352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1
1339. In reply to memo contained in your 11232 you should deliver following memorandum to Prime Minister Menderes at earliest opportunity.
“The Turkish Memorandum of November 14 has been given most careful study by the United States Government. The United States fully appreciates the potential dangers to which the Turkish Government has referred, and wishes to assure its Turkish allies once more of the steadfastness of its friendship and of its earnest desire to consult regularly on such matters of mutual interest and concern.
The United States is glad to note that the Turkish Government in its memorandum has posed its grave questions in the light of the long standing Turkish-American relationship and the common problems of the NATO alliance. The plans that are to be made and the [Page 705] action that is to be taken should of course be fully consonant with the interests, plans and actions of NATO.
The United States agrees with the Turkish view regarding the potential dangers of a Soviet policy of encirclement and isolation. Already the American Ambassador in Ankara has transmitted to the Turkish Government an estimate of the particular dangers in Syria. The United States would like to maintain hereafter an exchange of information and views on this subject, both bilaterally and in the North Atlantic Council. It is noted that the Turkish memorandum refers in some detail to the situation in Syria. The United States would be interested in learning more precisely what the Turkish Government might have in mind.
It has also been noted that various reports of actual Soviet penetration into Syria in the form of military personnel and quantities of Soviet military equipment, particularly aircraft, have considerably exaggerated the actual situation as we understand it to be. Discounting these exaggerated reports, there nevertheless remains a situation which is the cause of serious concern, the main factor at present being the apparent influence of military elements in Syria who seem to be favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union, and the tendency of the Syrians to look to the Soviet Government for support.
It is obvious that the Soviet Union has capitalized upon the Egyptian situation to increase the fears of the Syrians that hostile forces are threatening them, and to claim that the Soviets are their primary source of security. This presents a situation which is difficult to cope with, but it is our estimate that it will be far easier to deal with it as there is a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt and an increase of confidence that hostilities will not recur. In these circumstances the atmosphere for a change in the trends in Syria might be more propitious.
The dangers that face Iran are likewise clear to the United States Government. The United States has, in its communiqué of November 29, 1956,3 already made clear its stout support of the Baghdad Pact and the grave view the United States would take of a threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of the members of the Pact. Moreover, it should be clear to all that if Iran again becomes the object of aggressive Soviet designs as it was in 1946 the United States will, as it did then, lend its influence and full support to United Nations action to check aggression. The determination of this Government to cooperate fully with the United Nations in such matters has been so amply demonstrated in Korea that it does not require further elucidation. We are, of course, continuing substantial economic and [Page 706] military aid to Iran and shall demonstrate in all feasible ways our interest in the welfare and security of that country.
In dealing thus with the problems of the flanks of Turkey, the United States does not underestimate the central problem of the defense of Turkey itself. Appreciating the need for more effective air defense measures, the United States is prepared to explore ways to contribute to the solution of this problem.
Regarding the ‘coordination of cooperation’ in NATO, the United States Government reiterates to the Turkish Government its resolution to join its allies in taking the action called for under the North Atlantic Treaty against armed attack on Turkey. Agreed NATO procedures, in our view, cover the measures for coordinating action under the treaty.
In setting forth these views and intentions, the United States Government wishes to express once more its appreciation for the frankness and spirit of confidence which have marked the Turkish Government’s Memorandum and to assure the Turkish Government of its willingness to undertake further consultations upon these problems of serious mutual interest.”4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–1456. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Williams and Jones. Repeated to Moscow, London, Athens, Paris for USRO and Knight, Rome for McSweeney, and Tehran.↩
- Dated November 14. (Ibid.)↩
- For text of the U.S. statement, issued by the Department of State as a press release, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918.↩
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On December 18, in telegram 1442, the Embassy replied to this telegram:
“Anticipate Turk authorities here may approach U.S. re promise to Menderes that U.S. prepared explore ways contribute to solution problem more effective air defense measures for Turkey.
“Would appreciate guidance as to response to be made any such approach particularly with reference when, where and who Turks should consult.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–1856)
In telegram 1438, December 20, the Department informed the Embassy at Ankara:
“Defense is studying possible measures to assist Turkey in air defense. Until present study completed specific guidance must be delayed.
“Meanwhile if Turks raise question report fully but do not take initiative at this time in discussing matter with them.
“Defense concurs.” (Ibid., 782.5/12–2056)
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