Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

242. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Current Status of the Gomulka Regime in Poland

A current appraisal of the situation in Poland made by our Embassy in Warsaw (Embtel 1316, March 22)² and by the Department together with the CIA³ has resulted in the following conclusions:

1. The basic elements of Gomulka regime policy remain substantially unchanged since last December when the finding was made that Poland had achieved a relative degree of independence from Soviet control and domination and hence could be regarded as a “friendly nation” under Section 107, PL 480.

2. While there have been variations in various aspects of the general situation in Poland, there has been no significant alteration. Poland still has a relatively high degree of independence in domestic affairs, while it maintains only limited deviation from the Soviet bloc countries on foreign policy.

3. There has been no significant reversion to the situation before establishment of the Gomulka regime last October. All the major measures deviating from Soviet-approved practice continue in force, e.g. decollectivization in agriculture, workers councils, the church-state agreement, cessation of jamming, limited revival of private enterprise, a modicum of press freedom.

4. Press reports that Polish liberalization processes are undergoing recession have been misleading. Gomulka has been reining in some party editors who tended to allow discussion to go considerably beyond the limits of the regime’s program.

5. Despite the retention of Deputy Prime Minister Zenon Novak and other leading Stalinists, there has been a continuing reduction in the number of Stalinists holding key posts.

6. Even in foreign affairs, the Poles continue to show some independence in preserving cordial relations with Yugoslavia and indicating continued reserve regarding the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Gomulka’s March 15 message to the Hungarian press was not so different from previous messages;⁴ he has still not given personal endorsement to Kadar or expressed appreciation for the role of the Soviet troops in Hungary.

7. The Gomulka regime has maintained its efforts to re-orient its trade to the West and to seek economic assistance outside the Soviet bloc.

8. The USSR appears to be tolerating the Polish deviation watchfully, while trying to isolate and undermine it.

9. The Gomulka regime continues to represent the most important development in the Soviet bloc, since Tito’s expulsion in 1948, in the direction of U.S. national interests.

1. Source: Department of State, Poland Desk Files: Lot 61 D 77, Basic Statements re Poland. Secret. Drafted by Trivers.
2. Telegram 1316 concluded that it would be in U.S. interest to extend moderate credits, especially agricultural surpluses, on an installment basis. (Ibid., Central Files, 748.00/3–2257) Beam described telegram 1316 as “an excellent report, with which we fully agree” in calling it to Dillon’s attention. (Memorandum from Beam to Dillon, March 23; ibid., EE Files: Lot 76 D 232, Basic Preliminary Documents, #1)

3. This joint paper, dated March 22, concluded:

   “While the Gomulka regime, as a result of some of its more recent actions, may appear less ‘liberal’ than initially, nevertheless so long as the Gomulka forces remain in effective control of the Polish Communist Party, the Polish regime, in our opinion, will continue to seek as much independence as it can in its relations with the USSR.” (Ibid.)

4. According to telegram 1316 (see footnote 2 above), Gomulka said: “Polish nation has witnessed with profound sympathy recent tragedy Hungarian nation—at moment when peoples of Hungary were entering road towards redressing past errors—counter-revolutionary force undertook mad attempt overthrow socialist structure”.