hungarian regime. This has been the subject of three recent despatches from Budapest, copies of which are attached,² in which the Legation suggests that the time may be approaching when increased travel of American citizens to Hungary and some cultural exchanges would prove beneficial to our own interests and to the Hungarian people. Naturally as long as the Hungarian regime is pursuing its present policy of terror, the US cannot make any large gesture which might redound to the direct benefit of this regime. Like the Legation, however, we feel that considerable advantage might accrue from a quiet and gradual modification of some aspects of our current policy, particularly since we fear that our present extremely rigid tactics may lead to a dead end from which retreat will become increasingly difficult. The moderations which we would suggest pertain to travel and cultural exchanges, as suggested by the Legation, and, in addition, to social contacts with diplomatic representatives of the existing Hungarian regime.

In considering our policy in these fields it may be useful to review briefly the present status quo:

a. Travel of American citizens to Hungary—Even prior to the Hungarian Revolution the travel of American citizens to Hungary was restricted and most passports were stamped not valid for travel in Hungary. During the summer of 1956, in recognition of the somewhat improved political situation in Hungary and the more cooperative attitude of the Government toward our Legation, travel to Hungary was being permitted with increased liberality and a number of businessmen’s passports were validated in addition to journalists and persons with compassionate reasons for visiting Hungary. When the Revolution broke out the passport restriction was again rigidly enforced and in the post-Revolutionary period we have thus far validated the passports only of accredited journalists, persons with extremely compassionate reasons for travel to Hungary and individuals connected with the American relief effort there. Requests of businessmen and persons desiring to visit relatives have been consistently denied. Since the Hungarian regime in turn has granted only a few visas to American journalists, the number of American citizens entering Hungary has been sparse indeed.

b. Cultural exchanges—There have been no cultural exchanges with Hungary since the Revolution although a number of Hungarian scientists nave been permitted to come to the US within the East-West Contacts Program to attend scientific conferences. This past summer Mr. Yehudi Menuhin was extremely anxious to give concerts in Hungary but, as you will recall, was dissuaded from doing so by the Department.

c. Social contacts with representatives of the Hungarian regime—At the present time the situation with regard to social contacts with representatives of the Hungarian regime is as follows:

(1) In Budapest the Legation is under instructions to keep social contacts with Hungarian officials to a minimum. The Legation has been told that Hungarian officials should not be invited to other than the Fourth of July party and invitations from the regime should be accepted “only when the Chief of Mission feels that non-attendance would be definitely harmful to the effective operation of the mission.”

(2) Posts other than Budapest are under instructions to avoid social contacts with Hungarian representatives but to observe the minimum requirements of diplomatic protocol as far as official contacts are concerned.

(3) In Washington representatives of the Hungarian Legation staff are not included on any official US invitation lists and informal social contacts with the Hungarian Chargé or other Legation personnel is avoided.

By maintaining our current policy in these fields we continue to illustrate our unyielding opposition to the present regime of Hungary. By exerting a strong lead in these matters, we, to a limited extent at least, prevent the Kadar regime from achieving the position of an accepted government in the international community and we help to perpetuate the opprobrium in which the regime is generally held. By limiting travel to Hungary we also prevent the Hungarian regime from obtaining any appreciable amount of dollar currency from tourist trade and hinder somewhat their business contacts. Finally by refusing to deal more than absolutely necessary with representatives of the Kadar regime we are acting in harmony with the UN position of neither accepting nor rejecting the credentials of the Hungarian representatives. On the other hand our present policy severely restricts the possibilities of contact between the Hungarian people (as opposed to the regime) and our own. As the Legation points out, US cultural contacts with Hungary are now considerably less than those with the Soviet Union notwithstanding the fact that the Hungarian people have made abundantly clear their thirst for all types of association with Western culture. The reasons for this are clear but it does in a sense penalize the wrong party. The travel of more US citizens to Hungary would inevitably give more Hungarians an opportunity of learning of life in America and would probably contribute to their understanding of American policy during the Revolution. Increased cultural exchanges would be impressive evidence that the US continues to be interested in Hungary while at the same time illustrating to the Hungarian people our cultural accomplishments and giving to them further justification for feeling that they remain within the main stream of Western civilization. Moreover, these increased contacts would pose an additional problem for the regime in its efforts to achieve political domination over the population since in this struggle the regime’s most potent ally next to the presence of Soviet forces could be a feeling of desperation and isolation among the people.

Any marked change in our policy toward social relations with the representatives of the existing regime would probably be unwise in view of the status of the Hungarian question in the UN and misleading concerning our own attitude toward the regime. But some slight moderation which would give our Chargé in Budapest somewhat more discretion in this field might increase the information which we obtain concerning developments in Hungary and render somewhat more stable the position of our mission in Budapest. Moreover, it would put us in a more favorable position to encourage any liberal trends which might become apparent within the Hungarian leadership. Such a moderation in Budapest to be effective at all would have to be reflected to a small extent in our policy in other posts throughout the world.

On the whole we believe that the advantages of modifying our policy in the three fields under discussion outweigh by a considerable margin the disadvantages particularly in the light of our long range aims. It can be argued, of course, that we should await some improvement in the situation in Hungary or at least some conciliatory gesture on the part of the existing regime before we institute even minor relaxations in our policy. This, it is believed, would only be logical if the relaxations would work in favor of the Hungarian Communists and the Soviets. Actually the relaxations, in our view, would serve our aims primarily and to delay their implementation would, in effect, be to work against our own purposes. At the same time it is clear that we must proceed slowly in order to avoid any impression of a basic revision in our attitude toward the existing regime and to enable us to take into consideration any changes that occur in Hungary whether they be for the better or for the worse.

Recommendations:³

a. That beginning immediately the restrictions on travel to Hungary be more liberally interpreted to permit the travel of (a) reputable businessmen to Hungary who have legitimate business to complete there, (b) US citizens who have close relatives in Hungary whom they have not seen for a good many years, and (c) certain other Americans whose travel to Hungary would appear beneficial to US interests. We would review this policy in another six months and if no untoward incidents had occurred we would then give consideration to lifting all restrictions on travel to Hungary and at the same time informing the Hungarian regime that because of this we will be increasing our staff in Budapest;

b. that Hungary be included in the cultural exchange program planned for other East European countries. We understand that a tour of Eastern Europe is currently under consideration for the Harlem Globe Trotters. We believe that their appearance in Hungary would have considerable impact and consider that this might be an appropriate attraction with which to initiate a new program;

c. that our Chargé d’Affaires in Budapest be authorized henceforth to use his discretion in accepting Hungarian invitations and inviting Hungarian representatives to American affairs keeping in mind, of course, our continuing attitude toward the Kadar regime; and that elsewhere throughout the world, Hungarians henceforth be included, as are the Soviets, on invitation lists when representatives of all other diplomatic missions are to be invited. This would probably include only the Fourth of July parties abroad plus a few standard functions in Washington.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/11–857. Confidential. Drafted by Sutterlin.
2. Despatches 217, 218, and 219 from Budapest, all dated October 11. Despatch 217 is Document 270. Despatches 218 and 219 are not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3 to despatch 217.

3. These recommendations were forwarded to Murphy in a separate memorandum from Elbrick, also dated November 8. Elbrick briefly summarized Leverich’s arguments and Murphy approved the recommendations. Attached to Elbrick’s memorandum is Leverich’s memorandum to Elbrick and copies of despatches 217, 218, and 219 from Budapest. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/11–857)

   In a subsequent memorandum to Murphy, dated November 14, Berding expressed “hearty agreement” with these recommendations, but noted that as the modification of policy got underway it would become apparent to newspaper reporters, particularly those in Budapest. Berding stated that the Department of State would have to ensure that the modification not be interpreted as a resignation by United States to the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. A marginal note by Loy Henderson on Berding’s memorandum reads: “I also agree, LWH (O)” (Ibid., USIA/IAE/E Files: Lot 64 A 536, Hungary Political Reports, 1957)