Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

257. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 24, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Reconvened GA on Hungary

In examining the considerations surrounding a decision whether the General Assembly should be reconvened on the Hungarian item, we have reviewed the pros and cons once more to be sure that we have not overlooked any pertinent factors. The following questions emerge:

1. Would our own objectives, including our desire to maintain pressure on the USSR and the need to respond to public opinion, here and abroad, be better served by discussing the situation in Hungary at a reconvened session now or by deferring such discussion to the Twelfth Regular Session?

2. Would a reconvened Assembly session exclusively on Hungary, the outcome of which could not be practical in any degree, damage the prestige of the UN by highlighting its ineffectiveness?

3. Would a US initiative for reconvening the Assembly on Hungary prejudice such prospects as there are for successful negotiations in other areas where US-Soviet interests are not in direct conflict?

4. In view of the recent increased pressure of the Hungarian regime on Western diplomatic personnel, would reconvening the Assembly stimulate the Soviets to direct the Hungarians to break diplomatic relations?

[Attachment]

REASONS FOR AND AGAINST RECONVENING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON HUNGARY

For

1. It would give added status and publicity to the Committee’s report² and conclusions.

2. It would maintain pressure on the USSR and demonstrate it remains in defiance of the General Assembly resolutions on Hungary.

3. It would force the uncommitted states to face the issue of Soviet action in Hungary on the basis of the Committee’s report.

4. It would constitute a positive response to domestic and international pressures, official and otherwise favoring further action on the Hungarian situation.

5. It would demonstrate to the people of Hungary, and in the satellites generally, that their plight was not forgotten.

6. It would provide opportunity to focus world attention exclusively on Hungary without the competition of other subjects.

7. Failure to reconvene the General Assembly might be interpreted as an effort to bury the Committee’s report and as reflective of unwillingness to face the consequences of its decisive findings.

Against

1. Any conceivable General Assembly resolution would have no practical effect in Hungary, would appear weak in proportion to the magnitude of the Hungarian problem, and consequently disappointing to advocates of further United Nations action, and might not command the same measure of support as past General Assembly resolutions on Hungary.

2. Routine, apathetic discussion by second-level representatives would underscore the United Nations’ ineffectiveness, tend to vitiate the report’s effect and minimize the importance of the Hungarian question, and might be exploited by the USSR to its own purposes.

3. Pushing the Hungarian item might affect prospects for negotiations in other areas, e.g. the Middle East, and might sow doubts (with Soviet support) in uncommitted areas as to the good faith of the United States in pursuit of disarmament and re-establishment of confidence.

4. A reconvened Assembly might be confronted with proposals for additional agenda items; even if such proposals were defeated the accompanying procedural discussion could cause serious problems and might dilute the desired effect. The French particularly are fearful and have even asked us to take the lead in opposing reconvening.³

5. If the resumed General Assembly primarily stemmed from United States initiative, Assembly discussion would to a considerable extent take on the aspects of a straight cold-war exercise, with reduced support for any prospective General Assembly action.

6. The report might be used more effectively at the 12th General Assembly to give the United States greater maneuverability and flexibility in meeting Soviet propaganda offensives.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/6–2457. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown (IO/UNP). A marginal note on the source text indicates that the Secretary saw this memorandum. According to notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting of June 24, Dulles asked IO to prepare this memorandum because of Congressional pressure to seek reconvening of the General Assembly in special session. The Secretary thought there was “some merit in principle” to a special session. (Notes by Joseph N. Greene; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
2. See Document 255.
3. As reported in a memorandum of conversation by Matthew Looram (WE), June 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/6–2457)