Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

351. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

Washington, November 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Turkish Memorandum of November 15, 1956²

The Turkish memorandum describing the dangers with which Turkey is now beset and asking how we intend to cooperate with her, makes essentially the following principal points:

(a) Turkey describes herself as being “stabbed in the back,” and expects at the very least active undeclared and local warfare on the part of the USSR in the Middle East.

(b) The Turks are deeply concerned over the adverse developments in Syria and over the exposed position and military weakness of Iran.

(c) Turkey feels that it should warn the USSR on overflights but lacks the aircraft potential to make her warning effective; it desires United States support in a warning to the Soviet Union.

(d) Turkey feels a general need for appropriate action, coordination of efforts and exchange of information to meet the Soviet threats.

(e) High level United States consideration and comment on the foregoing is urgently sought. The British have been informed by the Turks of this approach.

There follows for your information our preliminary reaction to this Turkish approach.

(a) As we see it, the Turkish estimate of the situation indicates that the Turks are more concerned than the circumstances warrant. It is clear that, associated with their pessimistic view of developments, is a Turkish feeling that there should be a fuller exchange of views on our respective estimates of the situation. To meet that problem we believe arrangements should be made for a weekly or bi-weekly exchange of intelligence information with the Turks in Ankara.

(b) The Turks are deeply worried over their Iranian and Syrian flanks and over Turkey’s possible isolation and encirclement. Their concern over Iran is in the context of our failure to make a commitment for Iran’s defense, through the mechanism of the Baghdad Pact, similar to that for Greece and Turkey’s defense through NATO, and Pakistan’s defense through SEATO. If we are not going to join the Baghdad Pact, the development of alternative means for providing security assurances to Iran, and thus reassuring Turkey, must be given active and high-priority consideration. Among the alternatives are direct bilateral arrangements or through SEATO. As you know, this matter is being given urgent study by the Department and joint discussions with Defense are to be held on Monday.

(c) Turkish concern over Syria is in the context of Russian penetration there. We feel that their note is an invitation to the discussion of positive measures toward effecting a change of government in Syria. The Syrian situation is being urgently evaluated here and, based on this evaluation, we plan to convey soonest to the Turks appropriate information thereon. The question of alterations in the government of Syria and the desirability of consulting with the Turks on this matter, are also matters calling for urgent consideration. It should be noted that there is some basis to fear that the main purpose of the Turkish memorandum might be to put the United States on notice that the Turks are considering action in Syria, and thus minimize criticism on our part if they should proceed.

(d) The present Turkish concern is prompted in part by their belief that there are now numerous Russian overflights of Turkey.… There is a clear need for better aircraft detection facilities in Turkey and it is recommended as a minimum that current radar construction programs there under MDAP be accelerated. This is being taken up with Defense.

(e) The question of aircraft support has been raised informally by the Turks on several occasions during the last two weeks but they have not yet specifically addressed such a request to the United States. We have told the Turks that the matter of “American aircraft for Turkey” is under study. In view of the possibility of such a formal request being received soon, we believe that this general problem of detection and interception capability in Turkey should be given very high priority by the JCS.

(f) Turkey traditionally has sought to deal with the United States bilaterally on any questions where multilateral organizations are involved. To resort to bilateral arrangements of this sort out of the context of NATO would invite other NATO countries to request similar bilateral arrangements. The Turks appear to feel rebuffed over NATO’s refusal thus far to interpret overflights of Turkey as a basis for invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and would seem now anxious to obtain satisfaction from us.

(g) We do not believe that we should accede to the Turk request that we give public support to any warnings that they give to the Russians on the question of overflights. It would be imprudent to give such warnings in the absence of what we regard as definite confirmation, and in any event we should not give such bilateral assurances out of the context of existing NATO arrangements.

(h) Since the British have been informed by the Turks of this approach to us, we should perhaps consult with the British before responding.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/11–1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Jones, Williams, and Rountree.
2. Transmitted in telegram 1123 from Ankara, November 14. (Ibid.,684A.86/ 11–1456)

3. On November 20, MacArthur sent the following memorandum to Hoover:

   “I mentioned to the President this morning the recent memorandum we had received from the Turks, which he had seen. I said we were actively studying what we could do to meet the Turkish apprehensions, and said that specifically we were tentatively thinking about having weekly or bi-weekly intelligence exchanges with the Turks in Ankara; we were thinking about strengthening their radar screen; that while we did not believe it desirable to join the Baghdad Pact, we were thinking about some kind of a declaration which would be helpful not only with the Turks but with the Iranians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis; and finally, that we had asked the Department of Defense to study the question of whether additional US interceptor aircraft might be made available to the Turks. I made clear that our study was still in the preliminary stage but we had the problem under active consideration.” (Ibid., 782.5/11–2056)