189. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Prochnow) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall)1
- Comments on Suggested Measures to Aid Poland and Hungary Over and Above Economic Aid
Mr. Hoover has asked me to comment upon the various suggestions which you made to Mr. Jackson as to further steps which might be taken to assist Poland and Hungary.2
The events intervening since you wrote your memorandum to Mr. Jackson change the situation as far as Hungary is concerned. It is not now possible to make an evaluation as to the exact nature of the present government in Hungary. Therefore, our comments on Hungary should be read in the light of the above statement.
In the case of any satellite country, if the President is prepared to make a determination that a particular country is no longer under domination or control “by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement,” the United States Government will be in a position to take a number of steps to increase trade and other economic relationships with the particular country [Page 448] involved. It would be possible, for example, to give economic assistance, to enter into PL 480 transactions and to extend most-favored-nation treatment. However, until that determination is made, measures which can be taken are limited. It would not now be possible to make the above determination in the case of Poland.
The Polish Government has indicated that it is not in a position to accept United States economic assistance, though it would be interested in United States credits on account of its investment and consumer needs.3
Attached are specific comments on each of the suggestions which you made in your memorandum of November 1 to Mr. Jackson.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, CFEP Chairman Records. Secret.↩
- On November 1, the Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Paul H. Cullen, addressed a memorandum to Randall suggesting that agricultural surpluses be offered to Poland and Hungary at prevailing dollar prices; that most-favored-nation treatment be extended to them; that their membership in international economic and financial organizations such as GATT and the IBRD be advocated; and that unilateral and multilateral export controls be reviewed with an eye toward their relaxation. (Ibid.) These recommendations were incorporated in Randall’s November 1 memorandum to William H. Jackson. In addition, Randall suggested the negotiation of a treaty of friendship, navigation, and commerce and he also called for a review of the advisability of adjusting existing claims against Hungary and Poland. Copies of the memorandum were sent to the Secretaries of Commerce, State, and Treasury, the Administrator of ICA, and to the President’s Administrative Assistant. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.4841/11–256)↩
- See Document 186.↩
- The Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Henryk Jaroszek, informed the Department of State on July 31, 1956, that his country was still interested in purchasing wheat. (Memorandum of conversation by George Lister, July 31; Department of State, Central Files, 848.49/7–3156)↩
- Title II of 68 Stat. 454 was “Famine Relief and Other Assistance”; Title III was “General Provisions.”↩
- As enacted on June 16, 1951, Public Law 50 (65 Stat. 72) extended the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 for 2 more years dating from June 12, 1951. The Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat. 590) was amended on June 12, 1934 by the addition of Section 350 entitled “Promotion of Foreign Trade” to Title III. (48 Stat. 943)↩
- For text of the treaty with Poland, signed on June 15, 1931, see 48 Stat. 1507.↩
- For text of the treaty with Hungary, signed on June 24, 1925, see 44 Stat. 2441.↩
- Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks replied to Randall on November 16. He thought it might be appropriate to sell Poland surplus agricultural commodities at world dollar prices. If Poland took the initiative, he indicated his receptivity to any effort that nation might take to join international economic and financial organizations. He considered the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation to be premature, because Polish internal conditions precluded agreement on many points the United States believed essential. Finally, he supported opening negotiations to settle outstanding claims. (Eisenhower Library, CFEP Chairman Records, Poland & Hungary File)↩