40. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2316. This is companion to Embtel 2300,2 and is specific appraisal current treatment of STALIN based on latest authoritative Soviet statements (editorial current issue Kommunist and Pravda article April 5—Embtel 22783).
While yet impracticable here to try answer many questions on this development (e.g. precisely when and under what circumstances decision taken to launch frontal attack on STALIN), seems reasonably clear that party leaders pursuing three broad goals:
- 1.
- Leadership undoubtedly calculated campaign would facilitate restoration “Leninist norms party life,” infusing new vigor into party structure which (particularly on intermediate and lower levels) had withered under STALIN. In words Kommunist, “ignoring by STALIN of norms party life, collective leadership led to violations internal party democracy, lowering of activity of Communists, their initiative, independence, retarded development criticism and self criticism”. In sense, move is shock treatment, reaching new heights in post STALIN efforts to revitalize party. Purpose made clear by Kommunist: “Internal party democracy is not end in itself, but means for developing energy, activity of Communists, for mobilizing them for fulfillment economic and cultural plans”.
- 2.
- By disassociating themselves from and condemning arbitrary acts of STALIN, party leaders probably hope to win wider active support from key groups in Soviet population (e.g. cultural, managerial, scientific, military). They seek to convince both these groups and ordinary citizen that “democratic” party rule has replaced one man dictatorship forever. Move has further advantage of helping establish present collective leadership as proper, legitimate successor Lenin.
- 3.
- Finally, by repudiating certain aspects of Stalinism and presenting themselves as Leninist “democrats”, they may hope simultaneously to remove onus which brutalities Stalinism placed on party of world opinion and to narrow gap between Western social democracy (Titoism) and Soviet Communism.
Party leadership can reasonably be expected to achieve some success toward these goals. Its effect on certain segments of population non-Communist world, coupled with flexible foreign policy and deft manipulation propaganda symbols, should help USSR in its world diplomacy. Within Soviet Union, campaign should appeal among key groups mentioned above, not only because STALIN deflated but (perhaps more important) because it makes more convincing assertions Soviet leaders that police terror as it existed under STALIN is thing of past. Additionally, campaign will probably create atmosphere conducive to more realistic discussion of internal economic and social problems and may stimulate—as intended—greater local initiative. Finally, psychological-ideological barrier to reestablishment personal dictatorship raised by campaign must be regarded as one of its most significant substantive results.
On other hand, campaign poses certain real and potential problems for regime, though it is impracticable at this time to assess precisely their impact and this aspect must be approached with great caution. Nonetheless, following items deserve mention (subject to overall reservations in conclusion this message):
Party leadership runs risk of encouraging freedom thought, expression beyond intended limits, of creating or reinforcing doubts concerning party as infallible. Pravda editorial April 5 (tone of which somewhat defensive) makes clear that under “guise of condemning personality cult”, at least few party members have already given vent to “anti-party statements”, while others have taken “liberal attitude” towards these offenders. Pravda wailing may dampen further public expression “anti party statements” among party rank and file, but will it provide convincing answer to questions and doubts underlying such statements? This connection intelligent Russian contact of Western diplomat here recently asserted that campaign has shaken “faith” average Soviet in party and its leadership (has there been some miscalculation of impact?).
- 2.
- Senior members of Presidium in shaping course also place selves in exposed position. Abroad it is easy to point to hypocrisy these people and foreign Communists, but internal impact can be far more important. It is recalled in speeches at 20th Congress (which by nature is form for agreed policy presentation) Voroshilhov only member of party Presidium (except Kirichenko) who failed to criticize personality cult, while Molotov [garble] relatively weak in their condemnation. At least seven members party Presidium cannot escape fact they were STALIN’s creatures and tools during many of actions now criticized. This thought must come to minds of many Soviet citizens. And if repudiation of STALIN carried far enough, [Page 93] implication of these henchmen could be used in future by rising generation in party.
- 3.
- Process of repudiating certain methods or institutions of STALIN renders more difficult their future utilization by present leadership, in event this deemed necessary in time of stress.
Above is summary certain real gains and losses involved for party dictatorship. Without prejudging sum result this much can be said, there is no reason to believe that losses will have any significant immediate effect on Soviet political and social structure; they were apparent to leaders; anti-STALIN consistent with current Soviet internal, external policies and latest sign of confidence on party leadership (unconfirmed report is effect leadership considered initiating campaign as early as 1954 but concluded move premature) no evidence yet course completed, but that it logical in series of efforts since STALIN’s death to rationalize party dictatorship but also introduces new, dynamic element with possible far reaching consequences.