Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

221. Notes on the 59th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, January 4, 1957¹

Washington, January 4, 1957

MEMBERS PRESENT

• State—Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Chairman
• State—Mr. Edward L. Freers
• Defense—Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen
• Defense—Mr. Roger Ernst
• CIA—Mr. Laughlin Campbell
• USIA—Mr. Alfred V. Boerner
• OCB—Mr. Paul B. Comstock, Staff Representative

OTHERS PRESENT

• State—Mr. Robert O. Blake
• State—Mr. Howard Trivers
• State—Mr. Philip Burris
• State—Mr. Ralph S. Collins
• State—Mr. Robert M. McKisson
• State—Mr. Boris H. Klosson
• State—Mr. William A. McFadden
• Defense—Colonel Erik W. Ritzau
• CIA—Mr. Arthur M. Cox
• USIA—Mr. E. Lewis Revey
• OCB—Mr. Warren A. Kelsey

1. Hungary and the UN—Mr. Beam said that not much had happened on the Hungarian question since the committee’s last meeting.² The State Department, he said, had gone along with the move to form a special “Watch-Dog Committee” in the UN, but the British thought that this would be another ineffectual resolution and proposed that: (a) the Secretary-General be pressed to go to Hungary, (b) the UN make an official report on Hungarian events based on reports of chiefs of mission in Budapest, and (c) diplomats in Budapest be appointed UN observers.³ The Secretary General had drafted a second report to the General Assembly and had shown us a copy of the draft which in essence tried to get him out of the Hungarian picture.⁴ The draft report cites a letter from the observers’ group which considers that its usefulness is at an end and also proposes the formation of the new “Watch-Dog Committee.”⁵ The Department had not formulated its position on this report yet. There had been no further moves in connection with the credentials of the Hungarian representatives in the UN⁶ although there was some sentiment in favor of having them expelled from the ILO in view of some members’ bitterness at the suppression of the Hungarian revolt. The legality of this was questionable while Hungarian representatives remained in other UN organs. There was nothing new on the question of when and whether our Minister in Budapest would present his credentials, Mr. Beam concluded.

Mr. Cox asked what the new UN committee would do. Mr. Beam said that it was to follow events and invite governments to provide information on Hungary. He read from the committee’s proposed terms of reference. Mr. Cox inquired what group would hear Anna Kethly and other prominent refugees. Mr. McKisson said that there was some thought this new committee might hear such refugees. Another idea was for one of the regular committees or sub-committees to do so. The Scandinavian countries supported the move to have Kethly heard but would take no action on General Kiraly⁷ and the others although they would support a move from some other nation to have them all heard. Mr. Cox asked what other nation would take the lead in this matter and Mr. McKisson said that we might. Mr. Cox asked whether there was any reason why we shouldn’t, to which Mr. McKisson replied that we did not want to seem to bear out the Soviet allegations of American involvement in the revolt.

Mr. Boerner asked what our reactions were to the Secretary General’s report. Mr. Beam said that the Department had not formulated its position yet but there was not much in the report and, moreover, it was somewhat contradictory in that it said that the observers’ group could not function but nevertheless proposed the formation of another group to perform almost the same functions. Mr. McKisson commented that some of the British proposals would be useful even if the new committee were formed. Mr. Beam noted that until now the British and French had been reluctant for diplomats in Budapest to function as UN observers because of the precedent this might set for Cyprus and Algeria.

2. Aid to Hungary—Mr. Boerner inquired whether there were any new thoughts on the subject of aid to Hungary. In reply Mr. McKisson said that reports had been received on Hungary’s long-term relief needs, and the question had arisen whether relief on a large scale might develop into economic aid. A paper was being drawn up on this problem. It was desired to keep aid on a relief basis, going directly to the people through the Red Cross. Mr. McKisson also mentioned that a UN resolution soliciting contributions from member governments for Hungarian relief⁸ had met little response because members had preferred to make their contributions to the Red Cross. The Secretary General accordingly wanted us to contribute funds and supplies to the UN which would pass them on to the Red Cross, thereby at least technically insuring compliance with the resolution. There were some difficulties in this, he said, but they were not insuperable.

3. Soviet Indictment of U.S. on Hungary—Mr. Campbell inquired about the status of our plans to meet the Soviet indictment of the U.S. in the UN.⁹ Mr. McKisson replied that a group was working on this which had had only one meeting so far but was shortly to have another. He asked whether CIA was also working on this to which Mr. Cox replied they were but were hampered by a lack of terms of reference. Mr. McKisson said that Mr. Walmsley was preparing terms of reference and that there was some thought these terms might also go back to the Soviet part in causing the revolt, but our legal people were dubious about this. Mr. Campbell suggested that we might do this even apart from our UN tactics. Mr. Blake mentioned that the Soviet accusation is at the bottom of the political committee’s agenda, to which Mr. Beam replied that the political committee would adjourn after the third week in February. Mr. Blake said he had heard there was a possibility the committee might never get to this agenda item. Mr. Boerner mentioned a disagreement whether we should adopt tactics of brushing aside the Soviet accusation or take it seriously. Mr. Burris said that this question was being considered. Mr. McKisson said there also was a question whether we should take depositions from eyewitnesses of the revolt; if so we would have to start soon. Mr. Campbell said there was a need to know our basic strategy before information could be collected and Mr. McKisson replied that all of these problems were being considered. Mr. Burris said there was much material in the Polish, Hungarian and Yugoslav press which would be useful in refuting the Soviet charges and Mr. Beam mentioned a book on the “Hungarian Tragedy” by a British Daily Worker correspondent who had resigned in protest against suppression of the revolt.¹⁰ Mr. McKisson mentioned that the delay in getting a copy of the Hungarian White Book¹¹ from our Legation in Budapest was troublesome, since the White Book would probably be a guide to the tactics the Soviets intended to adopt. Mr. Beam suggested that our Legation should also get in on the planning on meeting the Soviet indictment.

4. Hungarian Refugees—Mr. Campbell inquired whether many foreign correspondents were seeing the Hungarian refugees in Camp Kilmer, to which Mr. Burns replied the refugees had perfect freedom to come and go and therefore did not stay in camp much. Mr. Beam mentioned that he had heard that in the Austrian camps the refugees had no newspapers or recreation facilities.

5. Polish Aid—Mr. Beam said that progress was being made slowly on this matter. Mr. Freers said that the Commerce Department would issue a press release the next day announcing that licenses would be issued for the private sale of agricultural commodities to Poland at world market prices. Mr. Trivers said that the achievements so far amounted to two things: the CFEP reversal of policy on the sale of agricultural commodities to the satellites, and the “friendly nation” decision.¹² The next problem was to find funds. Mr. Burris made the point that the Department of Commerce’s release was only about trade, not aid. Mr. Freers said that the “friendly nation” decision was sure to become public knowledge since the newspaper correspondents knew that it was a legal requirement. Mr. Beam said that there had been no unfavorable reactions yet and Mr. Freers said that the Poles in the U.S. would take a generally favorable attitude, especially in view of the church-state agreement in Poland.¹³ Mr. Boerner mentioned that moreover the Hungarian situation had had a calming effect on Polish-Americans.

[Here follows discussion of possible future Polish crises, a Hungarian revolutionary council, and Stalinism.]

Warren A. Kelsey

OCB Staff Representative

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 100.4–OCB/1–457. Top Secret. Drafted by Kelsey.
2. See Document 216.
3. Gadel 81 to USUN, December 29, contained the text of a possible U.S. draft resolution concerning the establishment of a U.N. factfinding committee of governments “for investigation and continuing observation”. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/12–2556) Barbara Salt, Counselor of the British Embassy, asked Walmsley on December 31 about the possibility of using representatives from the various Missions in Budapest for investigating and observing the situation in Hungary. Walmsley indicated U.S. reservations on this point because of the possibility of retaliation. (Memorandum of conversation by David M. Bane, December 31; ibid., 764.00/12–3156)
4. The text of the draft report was transmitted in Delga 422, January 3, 1957. Hammarskjöld provided the text to the U.S. Delegation on a confidential basis. (Ibid., 320/1–357) The report recommended that the General Assembly establish a special ad hoc committee which would take over the activities of the group of investigators established by the Secretary-General. The report was issued on January 5. (A/3485)
5. The letter, dated December 15, from Lall, Lleras, and Gundersen to Hammarskjöld, suggested that the investigation be suspended.
6. Salt and Walmsley agreed in their December 31 conversation (see footnote 3 above) that Western Missions in Hungary might be compelled to close if the Hungarian Delegation’s credentials were rejected. Because of the impact on Hungarian morale, it was not worth the risk.
7. Major General Béla Király had commanded the Hungarian forces in the last stage of the revolution.
8. General Assembly Resolution 1007 (ES–II), November 9, 1956.
9. See footnote 2, Document 210.
10. Peter Fryer of the London Daily Worker.
11. Ellenforradalmi Erök a Magyar Oktoberi Esményekben, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1957–1958).
12. See footnotes 5 and 9, Document 215.
13. See footnote 9, Document 207.