17. Despatch From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Effect of present Soviet tactics on Czech people and government
The Austrian Treaty,2 Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade3 and the Soviet proposal to establish diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic4 are recent events which must have had some effect on the present government of Czechoslovakia and upon those Czech people who have the time and energy to give much thought to international affairs. The Embassy will endeavor to obtain all information available, prior to the Four Power meeting in July, which will assist the Department in determining how profound the effects of these events are and how we can take advantage of the present fluidity of Soviet diplomacy to promote the cause of freedom in Czechoslovakia.
Our preliminary analysis of the effect of recent developments on the Czechoslovak Government is disappointing. The present regime is beset with economic difficulties, but there is little reason to hope that any member of the Party or Government hierarchy will make any independent economic or political move without clearance by Moscow. Present leadership is stable, docile and unambitious. There does not appear to be any split in the central leadership, as has been reported to be the case in Hungary, and it may be expected that all words and actions in Prague will parrot the Moscow line. The central leadership is completely dependent upon Moscow for its survival and there seems to be no one with enough popular support, ambition or courage to organize or inspire independent thought or action.
With regard to the people, their hopes for a slackening of rigidity of the chains binding them to Moscow have no doubt been increased by the Soviet gestures toward the Yugoslavs and the West Germans. Discontent has unquestionably been sharpened by Soviet overtures to two of the governments which for years they have been instructed to hate. We have found, however, no overt manifestations of disaffection aside from expressions of discontent in private conversations. Our limited contacts with the people reveal interest in current developments [Page 38] with the hope that the Soviet retreat will somehow result in favorable changes in Czechoslovakia. However, there is no disposition to assume risks and popular attitude appears passive.
Given this situation we consider it very unlikely that pressures from within will bring about any dramatic changes in this country at the present time. If the present Soviet tactics have any repercussions here they will be slow in coming and gradual in effect. If Soviet-Yugoslav relations eventually force a change in Soviet policy in the Satellites, Czechoslovakia will follow the lead of others but it will not take the initiative.
This pessimistic viewpoint is not shared by Ivo Vejvoda, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Prague. Since he knows the Czechs better perhaps than any other diplomat stationed here and has many contacts with both the government and the people, his views cannot be discounted. On the other hand, he held an important position in the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade in the 1948–1950 period and no doubt played a part in formulating policies which have so recently been proven themselves. He has been exhilarated by recent events and because of his enthusiasm may over-emphasize their impact here.
The day after Khrushchev’s airport speech5 Vejvoda informed us of the profound effect it had had on both the government and the people. When discussing the subject he repeats the adjectives “enormous” and “tremendous”. In government offices he claims to have heard bureaucrats repeating Khrushchev’s phrases “dear comrade Tito” and “sincerely regret” in jocular tones. He also tells a story of a factory meeting which occurred after Khrushchev’s arrival speech and states that the source of the story is one of the highest trade union functionaries. As he tells it, a factory party secretary was being severely criticized at a meeting for many short-comings. In desperation the secretary defended himself by saying, “Don’t blame me, I was misled by Beria and Abakumov.” Everyone laughed and the meeting adjourned without taking disciplinary action against the secretary. Vejvoda also claims that middle and lower level party leaders are in a quandary as they are being asked embarrassing questions by the rank and file and are receiving no policy guidance from the top.
Cepicka, Novotny and Dolansky attended a recent diplomatic reception and were engaged in serious conversation with Vejvoda for approximately half an hour. He has not related the substance of this conversation to any of my staff and I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss the matter with him. However, he has alluded to the interest with which the Czech leaders read the joint declaration on future relations, especially those sentences concerning respect for sovereignty, compliance with the principle of non-interference in internal [Page 39] affairs and recognition of different forms of socialist development. It is doubted that Cepicka, Novotny, Dolansky or any other present leader wants independence or freedom from Soviet control; and, although Vejvoda has never alleged that they do, he implies that they have been influenced by the respect shown his country by the Soviet Union.
One would assume that if the present Czech regime had an ounce of gumption it would have strong reservations concerning recent Soviet overtures to the German Federal Republic. If Czech leaders were in fact shocked, surprised, or disappointed at the Soviet overtures, their feelings were not revealed in the controlled press. All papers on June 9 carried leading articles on the subject of Czech-German relations and all expressed satisfaction with the Soviet gesture of June 7.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 749.00/6–1455. Confidential. Drafted by Albert W. Sherer, First Secretary and Consul, and Attaché Milan W. Jerabek.↩
- The Austrian State Treaty was signed at Vienna on May 15 and ratified by the Soviet Union on June 11.↩
- See Document 15.↩
- On June 7 the Soviet Union invited West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to come to Moscow to discuss the establishment of diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations.↩
- See Document 15.↩