20. Editorial Note
During the preparations for the Geneva Summit, the Paris tripartite working group, made up of representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, raised as a possible topic at Geneva the question of the Soviet Union’s domination of Eastern Europe. In planning meetings in Paris on July 9, the French suggested that while the satellite issue was important, it should not stand in the way of agreement on other matters. The British doubted whether the Soviet Union would agree to consider the satellite question realistically at Geneva and favored dealing with proposals for broader exchange of persons and ideas as the best means for change in the Soviet bloc. The United States reiterated the importance of maintaining pressure on the Soviet Union on the satellite issue. (Telegram 128 from Paris, July 9; volume V, page 312)
The President approved on July 11 NSC 5524/1, “Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to the Four-Power Negotiations,” which was discussed by the National Security Council at its 254th meeting on July 7. Contained as an objective in NSC 5524/1 was paragraph 12a dealing with Eastern Europe which reads as follows:
“The retraction of Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe, and ultimate freedom of the satellites from Soviet domination; as initial steps, (1) the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, and (2) the increased accessibility of the satellites to information and influence from the Free world.”
NSC 5524/1 treats more specifically the status of Soviet satellites in paragraphs 26–28, which read as follows:
- “26. Existing policy (NSC 174) sets as an ultimate objective the elimination of Soviet control over the satellites. This objective is to be pursued by ‘appropriate means short of military force’, including ‘if possible, negotiation with the USSR’.
- “27. The U.S. must maintain the position that Soviet control of the satellites is one of the principal causes of world tension and is incompatible both with lasting conditions of peace and with the basic [Page 47] principles of freedom and self-determination. The U.S. should publicly assert this position, possibly with specific demands for withdrawal of Soviet forces, for free elections in the satellites, and for increased accessibility of the satellites to information and influence from the free world, invoking the provisions of relevant international agreements as applicable. Any demands for withdrawal of Soviet forces from the satellites could best be approached through (a) German unification, which should be accompanied by withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and Poland; and (b) the coming into force of the Austrian state treaty, which should be accompanied by withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Rumania as well as from Eastern Austria.
- “28. In any negotiations the U.S. should seek every opportunity to weaken or break the Soviet grip on part or all of the satellite area. While making clear its view that a stable peace in Europe requires the restoration of national independence to the satellites, the U.S. should preserve flexibility of means in the pursuit of this objective. The U.S. must avoid in all circumstances any action that even appears to indicate any abandonment of this objective.”
For the complete text of NSC 5524/1 and the memorandum of discussion at the July 7 NSC meeting, see volume V, pages 287 and 268, respectively. For text of NSC 174, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume VIII, page 110.