114. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State1

537. For Under Secretary Hoover. Reference Embtel 535.2 In view Winiewicz response our aid approach and generally unresolved Soviet satellite relationships, now further aggravated by developments in Hungary, believe that, if we do not give publicity, Polish response will in due course be along lines Winiewicz comment reference telegram. On other hand, if we give publicity, Polish reply likely either be couched in temporizing, ambiguous terms to allay Soviet fears that Poland coming under US influence or downrightly unfavorable similar previous responses to aid offers.

In last analysis, question of desirability or undesirability publicity soon depends largely upon Department’s purpose in offering aid at this time. If offer is attempt create further discord between regime and Polish people and between both of these and USSR . . . , then early publicity is desirable as regime in present circumstances will have to decline or temporize and incur ill will Polish people.

On other hand, if objective stems from desire extend some form of aid which would benefit Polish people as whole, notwithstanding our unacceptance regime as representing will Polish people and unwillingness enhance its prestige, then early publicity likely, as indicated above, to create situation which would postpone possibility of such aid for longer period than otherwise might be case.

While on balance, my preference would be that no publicity be given now or until situation here, complicated by events in Hungary, has become somewhat settled and clarified, realize there may be other considerations that require early publicity.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/10–2656. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.
  2. Document 110.