Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

219. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 26, 1956—10 p.m.

1550. Informal discussions of nature indicated Deptel 764² at UN can of course be useful as shown by confidential Malik/Jessup talks in 1949 which led to raising of Berlin blockade.³ However, problem in that instance was specific and there was, as it turned out, coincidence of interest on both sides to end blockade. There is, however, nothing in Hung situation on which I can see any such community of interests, since on every point Sov position and Western attitude appear diametrically opposed. It is conceivable something in security field might be discussed were it not for fact that nature Hung system and govt in Sov eyes inseparable from security question. On nature of regime Hungary, Sovs have been completely consistent in all publicity and in their actions in emphasizing determination to maintain Communist regime which could only be done with strong Sov support, including presence Sov forces.

I have seen or heard nothing here which would indicate any Sov willingness to consider a coalition govt as suggested Budapest’s 443 to Dept rptd Moscow as Deptel 735.⁴ On contrary, series of authoritative arts Sov press have made it plain that only Communist party based on dictatorship proletariat would be acceptable and Kadar’s action in Hungary, which of course Sov directed, makes this determination completely clear. On other hand, Sovs would have every interest in trying to take attention off Hungary and might be prepared to this end to discuss in abstractions and generalities Hung situation, and conceivably, if situation there permits, the conclusion of an arrangement with Kadar along lines of recent Sov/Polish agreement on status of forces,⁵ which would confine Sov troops to specific garrison points under Warsaw treaty. I see no possibility whatsoever of Sovs withdrawing their troops completely from Hungary until and if Kadar or regime similar to it were regarded as sufficiently in control of situation as to warrant even consideration of withdrawal.

If informal discussions on our part are conducted solely as means of endeavoring ascertain what Sov Union has in mind as eventual solution in Hungary, I can see advantage, but if they are attempting to work out any agreement, however informal, between U.S. and USSR I believe they would be subject to all the dangers and disadvantages outlined in Embtel 1199,⁶ of making U.S. accessory after the fact.

Kuznetsov is certainly one of most agreeable and quiet spoken Sov officials, but he is likewise staunch Bolshevik and his “unofficial” approach is of course highly official but with added advantage that he does not have any decisive voice in Sov policy determination.

I do not see from our point of view any solution on Hungary alone and only possibility, which in itself is extremely remote, would be as part of general European settlement involving of course reunification of Germany. Any really constructive and concrete views Dept has on this subject, including Hungary, which it is desired to bring informally to attention Sov Govt I believe could best be done here more effectively than through Kuznetsov at UN solely for reason that it could be brought to people who have ultimate decision in these matters.⁷

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/12–2656. Top Secret.
2. Same as Delga 354 from USUN; see footnote 2, Document 211.
3. For documentation on the negotiations between the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, Yakov A. Malik, and U.S. Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, pp. 694 ff.
4. Document 212.
5. See footnote 9, Document 216.
6. Document 188.
7. On January 11, Lodge requested instructions on a response to questions from Kuznetsov regarding the Hungarian situation. He was not discouraged from talking with Kuznetsov but was cautioned there was nothing he could say other than the sentiments already expressed in U.N. resolutions and his own speeches. (Delga 483 from USUN, January 11, 1957, and Gadel to USUN, January 14; both Department of State, Central Files, 320.5764/1–1157)