252. Memorandum of Conversations Between the First Secretary of the Legation in Hungary (Rogers) and Cardinal Mindszenty, Budapest, May 19571
SUBJECT
- America’s Failure in the Hungarian Problem
I have discussed this subject with Cardinal Mindszenty several times, always at his initiative, and have heard him talk to others as well. His line of thought seems to be about as follows:
The West, and first and foremost the United States, failed Hungary, which clearly was fighting the battle for the West, during the revolution. The Cardinal seems to believe strongly that had the United States successfully urged UN action to bring in a small detachment of international troops, or to bring in a high-level UN representative early in the revolution, or had the United States delivered an ultimatum of some kind to the Soviet Union, the latter would not have intervened a second time. The Cardinal refuses to believe that some action of this kind, whether it presented an ultimatum or not, was not possible. He points to the activity of the United States in the Suez crisis in October and has said plainly that he thinks the greater activity in Suez than in Hungary has been because oil is involved. “Unfortunately there is little oil involved in Hungary, only moral.”
The Cardinal has not argued as strongly for an ultimatum or a threat of military action (during the revolution) as he has for a UN force or representation. He has accepted the argument that the situation in the Suez differed from that in Hungary, as far as UN troops are concerned, because Egypt accepted the UN forces. He does not accept the argument that the Hungarian situation is different because Hungary [Page 632] is occupied by the Soviet Army. “Hungary is occupied because Roosevelt agreed to it at Yalta.”2
The Cardinal also believes that the West, and primarily the United States, has failed in Hungary after the Revolution. Again he compares the situation in Hungary unfavorably with that in the Middle East. “At least, there, there is activity, whether there is success or not. Here there is only death.” He obviously has no patience with the discussions in the United Nations since the revolution and has referred bitterly at times to one news-item or another (examples: a remark allegedly made by the Secretary in mid-March concerning greater contacts with the Soviets; the withdrawal of Minister Wailes3 as being evidence of unwillingness to seriously consider stronger steps which he considers necessary.
To comments that we would welcome suggestions for peaceful means of helping the situation in Hungary, however, the Cardinal has few to make. His first suggestion and most frequently repeated is an economic boycott (his opinion of Soviet economic and military strength is very low), but he appears to accept some of the counterarguments. He has no other concrete suggestions, however, except “activity,” and completely fails to understand why there is so much continual diplomatic activity, a Presidential doctrine, a high-level mission, continual discussion in the UN, over the Suez, and “nothing” concerning Hungary. His bitterness on this point seems to be increasing as time goes on.
- Source: Department of State, Hungary Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, Refuge for Cardinal Mindszenty, 1956–57. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers. The source text does not indicate the dates on which the conversations took place.↩
- Reference is to the Yalta Conference among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, February 4–11, 1945.↩
- See Document 237.↩