Office of the Historian

275. Memorandum of a Conversation, Hotel Bristol, Paris, December 19, 1957, 3:15 p.m.1

Paris, December 19, 1957, 3:15 p.m.

USDel/MC/34

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Rockwell
  • Greece
    • Prime Minister Constantin Karamanlis
    • Foreign Minister Evanghelos Averoff-Tossitza
    • Mr. George Melas, Greek Ambassador in Washington

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

Prime Minister Karamanlis said that something had to be done to solve the Cyprus problem. Because of it Greece was in conflict with its allies and because of it it was hard for the Greek Government to oppose the Communists at home. The US must intervene decisively. The Greek solution would meet the interests of Greece, Turkey, the UK and the Cypriot population. Greece was willing to give guarantees regarding the latter.

The Secretary inquired whether Greece was working with Mr. Spaak. Mr. Karamanlis said that he had talked with Mr. Spaak [Page 526] yesterday and that Mr. Spaak agreed that partition was no solution. He favored a solution on the basis of independence. …

Mr. Averoff said that the US was the only power which could bring about a solution. Mr. Spaak had said that the UK was willing to accept independence for Cyprus, but not Turkey. That was why Greece was asking for US help in connection with the problem of the Turkish attitude.

Mr. Karamanlis was sure that next year a majority of the UN would vote for independence for Cyprus. He said that he was in severe trouble at home over Cyprus, facing eight opposition parties, the Communists, Makarios, and the Cypriots. …

The Secretary said he could understand why Greece felt it had to bring the Cyprus matter before the UN. We did not think the UN could solve it, and it was for this reason that we were not sympathetic to the UN approach, not because of our views on the merits of the Greek position. Emotional forces made a solution difficult. The Secretary told Mr. Karamanlis that he admired how he had conducted himself in the face of domestic political pressures. We recognized him as a real friend of the US, and we were trying to be a real friend of Greece. This did not mean, however, that we would do what we thought was wrong—to coerce another friendly country. We did not use our aid programs in this way. Furthermore, we had no mandate to settle the Cyprus problem, not that we were asking for one. We would like to help, but we could only do so through appeal to reason on both sides. The Secretary thought that if all the parties would put down what they wanted and why they wanted it, the “whys” could be reconciled.

The Secretary said that Mr. Spaak had a mandate of sorts to reconcile differences between NATO members. We were prepared to encourage him.

Ambassador Melas stated that just a display of interest with Turkey would be helpful. The Secretary replied that the President spoke with Prime Minister Menderes yesterday about Cyprus and that he, the Secretary, was going to see Mr. Menderes that very afternoon after his appointment with Mr. Karamanlis.

The Prime Minister said that Cyprus was the last part of Europe under colonial rule. This was intolerable.

Mr. Averoff said the Secretary should tell Mr. Menderes that partition is something rejected by everybody but Turkey. He should be made to be less sticky on this. Greece, for example, had proposed three or four possible approaches. Greece badly wanted the re-establishment of good relations with Turkey in order to be able better to withstand the pressure of the Slavs on the East Mediterranean.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 953. Secret.↩