Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

76. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957¹

Washington, October 10, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1656 and 1713)²

Mr. Cutler explained the order in which the various aspects of this item of the agenda would be presented to the members of the Council. He then called on the Director of Central Intelligence for a briefing on the Soviet earth satellite.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that at 1930 hours on October 4 the Soviets had fired their earth satellite from the Tyura Tam range. Its initial path followed the range, crossing approximately over the range’s other end at Klyuchi. Two hours after the successful orbiting of the earth satellite and after the second circuit of the earth by the satellite, the Soviets announced their achievement. This delay in the announcement was in line with the previous statements of the Soviet Union that they would not announce an attempt to orbit their satellite until they had been assured that the orbiting had been successful. Moreover, all the indications available to the intelligence community prior to the actual launching of the satellite pointed to the fact that the Soviets were preparing to launch either an earth satellite or an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mr. Dulles then stated that the actual launching of the earth satellite had not come as a surprise. Indeed as early as last November the intelligence community had estimated that the Soviets would be capable of launching an earth satellite any time after November 1957.

Information on the earth satellite itself remains rather sparse, but it is believed to weigh between 165 and 185 pounds.

The President interrupted to state that the Vice President of the Soviet Scientific Academy had informed Dr. Bronk that someone here had got a decimal point out of place. (There seemed to be no inclination in the Council to question the estimated weight as given by Mr. Dulles.)

Mr. Dulles continued by pointing out that the Soviets had joined together their ICBM and earth satellite programs, which fact helps to explain the speed of the Soviet launching of its earth satellite. We do not as yet know if the satellite is sending out encoded messages. Furthermore, we must expect additional launchings of Soviet earth satellites during the International Geophysical Year. The Soviets have said that they would launch between six and 13 such satellites.

Mr. Dulles then turned to the world reaction to the Soviet achievement. He first pointed out that Khrushchev had moved all his propaganda guns into place. The launching of an earth satellite was one of a trilogy of propaganda moves, the other two being the announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM and the recent test of a large-scale hydrogen bomb at Novaya Zemlya.³ Incidentally, added Mr. Dulles, …. Moreover, there had been another Soviet test late last night, also at Novaya Zemlya, ….

Larded in with Khrushchev’s propaganda statements had been a number of interesting remarks, such as the one in which Khrushchev consigned military aircraft to museums in the future. With respect to this remark, Mr. Dulles pointed out that U.S. intelligence had not observed as many Soviet heavy bombers on airfields as had been expected. This raised the question as to whether the Soviets are in the process of de-emphasizing the role of the heavy bomber. There had been no clear verdict yet by the intelligence community on this question.

Mr. Dulles thought that there was no doubt that in gearing up all this propaganda of recent days and weeks, the Soviets had had an eye to the situation in the Middle East, and wished to exert the maximum influence they could summon on that situation. Much of the Soviet propaganda comment is following closely the original Soviet boast relating their scientific accomplishments to the effectiveness of the Communist social system. The target for this particular thrust, thought Mr. Dulles, was evidently the underdeveloped nations in the world. He informed members of the Council that he had copies of an FBIS summary of Soviet comment,⁴ which were available to any who wished to have them.

The Chinese Communist reaction was to declare quickly that the launching of the earth satellite was proof of Soviet military and scientific supremacy over the United States. Maximum play on this theme was being provided in all the Soviet satellites.

Thereafter, Mr. Dulles touched on the reactions in Western Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that the Soviet Union was making a major propaganda effort which was exerting a very wide and deep impact.

[Here follow comments by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and others on the United States earth satellite program; for text, see volume XI, page 758.]

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Herter for an appraisal of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the successful launching of the Soviet satellite. Secretary Herter initially stated that it was extremely difficult to make such an assessment because there was such a mass of information pouring into the Department of State. While there had been insufficient time to analyze this intake, there were already some indications of the serious effects of the Soviet success which we hope to be able to counteract.

Thereafter, Secretary Herter read selected quotations to illustrate his point, with particular reference to Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines. He also pointed out the probable repercussions of the Soviet success in the United Nations. The United States may now encounter much greater difficulty in defending its disarmament position.

By and large, continued Secretary Herter, the reaction of our allies had been pretty firm and good, though even the best of them require assurance that we have not been surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR. The neutralist countries are chiefly engaged in patting themselves on the back and insisting that the Soviet feat proves the value and the wisdom of the neutralism which these countries have adopted.

Summing up, Secretary Herter described the first foreign policy reactions as “pretty somber”. The United States will have to do a great deal to counteract them and, particularly, to confirm the existence of our own real military and scientific strength.

Governor Stassen enlarged somewhat on the repercussions in the United Nations. He believed it was yet too soon to measure these repercussions with any assurance, but already the first surprise was settling down and the diplomats in the UN have begun to realize that the fundamentals of the world situation have not been changed—namely, that the capability for mutual annihilation still exists. Governor Stassen doubted whether there would be any quick shifts among UN members.

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Larson, who said that he was hesitant to say what he was going to say because he was not sure that he really believed it. He then went on to say that while we could not permit ourselves to be panicked by the Soviet achievement, he did wonder whether our U.S. plans were now adequate with regard to the next great break-through. If we lose repeatedly to the Russians as we have lost with the earth satellite, the accumulated damage would be tremendous. We should accordingly plan, ourselves, to accomplish some of the next great break-throughs first—for example, the achievement of a manned satellite, or getting to the moon. Do we have any such plans, asked Mr. Larson. If not, our people should begin to think about them.

The President replied to Mr. Larson by stating that while he could hardly quarrel with Mr. Larson’s conclusions if the Soviets were to win every time, the fact remained that the United States couldn’t possibly set up a whole vast scientific program of basic research in areas about which we don’t know anything, and then attempt to outdo the Russians in each aspect of such a program. We must, above all, still seek a military posture that the Russians will respect.

The Vice President inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles whether it was possible to provide estimates of the amounts of money allocated to basic research by the United States in comparison with the USSR. [Name deleted] answering for Mr. Dulles, could not give a clear response, though he could not say that the Russians had put in more resources than we have. Mr. Dulles said that at least the Soviets have concentrated more heavily on the guided missiles field than we have, ever since 1945. The President, agreeing with Mr. Dulles, pointed out that the United States had not made any all-out effort in the field of ballistic missiles until after the Killian Committee had submitted its report to the National Security Council.⁵ He added that of course the Soviets were bound to be ahead of the United States in certain fields and in certain discoveries.

The Vice President warned the Council that we must be prepared for the fact that Congress would insist on examining in great detail what we have been doing in the missiles field. In the course of such an examination they are certain to ask the question which he had just put—as to the relative amounts which the United States and the USSR had allocated to their respective missiles programs. Accordingly, we must be prepared to answer such a question.

After Mr. Larson had reiterated his plea for planning for a U.S. win in the next great break-through, Dr. Bronk commented that, in line with Mr. Larson’s views, the United States could, if it chose, give much greater emphasis to the spectacular achievements that we have made in the scientific field—for example, we could stress our vast achievements in the field of cancer research. Regrettably, it was hard to get the press to take an interest in these achievements. Mr. Cutler suggested that we might perhaps have announced the successful launching of a U.S. missile with a range of 3500 miles. Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Operations Coordinating Board was presently engaged in examining our public relations policies with respect to our missiles programs. General Twining cautioned that we should not permit ourselves to become hysterical about the Soviet achievement.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Discussed the subject in the light of:

(1) An intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite, its relation to the Soviet ballistic missiles program, and world reaction to the Soviet earth satellite.

(2) A briefing by the Department of Defense on the information regarding the Soviet earth satellite obtained by scientific tracking, and on the status of the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520.

(3) Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, on the scientific implications of the Soviet earth satellite.

(4) An appraisal by the Department of Defense of the military implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

(5) An appraisal by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

b. Noted the statement by the President on the subject issued at his press conference on October 9, 1957;⁷ and the President’s statement at this meeting of the importance of adhering to the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 as being well-reasoned and deliberately planned.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information and guidance to all holders of NSC 5520.

[Here follows discussion of “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs”, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, and “Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11. The discussion of item 1 is also printed in vol. XI, pp. 757–764. The text printed here includes material not previously released for publication in volume XI.
2. NSC 5520 is printed ibid., p. 723. For texts of NSC Action Nos. 1656 and 1713, see ibid., footnote 8, p. 747, and footnote 6, p. 753, respectively.
3. See Document 73. On September 24, the Soviet Government announced that nuclear tests were being conducted in connection with army and navy combat training.
4. Not further identified.
5. Reference is to the Killian report of February 14, 1955.
6. Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1799. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148)
7. For text of the President’s comments at his press conference on October 9, as well as text of the statement issued by the President at the time on the U.S. space exploration program, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 719–735.