Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 16, 1957¹

Washington, October 16, 1957

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Polish Relations²

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• W—Mr. Dillon
• EUR—Mr. Elbrick
• EE—Mr. Freers
• LS—Mr. Glenn
• The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Rapacki
• The Polish Ambassador, Mr. Romuald Spasowski
• Mr. Zbigniew Janczewski (translactor)

The Secretary greeted the visitors and mentioned his personal ties with Poland, in particular his work in Warsaw in 1926 and connection with the stabilization of the zloty and his work as counsel for the Polish Government in a suit involving the return of Polish gold stored with the French and looted by the Germans.

Mr. Rapacki expressed his satisfaction with the present visit, which was his first to the United States. He said that, at the time of the Secretary’s visit to Poland, he was far from being active, at least in public life, but that it was probable that the Secretary had met his father, a Governor of the Bank of Poland.

The Secretary said that he had indubitably met the Minister’s father.

The Secretary expressed his happiness at the recent resumption of closer relationship between the two countries. He assured the Minister that the United States does not aim at impairing close and friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union nor at following a cordon sanitaire policy similar to that of France after the First World War. The Secretary had repeatedly assured various Soviet leaders that it was the hope of the United States that friendly relations would prevail between the Soviet Union and neighboring governments. The Secretary expressed, however, the opinion that genuine friendship must derive from the expression of their independent will. He feared that Poland and Hungary, which have a long tradition of independence, would not be able to be friendly towards the Soviet Union unless given full independence. A situation dangerous to Poland, to the Soviet Union and to world peace would result if their full independence were not recognized. The United States has no objection to any form of social organization in any country. It is hoped that there would be an evolution within Eastern Europe towards greater independence. Such an evolution, however, should take place within a general framework of friendship between the Soviet Union and the countries concerned.

Mr. Rapacki expressed his agreement with ideas put forward by the Secretary. It is a fact that the relations between Poland and other countries, socialist as well as other, have improved. The further improvement of such relations is a basis of Polish policy. There is no contradiction between Poland’s friendship with her neighbor to the east or with socialist countries in general and Poland’s friendship with other countries. It is of great importance to Poland that the United States understands this.

The situations of Poland and of Hungary are quite dissimilar. Events such as those in Hungary are impossible in Poland because in Poland measures were taken in time in order to bring together the people and the Government. The intention of the Polish Government to continue to do all it can in this direction guarantees this. Mr. Rapacki joined the Secretary in the expression of opinion that friendship must be based on freedom and equality.

Mr. Rapacki expressed his satisfaction with the improvement in the relations between the United States and Poland in the economic as well as the political fields. He expressed the hope that the present meeting would be a contribution to the satisfactory development of such relations.

The Secretary stated that in order to move toward closer economic cooperation, he had had to make a finding that Poland was independent from the Soviet Union. It was not easy for him to take this decision. He hoped that events would prove him right.

The Secretary further stated that he was disturbed by the change in the Polish attitude towards the Hungarian question in the UN. He expressed the hope that this change does not mean that the Polish Government has lost the measure of independence shown earlier.

Mr. Rapacki stated that the experience of mutual relationship is the best way to find out whether or not Poland is independent. In regard to the Hungarian question, he stated that the Polish position was not influenced by any external pressures and that, in fact, the position of Poland in regard to this position has not changed. There may be differences of opinion as to the causes of the events in Hungary. There may be such differences of opinion between Poland and the United States on the one hand, and Poland and Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union on the other hand.

The Secretary expressed his surprise at the statement that the Polish attitude in respect to the Hungarian question had not changed, since last November Poland abstained on resolutions dealing with Hungary whereas this time Poland had voted against the Hungarian resolution, thus siding with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rapacki stated that Poland had long-standing reservations concerning the UN action in regard to Hungary. It is the opinion of the Polish Government that, irrespective of the causes of the events in Hungary, the further presence of the Hungarian question on the UN agenda can only further complicate the international situation. This was the opinion of the Polish Government last year and it continues to be so now.

The Secretary stated that it was, nevertheless, a fact that Poland voted differently now than it did a year ago.

Mr. Rapacki stated that a vote does not necessarily represent the entire position of a country and should not be construed as a sign of dependency.

Mr. Rapacki further stated that a clear understanding of the Polish foreign policy could be obtained only by appreciating the enormous importance for Poland of a general détente in the overall international situation. The economic situation of Poland depends on the international situation. At the present moment Poland is reorganizing her economy in such a way as to make possible a greater degree of individual initiative. The success of this reorganization depends on an international détente and on closer economic, technical and cultural relations with the United States. This shows what Poland’s interests are in international affairs.

Speaking of disarmament, Mr. Rapacki stated that Poland viewed this question from the point of view of the danger of German rearmament. German rearmament would create not only an immediate and direct danger but also an indirect danger, a political threat arising from encouragement which rearmament would give to revisionist tendencies in Germany. Poland is not overestimating the importance of such tendencies today, as it realizes that the major part of German public opinion is in favor of good relations with Poland. Nevertheless German rearmament and the lack of clarity in respect to the position of many countries in regard to the question of the Polish-German borders may create an incentive for a political revival of militarism and revisionism. Mr. Rapacki had recently had his first talk with a German diplomat, the late Ambassador Pfleiderer. From this conversation Mr. Rapacki gained the understanding that no serious German politician thinks of a change in the Polish-German borders but that the German government’s attitude is influenced by the stand of refugees from Polish western territories. Mr. Rapacki’s own opinion is that stating the truth would be better, as it would prevent the fostering of dangerous illusions by the Germans.

Another preoccupation of the Polish government is the banning of atomic weapons. Here again the question concerns nuclear weapons in German hands. This would create a new situation for Poland and might force even a change in Polish economic plans and hopes. This, in turn, would result in a hardening of East-West differences. In consequence, Poland had made a proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons from Polish, East German and West German territories.³ In order to make that proposal, Poland needed an understanding with the other countries of the Warsaw pact and, in particular, with Czechoslovakia. This understanding had been reached. Mr. Rapacki was sure that West German public opinion would favor the Polish proposal. It would also be a first step towards full disarmament.

Mr. Rapacki emphasized that the German question is the central preoccupation of Polish foreign policy. The situation in respect to Germany is the criterion by which the average Polish citizen judges foreign policy in general. Thus, the danger of German remilitarization is the most important mortgage weighing on the relations between Poland and the West.

It is not, of course, the only question which remains. There are also some remaining traces of the cold war but they should be easier to settle. For instance, the Polish government is disturbed by Radio Free Europe broadcasts in Polish, which deal exclusively with questions of Polish internal politics.

Mr. Rapacki stated that the Polish government would see nothing wrong with broadcasting of propaganda dealing with the achievements of the United States and defending American policies. He said that Poland stopped all jamming a year ago, including jamming of Radio Free Europe.

The Secretary stated that he would check into the facts concerning RFE’s broadcasts.

Mr. Rapacki repeated that he is in favor of an exchange of ideas but against a radio station broadcasting opinions on Polish internal affairs in the Polish language.

He further stated that he did not wish to give the impression that the Polish attitude towards Germany is nationalistic. Polish public opinion has evolved and the majority of Poles understand that Poland can and should be friendly with Germany. That is why already two years ago the Polish government stated its willingness to normalize relations between the two countries. Although there have been some gestures and declarations by Germany, no practical steps were taken by it.

Mr. Rapacki said that the Poles understand the necessity of German reunification but, of course, they would not outdo Adenauer on this matter. The time is not ripe for a purely mechanical solution which could only lead to an explosion fatal to both Germany and Europe in general. Only a general détente can make German reunification possible.

Mr. Rapacki expressed his satisfaction with the economic agreement concluded earlier between the United States and Poland⁴ —not so much because of the sum involved, as because of the fact of the agreement itself. The assistance obtained from the United States had helped Poland in a transitional situation. Poland is changing her methods of economic administration. It is moving towards greater democracy. Such changes are, however, easier to propound than to implement. One thing that has been done is the conversion of a large part of the metal industry to production of consumer goods. In regard to economic cooperation between the United States and Poland, Mr. Rapacki said the Poles approached this from the long-run standpoint of their central interest in reserves and investments. Reserves would make possible liberalization in agriculture, with a suppression of compulsory deliveries. They would also make it possible to have more liberalization in industry, greater freedom given workers councils, greater emphasis made on consumer’s goods, and more development of small handicraft enterprises. Reserve stores are needed for the changes in agriculture and industry, and tools and equipment are needed for the handicraft industries. The second major aim is to obtain investments for the consumer goods industries. This is an urgent task since the Polish population is growing at a rate second only to that of China. Poland must develop foreign sources of investment capital. Otherwise, the investments have to be carried out at the expense of the standard of living. This would have disastrous political consequences. Poland would like to talk about long-term economic prospects. It would like to discuss possibilities for creating conditions favorable for an increase of private investment in Poland. It would like our support for Polish membership in the International Bank.

Mr. Rapacki further stated that it was useless to talk of loans without talking about an increase in trade itself. In that respect Poland is handicapped by the lack of most-favored-nation treatment by the United States.

Mr. Rapacki expressed his satisfaction with cultural exchanges and technical assistance. He mentioned agreements with the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, CARE and the Joint Distribution Committee. Talks are taking place with other organizations.

To sum up, Mr. Rapacki stated that both nations have clearly the same aims in international relations although their methods may differ. What Poland is seeking most of all is a feeling of security.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Rapacki for his remarks. He observed that it is not possible to settle all of these questions right here at this meeting. The economic talks will be pursued with Mr. Dillon.⁵ In regard to political questions, the Secretary stated that the German situation was indeed of the highest importance. We recognize Polish concern about this after Poland’s experiences in two world wars. We also remembered these wars. A failure to obtain German reunification is bound to create very serious threats to peace. Even if it is not expected that these dangers may materialize within one or two years, they will certainly materialize within the next 20 years. It is impossible to keep divided a people as powerful and numerous as the Germans.

A second aspect of the question is how to control German rearmament. The close relationship which exists between the United States and the German Federal Republic should not lead one to believe that the United States is not aware of the importance of this question.

There are different theories as to the manner in which German remilitarization can be prevented. The Secretary himself participated in the work on the peace treaty at Versailles. Although the provisions of this treaty were worked out with great care by Marshal Foch and others, the experience of history has shown that this method failed because 20 years later nobody wanted to risk war to enforce the provisions of the treaty.

The only way of controlling Germany is by making it a living part of a whole dominated by peaceful elements. This is the basic principle of the Brussels Treaty on European unity and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They seek not to deny German rearmament but to place limits on it and to integrate German forces with others so as to render them ineffective when acting by themselves. We understand that this method is not favored by the Soviet leaders nor possibly by Foreign Minister Rapacki himself. Nevertheless, it is based on a sound historical experience and is bound to prove preferable in the long run. Thus, the aims of Poland and the United States are the same although their methods may differ.

Mr. Rapacki expressed the view that it might not be too bad for Poland if German troops were controlled by France, but it would be disastrous if French troops were controlled by Germans.

The Secretary stated that this might have been the case if France alone were concerned. In fact, however, the United Kingdom and the United States are also involved. He remarked that the Soviet Union asks for a withdrawal of American troops from Germany. The presence of American troops in Germany is the best guarantee of peace for Poland. The Poles should pray that these troops remain where they are.

Mr. Rapacki stated that Poland would prefer to see the German army reduced to an internal police force.

The Secretary said that this would be a return to the situation which prevailed after Versailles.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/10–1657. Drafted by Glenn and Freers.

2. In a letter to Dulles, September 17, Ambassador Beam asked the Secretary to meet with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, who was attending the U.N. General Assembly in New York. Beam noted that it was 10 years since a Polish Foreign Minister and an American Secretary of State had met. Rapacki, who was making his first visit to the United States, was described by Beam as a young, “decent,” remnant of the Socialist Party, which he represented as a member of the Polish Politburo. Beam also suggested possible topics for discussion. (Ibid., 003.4811/9–1757)

   On October 8, the Polish Embassy in Washington officially requested such a meeting and Dulles approved. (Memorandum from Elbrick to Dulles, October 8; ibid., 748.13/10–1457)

   In another memorandum to Dulles, October 14, Elbrick briefed him on his forthcoming discussion with Rapacki stressing the need to encourage continued Polish independence from the Soviet Union, to take the Poles to task for some recent backsliding in this respect, and to promise broader U.S.-Polish economic relations. (Ibid.)

3. During the U.N. General Assembly debate on disarmament on October 2, Foreign Minister Rapacki announced that, after consultation with other Warsaw Pact members, Poland was willing to accept prohibition of production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on its territory provided West and East Germany simultaneously took the same action. (U.N. doc. A/PV.697) This proposal came to be known as the Rapacki Plan.
4. Regarding the Agreement signed on June 7, see Document 253.
5. Ambassador Spasowski and Dillon met on October 22. Spasowski officially expressed his government’s willingness to start new economic negotiations with the United States. He proposed they be conducted through established diplomatic channels and expressed hope that they would be concluded quickly. Dillon replied that the progress of talks would depend on the U.S. Congress and the stability of the present political situation in Poland. In conclusion, Spasowski and Dillon agreed that discussions would begin on October 31 and cover a broad range of economic matters including Poland’s acquisition of American agricultural commodities, the role of U.S. industry in Poland’s economy, the problem of legislative restrictions on U.S. exports to Poland, and the extension to Poland of most-favored-nation treatment. (Memorandum of conversation by Colbert, October 22; Department of State, Central Files, 748.5–MSP/10–2257) See also Document 274.