68. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
44. Department pass Defense. In unusual procedure Soldatov called me personally to Foreign Office July 6 to inform me clearance had been granted for Ambassador Thompson’s plane fly Moscow July 10 and return July 12.
He then said purpose of calling me was to refer once again to his statement at time Ambassador Bohlen’s plane last cleared, i.e., if Soviet Government desired to send a Soviet plane to US on similar occasion, request would meet with “positive” response from US Government. (Embtel 2343, April 15.)2
I asked Soldatov whether Soviets had in mind plane for use Soviet Ambassador exclusively and whether he had at this time specific request to make. He replied Soviet Government was only now “studying” question; it had no specific request to make at moment; Soviet plane might be for use Soviet Ambassador or for important delegations such as Soviet Delegation to UN. In reply my direct question he said he did not expect specific reply this matter now but merely desired “express hope” that if specific request made in future it would meet with US agreement.
Obvious from manner in which this question has been raised twice in succession that Soviets are seriously considering request to send Soviet plane to US for official purposes at least in next few months. Question of what type of plane they would or could use and alternative routes are technical questions which Department may wish to discuss with Air Force. When I referred in conversation with Soldatov to fact that during war Soviet planes had flown to US via Alaska and inquired whether they had any particular route in mind, he confined his reply to restating they were only studying matter.
We suggest that this matter be given thorough study and that Department be prepared to answer specific Soviet request at any time in near future. Soviet practice with regard use Ambassador’s plane here is to require at least ten days prior notice.
Tying request for agreement in principle to flights to Moscow of Ambassador’s special aircraft, Soviets have made it perfectly plain that refusal would result automatically in immediate cessation of privilege we have long enjoyed. Aside from Air Force considerations, result would be loss of this means to bring in classified material not [Page 146] physically suitable for transmission by pouch, inconvenience to Ambassador and loss of highly desirable logistic support for Embassy to say nothing of unfavorable publicity in view number of years we have exercised this privilege.