Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

273. Despatch From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State¹

No. 250

Budapest October 29, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Review of United States Policy Toward Hungary

The Legation in its despatches Nos. 217,² 218, and 219³ of October 11, 1957, has suggested a review of United States policy toward the Kadar regime, with particular reference to cultural exchange and the travel of United States citizens to Hungary. The purpose of the present despatch is to carry this thinking somewhat further, into the field of political relations with the existing Hungarian Government.

As a result of the initial success of the revolution of October 1956 and the inability of internal Communist forces to subdue this revolt and to maintain in power a Communist government linked with and subordinate to Moscow, the Kremlin took overt action to suffocate the revolution and to set up a puppet regime under Janos Kadar. It was the fact that foreign troops were fighting in Hungary and violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people which led to various resolutions condemning the USSR being passed by the United Nations, caused the United States (with certain other countries) not to enter into “normal” relationships with the Kadar regime, resulted in the preparation of the “Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary”, and led to the designation of Prince Wan as Special Representative of the General Assembly to achieve the objectives of the United Nations’ resolutions.

There have been indications in the press and in the Department’s telegram No. 135 of September 28, 1957,⁴ that Prince Wan has seen the Soviet and Hungarian Foreign Ministers at the United Nations. The Press Officer at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, at a press conference on October 12, 1957, stated, in connection with a question concerning the possibility of a visit of Prince Wan to Hungary: “Prince Wan did not want to come to Hungary as a private person. He called, at his own request, on Imre Horvath, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and asked him to be allowed to travel to Hungary and to carry on investigations there on the basis of the instructions received from the General Assembly of the United Nations. Imre Horvath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, told him in his reply that—as the Hungarian Government had also in the past regarded the sending of a United Nations observer to Hungary as interference in the domestic affairs of the country—Hungary, for the same reason, being an independent and free country, would not be able to grant him an entrance visa.” The Legation has no information as to what further action may be contemplated by Prince Wan.

So far as the Legation has been able to observe, there has been no indication of any softening on the part of the Kremlin toward Hungary and, equally, no sign of any softening on the part of the Kadar regime toward those who participated in the revolution or toward those who may be considered unsympathetic to the present regime and its dependence upon the USSR. A wave of arrests, running into the many thousands, occurred in August and September. Violent attacks on the United Nations Report and on the General Assembly were made by the regime during the final session of the XI General Assembly. Press reports of trials were reduced during this period, but they are again appearing regularly and political arrests have once more become routine. Speeches by high officials of the regime have taken a consistently “tough” line, the latest being a long harangue by the Prime Minister at a conference of party activists on October 11, shortly after his return from Peking and Moscow.

As for the policy of the Kremlin, the Legation’s reading of the international news is that the Russians have again adopted a harsh line in their dealings with the West and are apparently taking the view that any liberalization in program of a Socialist-oriented country inevitably dooms that country’s Socialist efforts. The Kremlin appears fully preoccupied with the situation in the Middle East and in the earth-satellite and ballistic fields and is, therefore, disinclined even to consider the possibility of a change in policy toward Hungary or its other East European satellites at the present time. The probability that any easing of the internal pressures in these countries would be tantamount to the opening of a Pandora’s box and would require military dispensations and the exercise of constant political attention and supervision which the Kremlin cannot afford in the light of its present preoccupation elsewhere has probably been more than confirmed by recent developments in Warsaw. The filling out of the Russian divisions in Hungary, their being supplied with modern T–54 tanks and other similar weapons, and the maintenance of troops and equipment at a high point of efficiency are a further indication that the USSR is not prepared to countenance any changes or untoward events in this country at the present juncture. In any event, the Legation’s scanning of the Eastern political horizon has thus far revealed no patch of light, indicating the possibility of an early easing of the pressure on Communist nerve-centers and, in particular, on the policy being pursued by the Kremlin in Hungary both directly and through its local instrument, the Kadar regime.

The possibility that the Kremlin might make some change in the top command of the present regime in Hungary has been suggested, particularly prior to the final debate of the Hungarian question in the XI General Assembly. Since such action was not taken at that time, when it might have had some effect (favorable to the Russians) in the voting at the General Assembly, and since Kadar’s authority appears to be on the increase, there seems little reason to think that any significant changes will be made in the near future. The concomitant question also arises: Who could be selected as a replacement for Kadar, who might be as acceptable to the Russians and at the same time might have some appeal for those nations and peoples who have been and continue to be strongly critical of Russia’s bald intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary? The Legation is unable to find such a person in the present political firmament in Hungary.

The prospects for an early success of Prince Wan’s mission and of some change in the Russian position in and policy toward Hungary would, therefore, appear to be not particularly encouraging. If this analysis of the existing situation and of the probable outcome of the latest efforts by the United Nations is accurate, it would seem not inappropriate for the Department and the Legation to consider what changes, if any, in our policy toward the present regime in Hungary might be appropriate. The Legation, in the three despatches under reference, has already made certain very limited recommendations. It would seem advisable, however, to consider the broader field—of our diplomatic relations with the existing government in Hungary—in order to determine whether there should be any changes on our part, despite the fact that early changes on the part of the Russians seem improbable.

There has already been a slight easing of the tension between the regime and the Western diplomatic missions in Budapest. In the case of the American Legation, this tendency was initiated with the departure of Mr. Wailes (who had never presented his credentials to any Hungarian Chief of State) and the arrival of a new officer (“uncontaminated”, in the eyes of the regime, by direct contact with and knowledge of the revolution) to assume the duties of Chargé d’Affaires a.i. It was further determined that the Chiefs of most of the Western missions should accept the invitation of the Foreign Minister to a non-propaganda film showing and reception on July 2 and that the Foreign Minister and a few other officials of the Foreign Office should be invited to the Fourth of July reception and other National Day receptions. There has also been some slight increase in official contact between the Western missions and the Foreign Office, but this has been minimal and has been limited strictly to business representation regarding specific problems between the regime and the respective missions. The Foreign Minister did not attend the Fourth of July reception and the regime has not made great efforts to take advantage of or to expand this slight rapprochement on the part of the West, except that invitations to cultural affairs have been more frequent, as have contacts between the Hungarian General Staff and the Service Attachés of the NATO missions. However, the continuance of the virulent attacks on the West by the press and by the highest officials of the regime and the arrest of Hungarian members of the staffs of Western missions, on the one hand, and the publication of the United Nations Report on Hungary and the resolution passed by the XI General Assembly at its final session, on the other hand, have reaffirmed the rigidity of position between the Western diplomatic missions and the Kadar regime and have made it unlikely that any tendency toward a thawing of this situation will develop without a definite policy change on one side or the other. Since situations of this kind seldom remain static for long periods, there exists, therefore, the possibility that the relationships between the two sides will deteriorate still further unless remedial steps are taken.

The only change on the part of the West which would satisfy the Kadar regime would be the application of “normal diplomatic relationships” to it by the West. This would mean, for us, the designation of a Minister to this Legation. It would, likewise, mean the entering into regular official and social relations with the Government here and the attempt to settle outstanding problems through the usual diplomatic procedures. It would mean, as well, the recognition of the credentials of the Hungarian Delegation at the United Nations and, presumably, would entail some means of cancelling action contemplated by the various resolutions of censorship against Hungary and the USSR adopted by the XI General Assembly. It would also mean an easing of economic restrictions which have been placed on trade between Hungary and the West, although it is probable that this would not be made a sine qua non and that time, tide, and developments in other fields (political, cultural, travel, etc.) would be permitted to work their corroding effect on economic restrictions.

What quid pro quo might the Russians (as the ultimate masters of policy in Hungary) be prepared to give in return for some (and ultimately, all) of these concessions on the part of the West? Insofar as the United States is concerned, the changes to be effected would include (1) the trial or release of Legation Hungarian personnel at present in prison and a cessation of the molestation of our personnel; (2) the lifting of the limitation on the size of the Legation’s staff; (3) a liberalization in cultural exchanges and travel restrictions; and (4) a satisfactory arrangement with respect to Cardinal Mindszenty.

However, insofar as the Western powers generally are concerned, any easing of relations would have to go at least some way to meet the condemnations expressed in the various resolutions of the United Nations and would necessitate a decided change in Russian policy toward this country. As indicated above, the Legation sees no sign that the Kremlin is disposed at the present time to make appreciable changes in Hungary or in its policy toward Hungary. Any easing of its present pressure, even in return for some or all of the above-listed concessions from the West, might run the risk of giving encouragement to the Hungarian people, the vast majority of whom (in the Legation’s considered opinion) are fundamentally anti-Russian, violently anti-Communist, and deeply dissatisfied with the situation of their country under Communist administration and Russian domination. The prospect, therefore, would seem to be that, in order to accomplish some normalization of our relations with Hungary at the present time and under existing East-West tensions, an almost complete backdown on the part of the West and of the other countries which have censored Russian action in Hungary by their votes at the United Nations would become necessary.

There are, of course, deficiencies in the existing situation for the West. The lack of normal official contact with the government makes it extremely difficult for the Western capitals to be properly informed with respect to the thinking and policies of an important segment of the Communist world. There is no opportunity for an exchange of ideas and the possible exercise (admittedly a remote possibility) of some moderating influence. The very absence of such contact, despite the presence of the Western missions in Budapest, is an irritation in itself and undoubtedly causes the regime to take positions and actions which it might otherwise not take. Finally, the “affront” to the regime results in its taking annoying, but effectively crippling, action against the Western missions, such as pressure on or arrest of its local staff members and limitations on the size and activities of the missions.

For the United States, these limitations are administered to the fullest degree, since we are considered the leaders in the attack on the regime in the United Nations. Our contact with any Hungarians—official or non-official—is now reduced almost to the vanishing point. Our staff—both American and Hungarian—has been severely cut and there is constant interference with and pressure on the remaining Hungarians. In addition, we have the question of Cardinal Mindszenty, whose refuge in the Chancery is a point of periodic attack and a source of deep irritation to the Kadar regime.

In face of these deficiencies for us, it is obviously desirable that every possibility of improvement in the situation be explored. As indicated above, however, the Legation is unable to suggest any program which would be likely to meet the desired objective at the present time. The fact of the matter is that the Communist policy for Budapest is determined in Moscow and no change in that policy seems probable in the light of existing international preoccupations and the Kremlin’s seeming determination to retain as much of the status quo in Eastern Europe—and particularly in Hungary—as possible. The only possibility for improvement would be a complete back-down on our part and, even if such a step were effected, there is serious doubt that it would result in any appreciable improvement in our relations with Hungary—or with the USSR—under existing international tensions.

The Legation, therefore, recommends that our policy toward the Kadar regime and toward the USSR (so far as its relations with Hungary are concerned) not be altered at the present time. It is suggested that we await developments in connection with Prince Wan’s assignment, in the hope (admittedly not great) that his efforts will result in some slight easing of the situation in Hungary. If such easing should occur, we should, of course, be prepared to take prompt advantage thereof by seeking—together with the other NATO powers—to improve relations with whatever government may then exist in Budapest. The Legation regrets to see a continuation of the present rigidity of positions between the two sides, but it is believed that overall international factors outside Hungary are determining at the present time and that no useful purpose would be served by seeking to alter the local situation in the face of these broader and presently more important international considerations.

Garret G. Ackerson, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/10–2957. Secret.
2. Document 270.
3. See footnotes 2 and 3, Ibid.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5764/9–2657)