Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

39. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 9, 1956—7 p.m.

2300. This telegram and following message² (which will contain reference to present one) are companion pieces designed as of possible use during Ambassador’s consultation. Present message seeks to present general picture of post-20th Congress period, while next one will deal more specifically with most important element of so-called campaign against personality cult and will also endeavor to identify some of new problems which present solutions of old problems may produce.

I. Where STALIN is himself criticized in current line, it is because of specific errors attributed to him, errors which it is implied party, had it been able, would not have permitted. These errors were serious primarily in sense they diverted or slowed progress of Soviet Union or increased risks to it. STALIN’s “constructive” achievements, i.e. whenever he consulted leadership, are still separated and preserved. It is more plausible, therefore, to consider campaign anti-Stalinism rather than anti-STALIN.

II. Destruction of myth of Stalinist infallibility and invulnerability transfers to party legality, morality and omniscience. This, as reported before, provides ideological underpinning for party necessary as backdrop and to justify party decisions and actions of government responsive thereto.

It is as necessary to these people as to other societies that policy be based upon some standard of morality, ethics or faith; it is constitutional foundation which even most arbitrary of governments seem to need to justify itself.

III. Unified field theory of Soviet action seems to be borne out by developments. While needs of internal situation and of purposes of party seem to have immediately preponderant role in shaping new postures, external effects are not absent.

A. As to internal side, motives while in most instances still obscure seem to be divided into two categories.

1. Internal compulsions. These would include such problems as agricultural yields, productivity of industrial labor, and very importantly, the loosened relationships within Presidium inherent in collective leadership. Well-being of Soviet citizens which for a large percentage fall short of their aspirations and which during Stalinist forced draft were pretty much ignored, must also be present as consideration. It can be moreover imagined that professional military pride which had been deeply injured by purges and by STALIN’s assumption of credit for winning war has been a factor taken into account at least by leaders in weighing effects of present movement. Also, fact that system has held together despite demise of the autocrat suggests that party, bureaucratic and professional classes (especially those advanced rapidly into vacancies created by purges) have developed vested interest in privileges and positions attained in regime, contributing to its stability, and have some means to make their voice heard. It might also be expected that intellectual curiosity unsatisfied by strictly controlled availability of scholastic and technical material has created restiveness in growing numbers of students and younger professional people.

2. Internal purposes. At same time, thanks to proven stability of regime and demonstrated workability of collective leadership (crisis of succession in any case has been weathered), leadership has found itself sufficiently strong to take certain measures of its own will to counter-act and overcome its inherited shortcomings. While ends may be unclear to outsiders, it is unlikely that they differ greatly from what they were under STALIN, but progress towards these ends under Stalinist system was often slowed, arrested or reversed. One of important effects of Stalinism was lethargy and mediocrity engendered in state and party bureaucracy and discouragement of initiative and spontaneity in arts, professions and technology. Undoubtedly present moves are designed to. encourage initiative and provide incentives in order to increase material and intellectual output.

B. External factors. Realization that course STALIN had been pursuing would only increase risk of war, and honest appraisal of nuclear equation that was incompatible with principle of infallibility and invulnerability necessary to STALIN must have had important influence on present leadership. These people are sensitive to foreign reactions to estimates of their own intentions and are able, where STALIN was not, to behave in manner designed for favorable foreign impact. It cannot very well have escaped them that STALIN’s rigidity, suspicions and brutality were mainly responsible for fear abroad of Soviet Union, and for military and political counter measures taken abroad. If this fear can be dispelled more auspicious atmosphere might be built for historic developments which as Marxist leaders of Soviet Union feel must in time take place. Realistic strategic concepts that Soviet Government now gives signs of accepting indicate that modern war, i.e. destruction of Soviet resources and base of power, would advance neither their national interests nor Marxism.

IV. As to loosened relationship within Presidium (referred to above) its effects must be felt down lines of command; in Soviet relationships with Chinese Communists and satellites, and in those with countries of rest of world. This is less a calculated effect than psychological one, but even so it is extremely important one to recognize since it does not in any way represent lessened hostility toward United States and “reactionary” societies. Conviction of leadership here in “rightness”, strength and stability of system and in Marxist theory of history is no weaker, and is probably stronger. Willingness to “compete” in so-called peaceful co-existence starts from borders outward, never inward, of expanded empire inherited from STALIN. There is no sign of intent to move back from these borders. Competition they envisage is either in uncommitted areas or among populations of our allies, under new and, it must be admitted, more sensible set of ground rules. Undoubtedly Soviets have also in mind, without factor being controlling one, appeal to so-called progressive elements in West who were unable to stomach Stalinist brutalities, of mystique of daring reform movement credited to Lenin.

V. Cumulative documentation of the new line indicates that leadership has taken account of problems to arise from shift away from measures of repression toward incentives and indoctrination. Present movement is cautious, each step seems to be tested by measuring its contribution to envisaged ends against new problems it generates. When they speak of democratic centralism involving two antagonistic concepts, they are speaking of relative emphasis rather than of clear cut principle.

(These inbuilt problems were manifest at Writers’ Congress and more recent Architects’ Congress, and crack few days ago at provincial press for lack of originality; exhortations to creativeness coupled with warnings against departures from lines laid down from the top or violations of discipline.)

In sum, the place is in motion, but there is no evidence as yet that problem of stimulating initiative has been reconciled with necessity of preserving discipline.

Walmsley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–956. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn and pouched to posts in Eastern Europe.
2. Telegram 2316, infra.